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Through the 1950s and 1960s, American news correspondents working in 
Moscow had come to befriend many of the Soviet dissidents.  This friendship was 
realized in the American press, where there was an explosion of news coverage on the 
dissidents. Through this news coverage, American interest groups and politicians 
became interested in the plight of the Soviet dissidents and began to demand that their 
government make human rights an essential part of its foreign policy.  American 
politicians challenged the Nixon administration’s policy of détente by seeking to link 
trade with the Soviet Union to its human rights practices.  By 1976, the Moscow Helsinki 
Watch Group and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe were 
established to monitor the Soviet government’s compliance with the human rights 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.  This represented the first time Soviet dissidents and 
American politicians directly communicated on issues related to human rights.
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FORGING A DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
In May 1976 the two most important bodies charged with monitoring the Soviet 
Union’s compliance with the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
were established.  These were the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, a Moscow-based non-
governmental organization run by a small group of academic-minded acquaintances, and 
from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the US Helsinki 
Commission.  This was a congressionally mandated committee charged with monitoring
the Soviet Union’s compliance with regard to the Helsinki Final Act. The existence of 
these groups marked the first time in history where there was a direct line of 
communication about human rights between dissidents in the Soviet Union and policy 
makers in the American Congress. The US Helsinki Commission gave the dissidents a 
forum in the West, since it was the task of the Commission to recommend policy to the 
rest of Congress and the President given the reports and testimony it often received from 
the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.  For Soviet dissidents, this dialogue with the West 
on human rights was a major victory.  They finally had the attention of a powerful and 
receptive audience in the West that could potentially negotiate with the Soviet Union on 
their behalf.  This dialogue with the West also led the Soviet dissident movement to 
become even more dependent on the West for its own survival, as what was essentially a 
homegrown dissident movement became increasingly reliant on the help of America and 
Americans.  This growing dependence on the help of Americans for the survival of the 
dissident movement was mirrored by an increase in the relevance of the concept of 
human rights in American foreign policy, a notion that by 1976 came to dominate the 
2
political discourse in the United States with regard to relations with the Soviet Union.  
The establishment of this direct line of communication after the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act was also important because it was the culmination of a two decade long
departure from an atmosphere where both American policy makers and the Soviet 
dissidents were not at all interested in reaching out to one another. In the past, the Soviet 
dissidents had rarely considered reaching out to the West, just as many American policy 
makers had by and large been disinterested in the plight of the Soviet dissidents.  
For many Soviet dissidents, the idea of reaching out to the West was initially seen
as unnecessary, if not treasonous.  Many initially felt that dissatisfaction with the regime 
was something that was not the business of outsiders.  This was a sentiment clearly 
expressed by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a prominent member of the human rights movement 
in the Soviet Union, who recoiled on learning that one of her colleagues was publishing 
literature abroad, also known at the time as tamizdat.  Alexeyeva recalled in her memoirs 
writing, that “It was one thing to tell the truth at home.  It was something else to tell it to 
outsiders, many of whom were genuine enemies of our country.”1  Initially, many Soviet
dissidents genuinely believed that the Soviet government was interested in their demands, 
and therefore did not see any need to enlist the aid of foreigners, as was later the case.  
Several scholars in fact have suggested that this initial disinterest in reaching out to the 
West stemmed from both a lack of contact with foreigners as well as a Russian political 
tradition of deals struck behind closed doors and societal problems rarely discussed in an 
open public forum.2  
                                                
1 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post Stalin 
Era (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 113.
2 Richard N. Dean, “Contacts with the West: The Dissidents’ View of Western Support for the 
Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union” Universal Human Rights 2, no. 1 (Jan. – March, 1980): 49-
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Just as the Soviet dissidents were initially reluctant to receive help from the West;
many American policy makers were similarly disinterested in helping the dissidents.  
Between the 1950s and 1970s, it was generally the attitude of the US State Department
that the US could do little to affect the situation faced by dissidents and ethnic minorities 
persecuted in the Soviet Union.  Frederick G. Dutton, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations, indicated in a 1962 letter that, “It is very difficult for our 
Government to contribute to the direct solution of the problems of minorities in a territory 
where a foreign sovereign government exercises full control.” It was further believed 
that intervention on behalf these groups would make matters far worse for them by 
further alienating them from Soviet society, and that the best approach was for non-
governmental organizations to raise the issue.3  This attitude remained the official 
position of the US Government through the early and mid 1970s, where it became a main 
feature of President Richard M. Nixon’s, and his National Security Adviser (later 
Secretary of State), Dr. Henry Kissinger’s, policy of détente with the Soviet Union.
Through détente, both President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger wished to utilize their working 
relationship with the Soviet leadership to promote stable relations through fostering trade 
as well as acknowledging the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Soviet government and 
its institutions.  It was believed by the Nixon administration that such an understanding 
and working relationship with the Soviets would work towards America’s advantage, 
especially with regard toward promoting American interests elsewhere in the world, such 
                                                                                                                                                
50; Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 
2009), 88-90; Zhores A. Medvedev, The Medvedev Papers: Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the 
World: and, Secrecy of Correspondence is Guaranteed by Law (London: Macmillan; New York: St. 
Martins, 1971), 298.
3 Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to Senator 
Kenneth B. Keating, July 11, 1962 in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1961-1963, Vol. V: Soviet Union (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 211 (hereafter FRUS, with appropriate 
year, volume, and page number).
4
as in Vietnam and the Middle East.  Attention to controversial issues, such as human 
rights, would only bring harm to the working relationship with the Soviet Union and 
therefore such issues were best handled out of the public sphere, behind closed doors and 
through quiet diplomacy.
The subsequent rapprochement between the Soviet Union’s dissident movement 
and American policy makers was started with a dialogue that actually began first between 
Soviet dissidents and American foreign news correspondents based in Moscow.  Much 
like the Soviet dissidents, foreign news correspondents working in the Soviet Union had 
their freedom of speech and movement severely restricted by the Soviet government, 
which controlled what it was the correspondent could and could not report.  Therefore,
many American journalists in Moscow felt alienated and repressed in many of the same 
ways Soviet dissidents did.  The catalyst for the rapprochement between the journalists 
and the dissidents was the 1966 trial of Soviet writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavskii, 
which drew unprecedented Western media attention to the situation faced by the Soviet 
dissidents.  According to both historians and the dissidents themselves, the Sinyavskii–
Daniel trial was the moment where the Soviet dissident movement evolved from a small 
group of friends and into a movement with powerful political connections in the West by 
reaching out to Western journalists for help.4  These contacts between Western journalists 
and the Moscow-based dissident movement allowed the West to become aware of the 
relatively small human rights movement in the Soviet Union, while offering the 
dissidents a receptive audience with political leverage over the Soviet government.  The 
                                                
4 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 131; Paul Goldberg, The Final Act: The 
Dramatic, Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1998), 28; Barbara Walker, “Moscow Human Rights Defenders Look West: Attitudes Toward 
U.S. Journalists in the 1960s and 1970s,” Kritika 9, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 913; Phillip Boobbyer, Conscience, 
Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia (New York: Routledge, 2005), 77.
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close personal and professional relationships nurtured between Western journalists and
the dissidents resulted in a flood of news coverage on the dissident movement in the 
West.  This exposure caught the attention of the American public and American policy 
makers who were drawn to stories of these freedom fighters going up against the Soviet 
government.  Many politicians also found the issues of human rights and dissent much 
easier to articulate and discuss before voters than the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente, 
which many critics felt was apologetic towards the Soviet Union with regard to human 
rights.  A real relationship developed between American politicians who were seeking to 
help Soviet dissidents achieve the same rights Americans enjoyed at home, while 
bolstering their own political agenda by trumpeting the dissident issue.  All the while, the 
Soviet dissidents were eager to have these advocates abroad lobbying on their behalf.
The evolution of this dialogue on human rights was formalized through American 
legislative efforts and changes in the way the dissident community in the Soviet Union 
organized itself and eventually made sustained contact with the West their exclusive goal.  
Soviet dissidents became focused on maintaining their contacts with the West, through 
authoring samizdat, or internally self-published, pamphlets such as Khronika tekushchikh 
sobytiy, or the Chronicle of Current Events and the press releases and documents issued 
by the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.  On the American side, the formalization of a 
human rights agenda resulted in legislative actions such as the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, and the formation of the US Helsinki Commission in 
1976.  Both pieces of legislation were opposed by the Nixon, and later Ford 
administrations, because they challenged détente and they sought to force the American 
Government to take a stand with regard to human rights.  Both the Jackson Amendment 
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and the US Helsinki Commission were widely supported by the dissident movement in 
the Soviet Union, which believed that both pieces of legislation would shore up their 
position viz a viz Soviet authorities.
The 1975 Helsinki Accords and the push for the creation of Helsinki monitoring 
groups in the Soviet Union and in the United States completed the formalization of this 
dialogue on human rights.  The Moscow Helsinki Watch Group authored reports on 
human rights violations in the Soviet Union that were then sent to the United States and 
debated and made public by the US Helsinki Commission.  By 1976, the Soviet dissident 
movement had completely embraced the idea of reaching out to the West for political 
support, just as on the American political scene, the policy of détente was challenged and 
replaced by a more idealistic foreign policy championed by the new President Jimmy 
Carter, emphasizing human rights.
This dialogue between the Soviet dissidents and American policy makers would 
not have been possible had there not been an expansion in the number of information 
channels between the Soviet Union and the United States during the two decades leading 
up to 1976.  This growth was made possible by changes in technology and culture that 
allowed for greater interaction and communication between those in the Soviet Union and 
those in the West.  This was particularly true for American news correspondents who 
witnessed a gradual increase in their ability to communicate and report from the Soviet 
Union in spite of the strict controls the Soviet government had placed on them.  The aim 
of these controls was to eliminate the ability of Western journalists to influence the 
thoughts and views of Soviet citizens, as well as to report “State secrets” to the outside 
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world.  The Soviet government had been able to limit unfavorable news coverage of itself 
in the West by practicing a campaign of intimidation, surveillance, censorship, and 
expulsion of foreign journalists working there.  In particular, during the 1950s and early 
1960s, all outgoing press cables were censored heavily by Glavlit,5 which would not let 
pass any news story that it perceived to be disparaging toward the Soviet Union.  These 
conditions frustrated many American journalists working out of Moscow by making it 
virtually impossible for them to report fairly on events occurring there.  Even after 
Glavlit stopped censoring foreign journalists in 1961, the Soviet government continued to 
intimidate American journalists, typically through physical force or the threat of 
expulsion.  As a result of this intimidation there were still only sixteen Western 
journalists reporting from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.
The human rights movement itself grew out of the elite intellectual social circles 
of Moscow during the so-called thaw.  It began in 1956 after Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in his so-called “Secret Speech.”  These Russians 
became known as the “thaw generation,” a cohort who grew up a generation after those 
who carried out the Russian Revolution. Their young lives were shaped by shared 
events, such as the beginning and end of the Second World War, the death of Stalin, and 
Khrushchev’s 1956 Secret Speech.  This generation of Russians reexamined their most 
recent history in the light of the more liberal political climate that followed Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin.  As Alexeyeva noted of those years, “Such a limited enlarging of 
the boundaries of what was permitted, along with a refusal by the authorities to engage in 
mass terror, turned out to be sufficient for irreversible changes in the minds of people and 
                                                
5 Glavnoe Upravlenie po Delam Literatury i Izdatelstvo , which translates to: Main Directory for 
Literary and Publishing Affairs.
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in public life.”6  Another important aspect of the thaw was that it allowed more 
Westerners to travel to the Soviet Union.  Encounters between Westerners and Soviet 
young people led to irreversible changes in Soviet society, giving intellectually curious 
young Russians the ability to compare his or her own life with that of the foreigners they 
happened to meet.  Many urban Russians began to make their own depiction of life in the 
West by imitating the jazz music and dress of the Westerners they happened to encounter.  
The West, the idea of the West, and Westerners therefore began to have a major impact 
on Soviet culture.  
Much like the Soviet dissidents, the American news correspondents based in 
Moscow faced very similar restrictions on their freedom of speech and movement, and as 
a result many of the dissidents and the journalists made fast friends when they finally 
began working together.  Their rapprochement was however slow, due to cultural barriers 
between the two and the fear among both the dissidents and the journalists concerning the 
authorities’ reaction to their friendship.  This relationship was often personal, and it was 
symbiotic because it benefited the journalists by giving them a better story to write home 
about, while it was advantageous for the dissidents because it allowed them to get their
message out in the West.  As a result of this relationship, news coverage on the Soviet 
dissidents exploded during the late 1960s and into the 1970s.  Historian Edward Bailey 
Hodgman even noted that with regard to The New York Times, stories related to Soviet 
dissidents increased five-fold between the years 1968 and 1971.7
                                                
6 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and 
Human Rights (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 7.
7 Edward Bailey Hodgman, “Détente and Dissidents: Human Rights in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 
1968-1980” (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 2003), 127-128.
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The journalists played a vital role in providing Westerners and Western 
Governments with information on the Soviet Union.  This was especially since American 
journalists were able to befriend and socialize among ordinary Russians in a way that US
representatives could not, given the strict rules on fraternization extended to Western 
diplomatic staff.8  Therefore, for many Westerners and Western politicians, news 
provided to the correspondents working in the Soviet Union by dissidents made up a 
great deal of the public’s overall impression of what life was like in the Soviet Union.  
Peter Osnos, a correspondent for The Washington Post, even alleged that this relationship 
led to there being a disproportionate focus by American journalists on the relatively
marginal dissident movement in the Soviet Union, a movement that had at most only a 
few hundred participants, but received lopsided attention by the American press in 
comparison to other issues in the Soviet Union.  Osnos further alleged that this uneven
coverage distorted America’s impression of what was going on in the Soviet Union, 
given the bias of the American correspondents covering the Moscow bureaus.  To this 
affect Osnos wrote that the “Dissidents in the Soviet Union say what most Americans 
want – and expect – to hear about the evils of communism.  Excessive dependence on 
them, however, creates a picture of that complex country as oversimplified.”9
This oversimplification of the complex dissident movement in the Soviet Union 
affected American politicians just as it did the American public, resulting in a dramatic 
shift away from détente, and instead towards a foreign policy which was aimed at 
demonstrating America’s support for the dissident movement.  During the 1970s, as the 
issue of human rights in the Soviet Union became more prevalent in the press, American 
                                                
8 Peter Osnos, “Soviet Dissidents and the American Press,” Columbia Journalism Review 16, issue 
4 (Nov. and Dec., 1977): 32-36, 33.
9 Osnos, 36.
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politicians could not help but be challenged from an interested public which began to 
press their elected representatives to respond to the situation in the Soviet Union.  In 
particular this was with regard to the fight for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate from 
the Soviet Union.  The growing interest regarding human rights in the United States 
occurred just as there was a general rise in the notion of social justice, given the 
contemporaneous Civil Rights and the Anti-War movements.  It was also no coincidence 
that many of the same participants in the Civil Rights and Anti-War movements were 
also interested in the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union, particularly American 
Jews who empathized with Soviet Jews.  Given this growth in public interest, as well as 
in news coverage, American interest groups demanded that their politicians turn their 
attention to the human rights practices of the Soviet government.  Many members of 
Congress were receptive to this pressure because they either expressed similar concerns
themselves or were interested in furthering their own political careers by tapping into the 
public’s concern over the issue.  Two American politicians in particular, Democratic 
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington State and Republican Congresswoman 
Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey, weighed heavily into the political debate over human 
rights in the Soviet Union.  Senator Jackson was the leading force behind the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment.  This legislation sought to make President Nixon’s 1972 promise of
Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status and other economic incentives toward the 
Soviet Union contingent on the Soviet government agreeing to allow its Jewish minority
the right to emigrate unencumbered.  Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, was passionate 
in her desire to help the Soviet dissidents, and was a main supporter of the US Helsinki 
Commission.
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The legislation that resulted from this concern for the Soviet dissidents had mixed 
success.  While the Jackson-Vanik Amendment may have been well intended and 
produced some initial results, it ultimately led the Soviet Union to restrict emigration
further.  Similarly, the creation of the US Helsinki Commission succeeded in giving 
many Soviet dissidents some sense of hope and an outlet in seeking help in mediating 
their situation.  But the US Helsinki Commission lacked the ability to force the Soviet 
Union to comply with the Helsinki Final Act, and despite all the efforts of its creators to 
help the Soviet dissidents, the situation for the dissidents behind the Moscow Helsinki 
Watch Group had actually worsened by 1977, as many were arrested.  It is clear that as 
this dialogue on human rights expanded, the Soviet dissident movement became 
increasingly dependent on the West.  Overall this human rights rhetoric succeeded in 
accomplishing the limited short-term objectives of both the American policy makers and 
the Soviet dissidents.  American policy makers used the dissident issue to their 
advantage, especially given the fact that President Nixon was opposed to this new human 
rights rhetoric because he believed it would ultimately hurt relations between the US and 
the Soviet Union.  Alignment with the West also allowed for the temporary protection of 
some Soviet dissidents, as many of them became international celebrities given the 
attention they received.  US policy makers ultimately proved powerless to save as the 
Soviet authorities cracked down on dissidents, particularly in the mid-1970s. This 
growth in contact and communication permitted the spread of concepts such as human 
rights between East and West, while also making it possible for human rights to become 
an acceptable feature of America’s foreign policy, just as the dissident movement became 
increasingly dependent on America’s support.
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* * *
There is little existing scholarship addressing the relationship between the Soviet 
dissident movement and American policymakers as a dialogue between the two.  Many 
works focus either exclusively on the American political and foreign policy perspective, 
or on the history of the Soviet dissident movement.  Two recent exceptions are
dissertations by Sarah Snyder written at Georgetown University in 2006 and by Edward 
Bailey Hodgman at the University of Rochester in 2003.  Both authors stress that the 
increased emphasis on human rights issues in American policy towards the Soviet Union 
during the 1970s was a direct result of a dialogue with the dissident movement.10  Snyder 
and Hodgman also focus more on the shifting contours within the American political 
landscape as opposed to the dissident movement, making both works a better resource for
the study of American foreign policy than to the study of the dissidents.  Another recent 
work is a journal article written by historian Barbra Walker published in Kritika in 2008 
and entitled “Moscow Human Rights Defenders Look West: Attitudes Toward US
Journalists in the 1960s and 1970s.”11  Here Walker emphasized the nature of Western 
journalists as a medium of communication between Moscow’s dissidents and the West, 
and the dramatic impact this had on the dissident movement as it evolved.  Her focus was 
exclusively on the dissident movement and the relationship it had with the American 
journalists.  
Most of the historical literature on the dissident movement written prior to the last 
decade was authored by individuals intimately involved with the dissident movement 
                                                
10 Sarah Snyder, “The Helsinki Process, American Foreign Policy, and the End of the Cold War” 
(Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2006); Hodgman.
11 Barbara Walker, “Moscow Human Rights Defenders Look West: Attitudes Toward U.S. 
Journalists in the 1960s and 1970s,” Kritika 9, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 905-927.
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already.  Despite their understandable bias, several of these works are still useful if they 
are analyzed more as primary sources.  One is the book authored by dissident and 
historian Ludmilla Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post Stalin 
Era.12  This volume has become a classic in the field, often cited by many other 
researchers interested in the topic of Soviet dissent.  It is a memoir of Alexeyeva’s 
experience growing up in the Soviet Union and her intellectual journey toward becoming 
a dissident.  Alexeyeva also wrote a comprehensive historical narrative of the dissident 
movement, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and 
Human Rights.  Written by Alexeyeva in the early 1980s, after she had been exiled to the 
United States, it received funding from the US Department of State.13  Here Alexeyeva 
discussed the diversity of the dissident movements in the Soviet Union by drawing on 
both her personal impressions of the movements, as well as her research with samizdat
texts that were preserved in archives in the United States.  Alexeyeva broke the dissident 
movements into multiple groups, in part including the movements for self-determination, 
the movements for emigration, the movements for religious liberty, the movement for 
human rights, and the Russian national movement.14
Just as Alexeyeva was writing her versions of the dissident movement in the 
1980s, several other American writers also became interested in the subject.  The 
essential work on the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group is The Final Act: The Dramatic, 
Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, written by Paul Goldberg, an 
acquaintance of several members of the dissident movement and the co-author of The 
                                                
12 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation.
13 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 302-303.
14 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent.
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Thaw Generation with Alexeyeva.15  Like Barbara Walker, Goldberg placed a similar 
emphasis on the relationship between the journalists and dissidents in the Soviet Union, 
arguing that such a relationship was essential for allowing the dissident movement to 
evolve.  Goldberg’s emphasis on the importance of Western journalists laid the 
foundations for the argument that the dissident movement had become increasingly 
dependent on the help of the Americans.  Unfortunately, Goldberg’s account also suffers 
from the same bias as others written during the 1980s. The author was too close to the 
dissident movement itself to criticize the close relationship between the dissidents and the 
West. In a very similar manner as Paul Goldberg, historian Joshua Rubenstein wrote 
extensively on the dissident movement during the 1980s, authoring The Soviet 
Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights.16  But the volume was more about the 
evolution of the dissident movement within the Soviet historical context, and much less 
about the movement’s contact with the West and Western journalists and policy makers.
This thesis will cover a period beginning roughly in the mid-1950s after 
Khrushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress of the 
Soviet Union, and ending in 1976 with the creation of the two Helsinki monitoring 
groups, as well as the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States.  It will 
concentrate on the methods and motives behind the rapprochement between the Soviet 
dissidents and American journalists and politicians by analyzing statements made by 
them found in newspapers, memoirs, congressional sources, samizdat publications, and 
press releases.  The use of such sources will illuminate the changing contours within both 
                                                
15 Goldberg, The Final Act.
16 Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights, 2d ed. (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1985). 
15
the American and Soviet sides, and it will explore the shifting attitudes each side held for 
the other in a manner delivered chronologically over the course of three chapters.  
The first chapter sets the stage for the rapprochement between the Soviet 
dissidents and American politicians.  It begins by exploring the roots of the Soviet 
dissident movement as well as the diversity of the dissidents, since not all of them were 
intellectuals or Jewish, but many belonged instead to other minority national or religious 
groups.  The second section discusses the thaw and how the Soviet Union gradually 
opened itself up to Western influence, though in a very restricted way.  One of the aims
of the thaw under Khrushchev was actually to promote the Soviet Union’s image abroad 
as a world power by allowing a few more foreigners in and by sponsoring events such as 
the 1957 World Youth Festival in Moscow.  Khrushchev’s cultural diplomacy with the 
West was aimed at repairing the Soviet Union’s reputation after Stalin.  Despite the 
Soviet government’s acceptance of more foreigners and foreign journalists, the working 
conditions faced by these journalists remained repressive under Khrushchev.  Many were 
subjected to the strict censorship of Glavlit, as well as the physical intimidation of the 
KGB.  The first chapter concludes with an examination of how both the dissidents and 
the American news correspondents based in the Soviet Union built a relationship with 
one another, founded in part on their shared pariah status.  This rapprochement between 
Western journalists and the Soviet dissident occurred in the wake of the 1966 Sinyavskii 
and Daniel trial in Moscow, which was widely covered in the West.  As noted above, it 
has been viewed as the moment when the Soviet dissidents initiated their own foreign 
policy by reaching out to Western Governments and politicians through the use of 
American journalists.
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The second chapter focuses on how this dialogue began to work, especially as 
American interest groups and politicians became concerned about the dissidents in the 
Soviet Union.  In particular, American politicians were most concerned about the status 
of Soviet Jews, many of who were unable to emigrate from the Soviet Union because of 
the Soviet government’s restrictive emigration policy.  Therefore, the first half of the 
second chapter examines the dialogue between American and Soviet movements aimed at 
allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate, while the second half discusses how American policy 
makers viewed the issue and then reacted.  Most importantly, the issue of Jewish 
emigration posed a direct challenge to President Nixon’s détente policy, as many 
opponents to the policy used the issue of Jewish emigration as a means of discrediting 
détente.
The third chapter analyzes the impact of the Helsinki Final Act and how that 
declaration led to the formalization of a dialogue on human rights between the Soviet 
dissidents and American policy makers.  The first half discusses the creation of the 
Helsinki Final Act and how human rights were ultimately incorporated into the 
agreement.  The second half looks at the creation of both the Moscow Helsinki Watch 
Group and the US Helsinki Commission, and how both organizations attempted to hold 
the Soviet Union accountable to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.  A
brief epilogue follows, addressing the new US emphasis on human rights under President 
Jimmy Carter and the reaction of the Soviet Union’s dissidents these policies. It also 
considers some of the legacies of this US / dissident dialogue on human rights.
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CHAPTER I
THE THAW AND THE WEST:  
WESTERN JOURNALISTS AS THE MEDIUM FOR DISSENT
This chapter is about the cultural inspiration of the West for Soviet society and the 
reliability and relative security of Westerners as a medium of communication between the 
dissidents and the outside world.  The West, in particular America, Americans, and 
American culture, was always influential for the dissidents, providing inspiration for a 
movement with genuine roots in Russian political culture and history. As the dissident 
movement emerged from the intellectual milieu of Moscow during the Khrushchev thaw, 
the West was instrumental in inspiring and perpetuating this movement from the start.  
The very intellectuals who would provide the backbone to the intellectual dissident and 
later human rights movement were those most inspired by Western cultural currents and 
by Westerners who traveled to the Soviet Union during the thaw.  The beacon of the 
West fascinated the intellectually curious university-educated professional class in 
Moscow, reinforcing the neophyte dissident movement, and becoming even more 
influential following the freezing of the thaw under Brezhnev.  By then, the West was the 
most reliable and powerful medium of communication for the dissident movement and its 
ideas as the government sought to shut it up.
For the United States initially, Soviet culture and the issue of dissidence was a
matter of little importance. Prior to the Presidency of Richard Nixon, there were 
nonetheless some stirrings of Western interest in Soviet dissent, especially with regard to 
literature.  This was especially true of Boris Pasternak’s Nobel Prize winning Dr. 
Zhivago, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, and the 
18
writings of Iosef Brodskii.17  This Western interest in dissent could have only been made 
possible by the so-called Khrushchev thaw, where Soviet citizens had more room to 
criticize the current regime as well as make contact with Westerners.  Their ability to 
travel within the Soviet Union was much expanded under Khrushchev.  It was only then 
by the late 1960s that American policy makers and Soviet dissidents could begin to take 
an interest in one another as a result of an increased journalistic concern in dissident 
issues that followed the 1966 trial of Andrei Sinyavskii and Yuli Daniel, two prominent 
Moscow writers and intellectuals within the emerging dissident community.  The contacts 
the dissidents made with Western journalists during this trial began what historians have 
called a dissident “foreign policy” in reaching out to the West.18  
Before the rise of Western journalistic interest in the Soviet Union can be 
discussed, it is necessary to take some time outlining the Soviet dissident movement in 
general, along with American involvement and travel in the Soviet Union.  Such a 
discussion will illuminate the importance of the West, and in particular Americans in the 
dissident movement, and how unsurprisingly the dissident movement never could have 
taken off without such a steady stream of Western contacts and their ideas.  
The Thaw Generation and the Spectrum of Dissent
For many the birth of the dissident movement was Khrushchev’s “secret speech”
before the 20th Party Congress in 1956 where he outlined the crimes committed by Stalin
and blamed the misfortune of the previous two decades on his leadership.  According to 
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historian Vladislav Zubok, the shock of the “secret speech” was just as important for 
many idealistic and educated Russians as the beginning of the Second World War. “A
world of certainties came to an end, now that core beliefs and commonly accepted 
wisdom had turned to dust.”19  For these Russians, the whole Soviet project suddenly lost 
the foundations upon which it had rested; what had once been sacred was no longer.  
Many intellectuals began searching for a form of collective catharsis to move away from 
the past, a catharsis that found itself most readily expressed in literature, as was the 
Russian tradition.  As dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva wrote in her memoirs, “Such a 
limited enlarging of the boundaries of what was permitted, along with a refusal by the 
authorities to engage in mass terror, turned out to be sufficient for irreversible changes in 
the minds of people and in public life.”20  These changes even affected those who already 
expressed doubts about the system, such as scientist Yuri Orlov.  He used the opportunity 
to reveal to the public what he had long thought, writing:
Khrushchev’s report on the atrocities of the Stalinist epoch was read at closed 
Party meetings and shattered even those who, like me, were already anti-
Stalinists.  […]  What should I do?  There came that moment for which I had, in 
effect, been preparing my whole life—a life of tensely scrutinizing this strange, 
murderous, self-devouring society.  I must state openly everything I thought 
about.21
Therefore a new era emerged where many Soviet citizens, especially those young and 
educated, took the opportunity to push back against the system, finding their creative 
impulses suffocating under the Soviet State’s control over the media and art.  Even a 
1957 US State Department report on the dissident issue in the Soviet Union stated that at 
the time virtually all prominent artists, writers, composers, and scholars sought greater 
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freedom of expression from the Soviet state, making them the most open to dissident 
currents.22
Generationally speaking, the young Russians most open to considering dissent 
spent their formative years during the Second World War and post-war era. They have 
been referred to as the “thaw generation,” borrowing from Alexeyeva’s memoir, which 
described her experience growing up during this time.  For the “thaw generation,” their 
young lives were defined by many important moments in their youth, including the 
beginning and end of the Second World War, the death of Stalin, and Khrushchev’s 
Secret Speech.  This was also the most educated generation in Soviet history, attending 
and graduating from university in record numbers following the war.23  The Secret 
Speech and the process of de-Stalinization begun by Khrushchev produced irreversible 
changes in Soviet society and the psyche of Soviet citizens, with Alexeyeva writing, “To 
us, the thaw was the time to search for an alternative system of beliefs.  Our new beliefs 
would be truly ours; having gone through Stalinism once, we could not stand for another 
“progressive” doctrine being imposed on us from above.”24  This generation viewed the 
opportunity following the end of the Second World War, the death of Stalin, and 
Khrushchev’s “secret speech” as their moment to make their impact on Soviet society, to 
make it live up to their ideals.
In these early days, the dissident movement was far from organized or large.  
Organization into any kind of civic group had been impossible under Stalin.  People did 
not trust each other enough so that normal social gatherings were very difficult. No one 
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knew where another’s true convictions laid.  And there were very few public spaces
where individuals could meet, since restaurants, cafés, and other public meeting spaces
were few and far between.25  Despite these hindrances, the slightly liberalized atmosphere
following Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s 1956 speech made it possible for many young 
intellectuals to associate more freely within informal groups.  These informal groups of
Soviet intellectuals planted the seeds of the dissident movement and became known as
kompaniya. According to Alexeyeva, they were unique to the dissident experience of the 
1950s and 1960s, with nothing like them having ever existed before, except perhaps the
kruzhki, or circles of Russian intelligentsia during the 1840s.26  These kompaniya
consisted of young intellectuals in their twenties and thirties. They included members of 
various professional disciples such as scientists, artists, physicians, university professors, 
lawyers, and students.  Alexeyeva wrote of the kompaniya, that “Every night, we 
gathered in cramped apartments to recite poetry, read “unofficial” prose, and swap stories 
that, taken together, yielded a realistic picture of what was going on in our country.”27  
The kompaniya therefore provided social gatherings where lifelong friendships and 
relationships were forged, building mutual trust and becoming comfortable and intimate 
in their reflections on Soviet society.28  The kompaniya had sprung up as a social 
institution because they were needed. Alexeyeva wrote, “Our generation had a 
psychological, spiritual, perhaps even a physiological need to discover our country, our 
history, and ourselves.”29  Therefore it was within these kompaniya that Russians 
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reexamined their recent past by looking back at the works of Western and Russian 
philosophers and even the collected works of Lenin, Marx and other Communists.30  This 
reexamination of the past was expressed primarily in the artistic and literary 
environments and resulted in the first wave of literature critical of the Soviet system.  It 
emerged in the 1950s in the works authored by Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn and others that 
challenged the regime’s interpretation of history.  Poetry was also very popular within the
kompaniya and often critical of the regime.  These literary texts were produced by these
intellectuals, and were often typed up and read aloud during meetings and handed to 
members of other kompaniya.  These clandestinely written texts became known as
samizdat, or “self-publication.”  Samizdat was often written using typewriters with 
several carbon copies, requiring a lot of painstaking work.  This was a model that 
characterized the spread of information for all dissident movements within the Soviet 
Union, given the government’s strict control over the dissemination of information and 
prohibition on the spread of texts critical of the regime.
The presence of the kompaniya strongly influenced the intellectual and educated 
cadres of Soviet society, fueling the intellectual dissident movement that would be 
making the most of their contacts with the West over the next two decades. Dissent in 
the Soviet Union though was much broader than intellectual debates between the artists 
and the university educated since the thaw affected all elements of Soviet society.  The 
US State Department recognized this diversity, hopefully concluding in a 1957 analysis 
that “Conditions exist in the Soviet Union which give rise to a certain degree of 
dissidence in virtually every segment of the population outside the top leadership itself,” 
and that this dissidence came in many shades, ranging “from simple grumbling about 
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living conditions to complete and conscience rejection of the entire Soviet system.”31  
Dissidence in the Soviet Union therefore really cannot be described as a monolithic
movement, but more accurately as a series of movements, since its diversity mirrored that 
of Soviet society as a whole.  In the post-Stalin era there were three major categories of 
such dissent, nationalist, religious, and intellectual, none of which were exclusive.  Many 
movements overlapped these distinctions.32
Despite the concentration of scholarly literature on the intellectual dissidents and 
artists, it was those dissident groups that advocated national and religious self 
determination that experienced the broadest basis of support. But such movements found 
less success in working together, since their political and ideological goals often
conflicted. These groups were also unsuccessful in coming together due to the Soviet 
state’s strict control of the media, which prevented them from learning about the similar 
political aims and methods held by others.33  Despite their differences, these nationalist
and religiously based forms of dissent, like intellectual dissent, became possible only
with the death of Stalin and the thaw.  The thaw gave these groups greater space in which 
to breathe and seek political concessions. Among the most vocal groups advocating their 
national and religious self-determination were those that experienced the most repression 
under Stalin and within Soviet society.  With regard to religion, many faiths were 
repressed in the officially atheist Communist state.  Groups seeking religious self-
determination therefore were quite diverse, ranging from the omnipresent Russian 
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Orthodox faithful, to religions with far fewer adherents such as the Baptists, Pentecostals, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists.  There were also the Jews, who 
experienced discrimination on both ethnic and religious grounds, as well as Muslim and 
Buddhist groups who were repressed. These religious faiths, much like the nationalists, 
already had a firm sense of social cohesion stemming from a shared religious faith and 
culture.  This strong sense of identity endowed these groups with the social cohesion to 
rally around and push back against the Soviet government.
Distinctions regarding religion and nationality were not always clear in Soviet 
society since religion was often one of several markers of a cultural or ethnic identity.  
The most prominent example was the situation faced by the Soviet Jews, who were 
identified in both religious and ethnic terms, since “Jewish” was considered a separate 
national group according to Soviet policy.  The Jews underwent distinct treatment in 
Soviet society, experiencing much hostility and discrimination following the Second 
World War.  During the war, millions of Soviet Jews perished because of the Holocaust, 
and in spite of this many retained a relatively prominent role in Soviet society in the post-
war period.  Many Russians though came to blame the war on the Jews, reasoning if it 
had not been for them the Germans would not have invaded.  Many other Russians also 
viewed the Russian Revolution unfavorably, were similarly convinced that it was the 
Jews who were behind the Revolution.   Many Jews experienced this persistent anti-
Semitism and accusations of “cosmopolitanism” and “Zionism” in the years immediately 
following the war, closing many opportunities for them within Soviet society, while 
barring them access to many government positions and institutional advancement.  As 
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early as 1947, Jewish writers were accused of slandering the Soviet state, as many 
witnessed their cultural institutions degraded and derided by the Soviet government.34
Given this public shunning many Jews were especially predisposed to dissident 
currents.  This predisposition to dissidence is also attributed to the connections many 
Jews had abroad, as well as a large urban and educated population, many of who 
participated in and socialized amongst the intellectuals in the kompaniya.  The plight of 
the Soviet Jews is intimately related to the birth of the dissident movement, with civically
minded Russians, such as Ludmilla Alexeyeva and others, coming to the defense of their 
Jewish colleagues and friends in the face of mounting anti-Semitism. In fact, it is in 
defense of one of her Jewish university-mates, Stella Dvorkis, a woman Alexeyeva never 
met, that her career as a champion for human rights and social justice was launched.35  
Alexeyeva was also among the members of the Russian population who had friends who 
were Jewish.  She witnessed the toll anti-Semitism was taking on her friends, in particular 
her best friend from university, Marina Rosenzweig, whose Jewish friends were 
imprisoned by the NKVD for supposed participation in the Doctor’s Plot to kill Stalin.36
The hopelessness of the situation faced by many Soviet Jews, led some to 
advocate in favor of emigrating from the Soviet Union.  This desire for emigration was 
closely tied to the attraction of Zionism.  Many European Jews had sought to immigrate 
to Israel in order to escape persecution at home and to have the freedom to practice their 
own religion.  For the Soviet Jews who survived the Holocaust, the ability to immigrate 
to Israel was much restricted.  Beyond the usual Soviet restrictions, the emigration of 
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Jews was discouraged because the Soviets were fearful of offending their Arab allies in 
the Middle East.  Most Jews did not consider emigration to be an option during the 1950s 
and 1960s anyway.  Many were secular and many thought that Soviet society could 
change itself from within.  This attitude changed after the Six Days War, where many 
Soviet Jews found their sense of Jewish identity reawakened by Israel’s victory and the 
increased repression they experienced at the hands of the Soviet regime in its wake.
Whereas the Jews came to eventually advocate in favor of emigration, other 
nationalities sought to find greater autonomy for themselves within the Soviet Union, 
such as the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, and Armenians, 
while others sought justice for the crimes committed against them by Stalin.  Most 
notably, those groups that sought social justice were the Meskhi Turks, Chechens, and in 
particular the Crimean Tatars.  These ethnic groups were described by Alexeyeva as 
being the “the outcasts of outcasts” because they were deported by Stalin at the end of the 
Second World War, and were they were the first groups to organize and protest to the 
authorities.37  This was particularly true of the Crimean Tatars, who were targeted by 
Stalin in 1944 for deportation from their homeland on the Crimean Peninsula to Central 
Asia under the charge of having collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World 
War.  Thousands of Crimean Tatars perished during the deportation and the first few 
brutal years of settlement in Central Asia, where they were treated as prison laborers 
under the special settlement regime.  Their position improved after the death of Stalin and
following the Twentieth Party Congress where the Crimean Tatars were granted the right 
to leave the special settlement camps, but not the right to return to their homeland.  This 
sense of injustice sparked the formation of the Crimean Tatar national movement, led by 
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former Communist Party leaders, government figures, and war veterans.38 It took until 
1957 for the movement to reach what historian Gulnara Bekirova described as a “mass 
character,” through the use of petitions and delegations aimed at organizing the Crimean 
Tatars and making their plight known to the authorities.  The first such petition was 
organized in July 1957, attracting 6,000 signatures.  Later petitions gathered more 
signatures, eventually enough to secure the occasional meeting with a high ranking 
Communist Party official, meetings which produced little or no tangible results.  Through 
the early 1960s these petitions grew in size, with a March 1961 petition sent to the 
Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union having
over 18,000 signatures.39  By 1961 the Soviet authorities began to crackdown on Crimean 
Tatar political activity, bringing the first activists to trial in October of that year.40  
Activists by late 1961 and early 1962 experimented with the formation of the “Union of 
the Crimean Tatar Youth,” whose goal was to teach young Tatars their national language 
and discuss the problems associated with a return to their homeland.  Its membership was 
also arrested and tried, and other similar attempts at official organization were squashed
by the authorities.41 With these arrests the Crimean Tatar movement entered what 
historian Timothy Waters called the “dissident phase.”  No longer was the movement led 
by Red Army veterans and the former party functionaries, but by the generation of 
Crimean Tatars who were young during their expulsion and radicalized through the
                                                
38 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 139.
39 Gulnara Bekirova, “Crimean Tatar National Movement in the 50-60’s.: Formation, First 
Victories, and Disappointments,” Center of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars, 2002, 
available: http://www.cidct.org.ua/en/studii/13-14/7.html (22 November 2010), 2-3.
40 J. Otto Pohl, “Stalin’s Ethnic Cleansing of the Crimean Tatars and Their Struggle for 
Rehabilitation, 1944-1985,” The Ukrainian Quarterly 60, no. 1/2 (Mar., 2004): 47.
41 Bekirova, 5.
28
experience.42  They no longer viewed their deportation as a “mistake,” like their 
predecessors did. Instead for these activists their deportation was a “crime,” and they 
deployed the language of “racism” and “genocide” in describing their experience.  
Whereas the activists of the 1950s were polite in their fight for rehabilitation, this new 
generation demanded it, unafraid to fight a system they viewed as unjust.43  This 
generation of Crimean Tatars was drawn from the same generation of intellectuals who 
were pioneering the intellectual dissident movement.
For the Crimean Tatar national movement, as well as the Soviet Union’s 
intellectual and Jewish dissident movements, their timeline’s closely mirrored one 
another’s.  Protests began as unorganized and spontaneous but became increasingly 
sophisticated, employing the creation of samizdat texts, and an unorganized leadership.  
The Crimean Tatar national movement is but one prominent example of many similar 
movements that emerged during the thaw, demonstrating the diversity of dissidence in 
the Soviet Union.  Notably, the Crimean Tatar movement, like that of the intellectuals, 
the Jews and others, remained relatively free of violence and its motives and procedures, 
such as open letter writing and petitioning, were identical to those used by other activist 
groups in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet government’s strict control of the media 
prevented these groups from communicating with one another.44  Therefore samizdat
texts were the most important source of information, and it became clear, in particular to 
the intellectual dissident movement, that these samizdat texts could really gain some 
traction if sent abroad.  Therefore, the introduction of foreigners into the homes of Soviet 
dissidents, and their interest, became vitally important to the dissident movement, and 
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this opening to the world became possible only during the thaw and Khrushchev’s 
cultural diplomacy with the West.
The Soviet Union Opens to the West
Instrumental to the thaw was the gradual opening of the Soviet Union to the 
outside world, allowing foreigners greater access to the Soviet Union, as well as giving 
Soviet citizens the ability to travel abroad.  Prior to the thaw, the Soviet Union was 
guided by a desire to minimize foreign contact as much as possible.  This policy was 
based on Soviet anxiety over the possibility of capitalist encirclement and contamination, 
a phenomenon that historian Terry Martin referred to as “Soviet xenophobia.”  This 
differed from traditional Russian xenophobia in that it was not based on racial or ethnic 
distinctions, but upon the ideological hatred of a foreigner’s capitalist government, 
permeating all sectors of Soviet society, even the dissidents themselves.  Alexeyeva 
mentions her xenophobic attitudes in reference to learning about her friend Yuli Daniel’s 
publishing books in the West, writing that “learning that Yulik, a person I admired, 
would allow foreigners to publish his work was shocking enough.  It was one thing to tell 
the truth at home.  It was something else to tell it to outsiders, many of whom were 
genuine enemies of our country.”45  This xenophobia and isolationism imbued the 
relations of the Soviet Union with the outside world, especially with regard to the West, 
greatly impairing relations.46  It was Stalin in particular who feared the contamination of 
Western values and capitalism.  He severely restricted the ability of foreigners to travel in
the Soviet Union as well as the access Soviet citizens themselves had to the outside 
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world.  Despite these restrictions, there was no time when relations between the Soviet 
Union and the outside world were completely cut off, even during some of the most 
isolating periods, such as the late Stalin years.  Between 1948 and 1953, most of the 
contact between the noncommunist world and the Soviet Union were between Soviet 
delegations and foreign communists or fellow-travelers, or between visiting groups which 
were composed mainly of such persons, and Soviet communist party or government 
agencies.47  Americans and other Westerners therefore had very little exposure to Russia 
and the Soviet Union, just as Russians similarly lacked such exposure to American 
culture.  
This lack of exposure to the outside world in no way prevented young Russians 
from seeking to learn more about the West and Western culture.  In particular, young
educated children of the elite, who already had the most access to such foreign contacts, 
were most interested in learning about the West.  During these late Stalin years many 
urban youths sought a cultural style of their own, and were heavily influenced by the few 
American and German films that were released in the Soviet Union, especially after 
1956.  These youths sought to imitate the Americans and Westerners they saw by 
wearing similar clothing and listening to contraband American music, particularly jazz.  
One Russian musician, Julie Whitney, the Russian wife of American journalist Thomas 
Whitney, described being punished in her youth for her interest in American jazz.  
Despite her punishment she contended that jazz music fascinated many Russians, writing 
that they “want the more modern fox trots, rhumbas, sambas, tangoes and fast waltzes.  
And one way or another, they get them.  They listen to foreign radio stations and 
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Russians who go outside Russia bring back records.”  She even added, “In Soviet motion 
pictures the composers manage to sneak in a little jazz sometimes, nominally as anti-
American propaganda, but actually because the audiences like it.”48  While many 
Russians had a tacit interest in jazz, a select minority idealized American culture, viewing
as trophies American jazz records or any Western products.  These youths in particular 
dressed in a way resembling American zoot-suiters, with men wearing broad-shouldered 
jackets and large brightly-colored ties, while women wore extravagant hairdos and heavy
makeup.  These young people developed their own counter-culture, running against the 
Soviet cannon where young people were supposed to dress conservatively and frugally, 
and young women without any makeup.  These young people would become known as 
stiliagi, or “style apers.”  American journalist Chalmers M. Roberts described these 
stiliagi and those who had taken favorably towards American culture in a 1955 article in
The Washington Post, writing: 
There is a new Soviet man—he may be seen in all the major cities wearing a light 
gabardine type topcoat, eating in restaurants, enjoying opera and ballet, and living 
in the newer and roomier apartment buildings. […]  The new Soviet man’s wife 
uses lipstick, paints her fingernails or has them painted in a beauty parlor, wears 
nylon stockings.  Their children, too, are better dressed.  The parents also like 
American-style jazz, and in Moscow have a television set.49
Such young Soviets later become the advocates of Western-style openness and 
liberalization in Soviet society, as Zubok argued.50  
Western music and style witnessed an awakening under Khrushchev whose 
policies permitted an increase in cultural relations with the West, albeit in order to 
demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet system, both culturally and politically.  
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Khrushchev, unlike Stalin and his cohorts, was unafraid of approaching Westerners and 
the West, boldly inviting himself and his entourage to a Fourth of July barbeque at the 
American Embassy in 1955, meeting, greeting and mingling with the guests there.51  The 
opening of the Soviet Union to the outside world began in 1955, allowing foreigners 
greater access to the Soviet Union, as well as allowing Soviet citizens increased capacity
to travel abroad especially after the 1957 World Youth Congress in Moscow.  The goal of 
Khrushchev’s cultural diplomacy was to present a new image of the Soviet Union and to 
offset the dominant Cold War image of Russian militarism.  It emphasized Great Russian 
culture such as the ballet, music, art, and literature, as well as Russian advances in the 
sciences and was all part of what scholar Frederick C. Barghoorn has referred to as 
“Soviet Cultural Diplomacy.”  Its goal was to “project to all men an image of the Soviet 
way of life calculated to facilitate Soviet foreign policy objectives.”52  Another goal of 
Khrushchev’s cultural exchanges was to blind Americans and foreign visitors to the 
problems of the Soviet Union.  Therefore Soviet officials sought to ingratiate foreigners, 
Barghoorn stating, “the Kremlin can see to it that hospitality is lavished upon visiting 
American Congressmen, businessmen, or scientists, and, to a considerable degree, it can 
control even the physical environment in which the occasionally vodka-happy but more 
often merely uninformed visitors pass their travel time.”53  Such contacts though became 
increasingly difficult to monitor and control, with many Russians having an interest and 
curiosity in American and Western culture that often was not reciprocated.  These 
contacts and attempts at propaganda and counter-propaganda went both ways, as 
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demonstrated by the dueling Soviet exhibition in New York and the American exhibition 
in Moscow in 1959.  The American exhibition in Moscow attracted far greater numbers 
than the Soviet exhibition in New York, drawing 2.7 million visitors during its six week 
run.  Many Russians scoffed at the material culture on display, but nonetheless it left an
impression on those young members of the intelligentsia curious about life in the West.54
These changes first began with citizens of the other People’s Democracies in 
Eastern Europe in 1955, with the Khrushchev regime allowing both tourism and the sale 
of foreign language books and newspapers.  In fact, by 1957 close to half a million Soviet 
citizens had traveled to places such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, China, and East 
Germany.55  This opening up of the Soviet Union first to fellow People’s Democracies 
quickly expanded to non-communist countries, as long as potential travelers could be 
approved for an exit visa, which usually meant undergoing an extensive background 
investigation and winning the approval of one’s place of work or study.  Such exit visas 
were administered by a special “exit” section at the communist party headquarters, as 
well as the KGB, both of which sought to ensure that a candidate for travel had 
impeccable “moral and political” credentials.56  Similarly, some Americans began 
traveling to the Soviet Union, with Moscow, Leningrad, and Rostov becoming open to 
the West and repairing and restoring their tourist infrastructure in order to attract foreign 
tourists.57
This opening to the West inspired many Russian intellectuals, with Vladimir 
Bukovsky, a neuro-physicist and later human rights activist, even noting in his memoir
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the opening was equal in importance to Khrushchev’s exposure of Stalin.58  For Russians, 
their perceptions of the West and Westerners were colored by the intense isolation from 
the rest of the world they experienced under Stalin, and even the post-Stalin era.  
Therefore, as Barbara Walker pointed out, Westerners stuck out, and drew intense 
interest from Muscovites.59  This was especially true with regard to the World Youth 
Festival hosted in Moscow, which began on July 28, 1957, and was envisioned as a 
propaganda gain for the Soviet Union.  The festival attracted youth the world over to 
Moscow, but in reality it demonstrated the backwardness of the Soviets in comparison to 
the rest of the world, as well as opened the minds of Soviet youth to the possibilities that 
existed beyond home.  The Moscow World Youth Festival was the greatest single influx
of foreigners into the city since the Second World War, necessitating the mobilization of 
much of the city in support of the festival.  As Zubok pointed out, the fair made obvious
the backwardness of Soviet society with regard to the economy and the infrastructure that 
had to be updated and modified for the event.  Especially apparent was the scarcity of 
hotels, advertising, clothing, fast-food outlets, and shopping, all of which many 
foreigners were accustomed and expected to have access to.60  
In all some 34,000 foreign guests from 130 countries arrived in Moscow for the 
World Youth Festival.  Such a large volume of foreigners overwhelmed the Soviet police 
state, with many young Russians sharing with Western visitors their fears of the Soviet 
police, with too many contacts being made between Soviet youths and the Westerners for 
the Soviet security apparatus to monitor.  Some of the Russians making contact with 
foreigners included Alik Ginsberg, a future human rights activist.  Ginsberg had a large 
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appetite for American print literature, and acquired many foreign magazines and papers 
throughout the course of the festival.61  The festival also gave other young Russians the 
space to experiment and express themselves in ways that were against the Soviet grain.  
Jazz, western clothing and Western art all broke free and were viewed as mainstream 
during the duration of the festival.62  Another Vladimir Bukovsky even stated that “the 
World Youth Festival in 1957, then the American exhibition in 1958—[were] the first 
swallows of the West in our entire Soviet history.  All this talk about ‘putrefying 
capitalism’ became ridiculous.”63  For many Soviet dissidents, the Youth Festival proved 
to be another monumental event in their youth, since it brought the outside world to their 
door step, and was the first time many young Russians began having extensive contacts 
with foreign nationals, contacts that grew and solidified into real relationships and 
friendships.
Introduction of Foreign News Correspondents in the USSR
Of these relationships with foreign nationals, perhaps none were as important as 
that between the dissident intellectuals and foreign news correspondents, a relationship 
that was officially banned by the Soviet government, but would nonetheless be successful 
in transmitting the activities of the Soviet dissident movement to the world.  Like Soviet 
intellectuals, many foreign news correspondents faced similar restrictions on their 
freedom of communication, given the Soviet government’s strict control over what could 
and could not be reported abroad. According to CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, this 
control was there to protect the “image of monolithic unity and steady progress” the 
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Soviet Union projected abroad.64  Prior to the death of Stalin, journalistic access to the 
Soviet Union was nearly impossible since foreign journalists were viewed as agents of 
the ruling class of their homelands.65  After the end of the Second World War, Stalin 
intensified the restrictions placed on foreign news journalists, since the Kremlin sought to 
control information available to foreign correspondents, eliminate unfavorable stories, 
and effectively reduce the number of foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union, 
especially Americans.  The Soviet government achieved these goals by practicing a 
campaign of intimidation, surveillance, censorship, and expulsion, which confined the 
access of a news correspondent in the Soviet Union.  At the end of the war over a dozen 
American correspondents were reporting from the Soviet Union, representing about ten 
news organizations.  Stalin’s policies forced this number to dwindle to four by 1949.66  
These regulations persisted through March 1961, when Khrushchev officially ended
censorship, since the program became impossible to enforce, given technological 
advancements as well as the explosion in foreigners traveling to the Soviet Union. 
Despite the end of censorship, the Soviet government’s policies of intimidation against
foreign correspondents continued, making the Moscow bureau the most frustrating
assignment a journalist could receive.67
During the Stalin and early Khrushchev years, the greatest tool the Soviet 
government held regarding the information a foreign correspondent could send abroad 
was control over their visa.  Soviet visa restrictions made it difficult for American news 
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outlets to get a correspondent in Moscow.  The New York Times for instance did not have 
a Moscow bureau for over a year and a half in the late 1940s, since it was impossible for 
the paper to come up with a candidate the Soviet visa granters found suitable.  It took 
until the managing editor of the paper, Edwin L. James, wrote an “open letter” to Stalin 
before journalist Harrison E. Salisbury was granted a visa to the Soviet Union.68  
Journalists who eventually made it to Moscow would have to struggle between 
preserving their journalistic credentials on the one hand and preventing themselves from 
becoming Kremlin tools on the other, since careless and overly critical reporting often 
meant the expulsion of the offending journalist, and sometimes even the entire news 
bureau he represented.  One such incident occurred in October 1958 where the entire 
CBS Moscow bureau was closed due to the network’s broadcasting of a drama on the 
death of Stalin in which Khrushchev was portrayed as a conspirator in a plot to oust
him.69  CBS was accused of a litany of infractions in its portrayal of the Soviet Union. 
Just a few months prior to the airing of the drama, their Moscow correspondent Daniel 
Schorr was refused reentry into the Soviet Union because he had taped a Russian student 
exclaiming that close to ninety per cent of his fellow students disagreed with the Soviet 
Union’s intervention in Hungary in 1956.70  This risk of expulsion therefore hampered
the ability of journalists to report fairly and openly from the Soviet Union, forcing many
of them into self censorship.
These restrictions on foreign news correspondents were part of the general 
clamping down by Stalin’s regime following the end of the Second World War.  The 
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foreign press was targeted in particular with the goal of reducing their numbers and 
ability to report on the true happenings in the Soviet Union.  The most frustrating
regulation put in place by Stalin for foreign correspondents was the establishment of 
Glavlit71 (Main Directory for Literary and Publishing Affairs) which assumed 
responsibility over censoring foreign news dispatches from the Foreign Ministry Press 
Department in February 1946.  Unlike before, correspondents could no longer see who 
was handling their press cables, let alone negotiate with the censor, a process carried out 
in complete secrecy and anonymity.72  The Soviet censor for Glavlit resided in Moscow’s 
Central Telegraph Office on Gorki Street, the only point through which foreign 
correspondents could submit their cables.  There, the censor assiduously checked every 
word a journalist included in a dispatch, searching for unfavorable information that he 
would scratch out, providing no explanation of the deletions, or an appeal process.  Their 
deletions were often arbitrary and depended on the attitude of the censor himself, a 
process that frustrated many American journalists who were often unable to send a 
simple dispatch, and their editors, who would ask for projects not feasible under the 
censorship regime of Glavlit.73  Entire news stories would disappear, succumbing to the 
censor.  In one instance, journalist Drew Middleton of The New York Times got the 
chance to interview Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov in Odessa, authoring a long account 
concerning the interview.  But when Middleton’s press cable returned from the censor’s 
office it consisted of a single line: “Marshal Zhukov was in Odessa today and spoke to 
correspondents.”74  Other journalists were more privy to the arbitrary nature of the 
                                                





censoring process, with Irving R. Levine of NBC, writing that in one case a newspaper 
columnist described a Soviet home as having “every nook and cranny” utilized for living 
space, only to have this report returned to him with the word “cranny” crossed out, but 
“nook” remaining.75  Despite the inconsistency, there was a general pattern to the types of 
stories that failed to pass the censor at the central telegraph. As Daniel Schorr pointed 
out in an article in The New York Times Magazine, stories which failed to clear the censor
typically included indications of internal unrest or discontent, suggestions of disharmony 
among members of the Communist bloc, speculation on antagonisms and disunity 
amongst the Soviet leadership, military information, unflattering personal references to 
Soviet leaders, references to the secret police, the camps and other security organs, and 
references to censorship itself.76  Generally for these journalists, the prospect of 
censorship and the frustration the process entailed colored a correspondent’s attitude 
toward the Soviet state.  This allowed many journalists to view the Soviet Union in a 
negative light, often leading them to make harsh characterizations and assertions about 
life in the Soviet Union.77
Journalists found ways, whenever they could, to circumvent the censorship of 
Glavlit.  Sometimes simply the use of idiomatic language was enough to pass the censors.  
Levine cited in one case, while covering the Soviet leadership’s commemoration of the 
October Revolution, that he was able to bypass the censors when he wrote, “Fireworks lit 
up the sky over the Kremlin, and inside the Soviet leaders were equally lit up.”78  Not 
every journalist could get away passing their true perceptions through coded and 
                                                





idiomatic language, some journalists had to resort to passing information through on 
tapped phones, at least until the lines were cut.  Levine even quoted in one case 
journalists discussing basketball as a coded language in order to cover up a conversation 
on internal politics in the Soviet leadership.79  Another popular method was to send 
information though the diplomatic pouch, though it was technically forbidden by the 
American Embassy.80 As technology improved, and as more foreigners began to travel to 
the Soviet Union, journalists began to employ them in their bid to send information 
abroad, just as dissidents used these travelers to send their texts abroad.  These foreign 
tourists, who often times volunteered their services in carrying items abroad, were 
frequently referred to as “pigeons,” and this became a popular medium of communication 
for many journalists as long as the censorship regime of Glavlit persisted.81  
In line with Khrushchev’s opening of the Soviet Union to the West during the 
mid-1950s, more journalists were granted access to the Soviet Union, just as Khrushchev 
himself began to openly approach journalists and socialize with them, unafraid to speak 
his mind when he needed to. This all began when Khrushchev unexpectedly approached
the American embassy during their Fourth of July picnic in 1955, greeting the American 
Ambassador’s wife and meeting the American journalists attending.82  Khrushchev’s 
policy of cultural diplomacy toward the West made it easier for Western journalists to 
enter the Soviet Union, resulting in a rise from the four American journalists in 1949 to 
sixteen by the mid 1960s.83  The growing tide of visitors, as well as the exciting pace of 
change in the Soviet Union, with the launch of Sputnik, touring of American musical 







performers, the “kitchen debate” between Khrushchev and Vice President Nixon, the 
World Youth Festival, and many more, all changed the nature of reporting from Moscow, 
and taxed the policing abilities of the Glavlit.84  The flow of information from the Soviet 
Union was also becoming increasingly difficult to control, through a growth in foreign 
travel and changes in technology.  For instance it took a while for Soviet authorities to
uncover the loophole posed by movie newsreels, which became increasingly popular 
during the late 1950s with Irving Levine and Daniel Schorr becoming the first two TV
network correspondents to report from Moscow.85  The ability of the Kremlin to censor 
what was reported from the Soviet Union became increasingly difficult and its methods 
obsolete, since the censorship system allowed for such loopholes.  Khrushchev and the 
leadership caught on to the trend and in March 1961 summoned all the foreign 
correspondents to the Foreign Ministry where the head of the Press Department, Mikhail 
K. Kharlamov, announced an end to censorship and to Glavlit.86
The end to censorship did not necessarily mean that foreign reporters were free to 
report whatever they wanted, since the Kremlin made sure it still possessed other tools of 
intimidation and enforcement meant to hold reporters accountable if they happened to 
report “incorrect rumors,” as Kharlamov put it.87  The Soviet government kept reporters 
under surveillance as it did before the end of Glavlit’s censorship, and it still possessed 
the power to revoke visas and expel reporters.  Whitman Bassow wrote of his own 
expulsion as Newsweek’s Moscow bureau chief, the first American reporter expelled after 
the termination of censorship in August 1962.  Bassow wrote that his expulsion was on 






account of a feature he had written on Soviet humor that had offended the regime.  The 
joke Bassow published in his article was provided to him by Feliks Soloviev, the KGB 
agent tasked with following him, and who Bassow believed provided the joke to him as a 
pretext to try and get Bassow expelled from the country.88  Therefore correspondents 
remained apprehensive, taking time to get used to reporting without the censor’s watchful 
gaze, with many reporters remaining skeptical and untrusting of the Soviet regime.  It 
took a while for this mindset to change, but new stories emerged when correspondents 
loosened up and began to report on the darker side of Soviet life, such as corruption, 
alcoholism, the black market, and the housing shortage.89  They could also begin to cover 
the ferment within the Soviet art and intellectual world, concerning changes in the arts,
the cinema, and literature.  This was especially the case after Soviet author Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn published his famous novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which 
correspondents covered heavily along with other stories concerning de-Stalinization.90
The Khrushchev years were according to Bassow, “ten years of dramatic change 
in the status of foreign correspondents working in the USSR.”  Despite these dramatic 
changes, Bassow also pointed out that in the four years following the termination of 
censorship, six correspondents, including himself, were expelled from the Soviet Union.91  
Being a foreign news journalist was risky business, with the only safe bet kowtowing to 
the authorities and translating excerpts from TASS, Pravda, or Krasnaya zvezda, as some 
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journalists invariably were forced to do.  The Soviets continued to intimidate foreign 
news correspondents, as Hedrick Smith, a reporter for The New York Times described: 
The Russians have other ways [than censorship] of dealing with reporters who 
poke into things they prefer left uncovered.  The most common is to constantly 
hound, scold, reprimand them for their dispatches, usually in private but 
sometimes publicly in the press.  Occasionally, tires are punctured or reporters are 
beaten up by police goons to deter them from making unauthorized contacts.
The KGB was especially ruthless in its intimidation of foreigners. Many correspondents 
in fact knew who their assigned KGB agent was, occasionally meeting them for lunch or 
dinner.  Whitman Bassow knew his KGB agent on a first name basis, Feliks Soloviev, 
who planted the joke Bassow later published and which forced his expulsion from the 
Soviet Union.  Another popular KGB trap was to goad the typically single male journalist 
into a scandal by setting up a situation where the foreign correspondent would by tempted 
by a Russian woman, and then later blackmail the journalist over the encounter.  Bassow 
described one such occurrence while taking the midnight express between Moscow and 
Leningrad, and his unusual encounter with a Russian girl with the name, Karolina, who 
attempted to seduce the married Bassow as part of a KGB trap to embarrass and discredit 
the journalist.92  
Foreigners also continued to be segregated from Soviet society, residing in 
compounds resembling prisons and specially designed to house foreigners, as The 
Washington Post correspondent Anatole Shub described, “These ghettos are surrounded 
by high wire fences and patrolled 24 hours a day by KGB men in blue police uniforms.  
Anyone who enters or leaves must pass at least one police booth, equipped with special 
telephones.  Russians ‘unlicensed’ to deal with foreigners are stopped and questioned.  At 
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night, the compound court yards are floodlit.”93  Concentrating foreigners in such 
compounds made it easier for the KGB to continue its surveillance, watching foreign 
correspondents and any Russians who may come to visit with them.  This policy also had 
the side affect of completely isolating foreigners from the local population, impairing 
their ability to understand them.  Dissident Andrei Amalrik noted this phenomenon in his 
March 25, 1971 essay on “Foreign Correspondents in Moscow.”  There Amalrik
criticized the manner in which correspondents were isolated from Soviet society, writing, 
“In general, a man isolated from the local population has far less understanding of what is 
going on in the country.”94
This covering up, intimidation, and censorship ultimately obscured the reality that 
was the Soviet Union, which according to Hedrick Smith hid from public view the vices 
of Russian life, or as Smith wrote, “the awkward truths that do not square with 
Communist propaganda.”95  This was especially true with regard to the fear of foreigners 
that gripped the Russian population, many unwilling to even sit near them on the metro, 
or talk with them on the street.  This fear became especially acute after the June 1945 
decree forbidding the giving up of “state secrets,” with secrets often being broadly 
interpreted.  This ban frightened many Russians from approaching foreigners, fearing
their own personal safety.  It also made it near impossible for journalists to gather 
material for their dispatches that consisted of anything other than official government 
bulletins.  This fear of foreigners was so pervasive that Walter Cronkite, who worked as 
United Press’s (UP) Moscow correspondent in 1948, reported how a Russian man came 
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to his aid after slipping in the ice. Upon discovering Cronkite was not a Russian, this 
man quickly checked the scene for witnesses and ran off, without saying another word to 
the baffled Cronkite.96  For Cronkite and other journalists, this kind of reaction by the 
local population made working in the Soviet Union near impossible, prompting Cronkite 
himself to leave after only a few short months on the job.  Therefore, this xenophobic 
attitude and fear that enveloped Soviet society permitted a censorship that just as 
destructive as that of Glavlit for the journalists: the self-censorship of ordinary Russian 
people.  
For American journalists, the Russians they typically dealt with represented what 
Hedrick Smith, a correspondent for The New York Times, called “official Russians.”  
These “official Russians” were according to Smith, “an entire veneer of people, running 
into the thousands […] created by the Soviet system for dealing with foreigners.” These 
“official Russians” were not merely government officials, but were also the Soviet 
Union’s journalists, specialists, translators, Intourist guides, foreign trade organization 
executives, Party scientists, and Party administrators, people found in every Soviet 
institution, and used to and specially trained in dealing with foreigners.97  As Smith 
continued, “These ‘official Russians’ who have a license, in effect, to deal with 
foreigners have the task of projecting Pravda’s Russia, the Russia of scientific success, 
socialist workers’ democracy, and the modern welfare state.”98  Correspondents who 
were not versed in Russian history, culture, or language were stuck dealing only with 
these “official Russians,” as Hedrick explained, and these correspondents were unable to 
step outside and explore the wider Soviet Union.  They were reliant on the help of the 





few correspondents who really did possess that area knowledge, or solely the official 
government dispatches handed to them.  These correspondents Amalrik alleged were 
reduced to work as “Soviet interpreters,” who simply translated or related the “official 
view” from the contents of Pravda or Krasnaya zvezda, and then obtained from his 
chauffeur or domestic help the opinion of the ‘man on the street’.99  NBC News 
correspondent John Chancellor confessed to his ignorance while in Moscow, later writing 
that, “Probably half the American correspondents in the last twenty-five years did not 
have enough training in [the] language, culture, and history of the Russian people.  I am 
an example of it.”100
For journalists like Whitman Bassow, Hedrick Smith, and Peter Osnos of The 
Washington Post, the greatest gift for a foreign news correspondent was the ability to 
speak Russian.  Bassow wrote, “The Russian language opens doors to Soviet society and 
to news; ignorance keeps those doors shut.”  For Bassow, the rewards of knowing 
Russian went beyond just learning the news and doing the job, but he felt a certain 
personal enrichment in learning about life through real Russians, writing that, “The most 
important journalistic reward was to be able to meet Russians and learn about their lives 
and dreams.”101 These contacts gave Bassow insight into aspects of Soviet culture and 
life that a lack of language skills and cultural preparedness would have precluded.  
Bassow provided one of the stories revealed to him by luck of his Russian language 
knowledge:
Alexander was an architect, working for Moscow’s municipal government.  A 
Jew, he rarely talked about his personal problems, but one night over herring, 
potatoes, and vodka at his kitchen table, together with two other Jewish friends, 
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he finally revealed his bitterness at the anti-Semitism he had experienced.  He was 
being blocked for promotion because he was Jewish, although he was a member 
of the Communist Party and a decorated war veteran.  His friends had similar 
complaints.  Without the Russian language I would have known nothing about 
this or much about how the system worked.102
For Hedrick Smith and other correspondents in the field, it took a special kind of Russian 
to have the curiosity and bravery to meet with foreign correspondents, given the constant 
KGB presence, and the deeply imbedded mistrust of foreigners in Soviet culture.  Smith 
wrote that given the restrictions correspondents faced, and those faced by the Russian 
people that “by and large those [Russians] with whom foreigners tend to mix are special 
people, almost all unusual in some way.  And this obviously affects and colors an 
outsider’s view of Russia.”103  These special people Smith, Bassow and other Russian 
speaking correspondents came into contact with beginning in the early and mid-1960s 
were the pioneers of the dissident and human rights movement.  These were the most 
cosmopolitan and open minded Russians, already at odds with the regime with less to 
fear, and it was them who satisfied the correspondent’s need for a view of a different kind 
of Russia.  As Andrei Amalrik wrote in his April 1970 article on the role of foreign 
correspondents in Moscow, “It is clear that the whole world could have learned about this 
[the human rights] movement only from the information of Western correspondents in 
Moscow (and in the USSR, from foreign radio broadcasts), for neither TASS nor any 
other Soviet organ would ever have publicized it.”104
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The Meeting of the Journalists and Dissidents
Foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union, like dissident intellectuals, found 
themselves in remarkably similar situation, with both being on the receiving end of the 
authorities’ crackdown on their freedom of expression, as well as their ability to access 
and communicate with the outside world.  Both correspondents and intellectual dissidents 
expressed a firm belief in the freedom of speech and the freedom of information, since of 
course in the Western tradition it is the media’s role to present and distribute information, 
and in the Soviet tradition, the intellectual dissidents sought the ability to communicate 
their thoughts freely.  Therefore through personal relationships that were established 
beginning in the early and mid 1960s, the foreign press in the Soviet Union came to the 
aid of the Soviet Union’s intellectual dissidents in serving as their medium of 
communication with the outside world.  Since samizdat could not be published at home, 
foreign correspondents became the pigeons, taking these forbidden political, scientific, 
artistic, and literary documents out of the Soviet Union for publication abroad.  Once 
published abroad these works became known as tamizdat, meaning, “published over 
there.”  The dissident connection to Western journalists should not be underestimated
since it was the foreign news correspondents who brought the dissident’s message, and 
more generally, their existence to the outside world.  This relationship between foreign 
news correspondents and the Soviet dissidents was the result of a long process, with the 
full fledged relationship between the two groups emerging during the media coverage of 
the 1966 trial of Soviet writers Andrei Sinyavskii and Yuli Daniel.  The arrests of 
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Sinyavskii and Daniel also marked the beginning of the systematic government 
crackdown on the intellectual counterculture and the end to the Khrushchev’s thaw.105
During Khrushchev’s premiership there had been sporadic arrests of those 
accused of perpetrating “anti-Soviet activities” despite official de-Stalinization.  These 
arrests were widespread, but subject to the erratic way in which the regime combated 
dissent.  The irregularity of these arrests and the inconsistent execution of the Soviet law 
portended the confusing pace of de-Stalinization, as well as the inability of the Kremlin 
to decide what exactly de-Stalinization meant.  Khrushchev’s vacillation compounded by
several significant blunders such as the Cuban missile crisis, the inability to raise living 
standards, and general dissatisfaction with his agricultural policy all became fodder for 
hardliners looking for a reason to remove him from power.  Therefore, when the 
opportunity arose while Khrushchev was away on vacation in Abkhazia, hardliners
aligned with the party apparatus, the KGB, and the military, deposed the Soviet leader in 
October 1964.  They replaced him with Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary and Alexei 
Kosygin as Premier.  This new Soviet leadership secretly admired Stalin, with 
Brezhnev’s rise to power foretelling the creeping re-Stalinization and glorification of his 
reign.106  Brezhnev’s regime, unlike Khrushchev’s, cracked down forcefully on the 
counterculture activities of the dissident movement, and began to recede from the outside 
world, much like Stalin.  As journalist Anatole Shub wrote of the comparison between 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev:
Khrushchev had the peasant good sense to venture out, to travel widely at home 
and abroad, to elicit, even provoke contrary opinions from uninhibited foreigners.  
Nearly all men who deposed him (Shelepin may be an exception) seem to be stay-
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at-homers by choice. […] Nearly half of the Politburo members and alternates 
have never spent as much as a month in the West in all their lives.107
The new regime therefore was a turn backward, seeking to derail the changes made 
during the previous decade, in particular by cracking down on the intellectuals and the 
growing role of their underground culture.  The turning point for the incipient intellectual 
and dissident movement came with the arrests of Andrei Sinyavskyii and Yuli Daniel in 
October 1965.  These arrests were clearly meant to warn other such intellectuals of the 
danger posed to them by criticizing the regime and falling off the party line, particularly 
of submitting materials to Westerners for publication abroad, as both Sinyavstkii and 
Daniel did.108
Andrei Sinyavskii and in particular Yuli Daniel, were prominent members of 
Moscow kompaniia and were widely known in the intellectual community with hundreds 
and perhaps thousands having been personally acquainted with the two.  Both men were 
authors of short stories and poetry, much of which was critical of the Soviet regime and 
of the dominance of socialist realism, so both men sought a publisher abroad for their 
works, writing under the pseudonyms of Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak.  Both writers 
were accused of sending literature critical of the Soviet Union abroad for publication and 
were arrested and charged under article 70 of the Soviet Constitution for instigating “anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda.”  They were, according to dissident historian Ludmilla 
Alexeyeva, the first writers or poets in the Soviet Union to face criminal charges based on 
the content of their work, since there were no prominent trials of Soviet writers since the 
reign of Stalin.109  
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The arrests of Sinyavskii and Daniel signaled to Soviet intellectuals that the thaw 
was freezing up and that a “re-Stalinization” was on its way in.  Their September 1965
arrest got the attention of many others within the intellectual milieu, whose sense of 
collective injustice compelled them to action.  In particular, many intellectuals criticized 
their arrests on constitutional grounds.  They reasoned it was time to act, and make the 
Soviet government aware that the authorities were not following the letter of the law.  
This was especially the case with Alexander Esenin-Volpin, a logician and 
mathematician, also considered the father of the human rights movement in the Soviet 
Union, given his firm belief that Soviet authorities were compelled to strictly follow the 
Constitution, which guaranteed Soviet citizens the right to freedom of speech and 
demonstration, rights denied in practice.110  Esenin-Volpin arranged for the first political 
demonstration to take place on December 5, 1965, the birthday of the Soviet Constitution, 
demanding that glasnost, or openness, to be applied in the upcoming trial of both 
Sinyavskii and Daniel, so that the family and friends of the imprisoned men may attend 
the trial.  On the appointed day, Esenin-Volpin, along with a group of twenty or so like-
minded intellectuals and students, descend upon Pushkin Square and unfurled banners 
calling for “Glasnost in the Trial of Sinyavskii and Daniel,” and “Honor the Soviet 
Constitution.”  Their protest lasted but a moment, since the police and KGB were well 
aware of their attempted demonstration and moved in to suppress it immediately.  The 
protest that began at Pushkin Square on December 5, 1965, has been commented upon by 
many scholars and dissidents as the moment which marked when the intellectual 
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community in Moscow developed from just circles of kompaniia and intellectually 
minded friends into political activists.111
The demonstrators at Pushkin Square were successful in keeping their banners 
unfurled long enough for a reporter from The New York Times to snap a photo and have it 
published on the front page of the paper two weeks later, on December 18, 1965.112  The 
dissident movement officially made news in America, with Alexeyeva writing: 
It seemed that the editors of Western newspapers didn’t know quite what to make 
of the December 5 Glasnost Meeting.  Two weeks later, presumably after they 
realized that their reporters had witnessed antigovernment stirrings at the heart of 
a police state, the story got prominent play.  On December 18, the Glasnost 
Meeting was on page 1 of The New York Times.  Our existence was noticed and 
acknowledged.
Soon thereafter Alexeyeva wrote that she noticed the names of prominent international 
thinkers and philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Günter Grass, Norman Mailer, and 
many more being read on shortwave radio stations, all petitioning for Sinyavskii’s and 
Daniel’s release.113  The February 1966 trial of Sinyavskii and Daniel was the first high-
profile dissident trial to draw such western media attention.114  According to historians 
and the dissidents, the trial was a turning point in the history of dissent in the Soviet 
Union because it marked the moment when the dissident movement became politicized,
evolving from a small group of friends to a movement with powerful connections in the 
West.115  Whitman Bassow wrote of the trial: 
That day in February 1965 was a landmark, signaling the beginning of turmoil 
and convulsion in Soviet society that spawned a decade of dissent and dissidents.  
Although only a relatively small number of individuals became involved, their 
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appearance as a highly visible and vocal group was to affect profoundly the 
professional and personal lives of the American correspondents.116
The trial therefore marked for the foreign news correspondents the beginning of an era 
where they would become increasingly involved in the dissident movement, with many, 
though not all, risking their own personal safety to make contact with dissidents and 
make their stories known.
Initially though these contacts were overlaid with an air of mistrust.  As indicated 
earlier, years of isolation from the West colored many Russians’ perception of outsiders, 
making it difficult for them to trust foreigners.  Historian Barbara Walker noted that
many Russians felt a sense of superiority when they compared themselves to Westerners.  
This was based on the perceived inability of Westerners to take full advantage of their 
freedoms when compared to those of a Soviet citizen.117  Ludmilla Alexeyeva conveyed
this bifurcated attitude between distrust and an innate curiosity better than anyone else in 
her memoirs.  At one point she wrote about her own battle repressing her initial 
xenophobic reaction upon learning that her friend Yuli Daniel was sending his works 
abroad to be published.  She wrote of her reaction in this particular circumstance, “That 
was Soviet xenophobia, the remnants of teachings about ‘the progressive forces,’ ‘the 
forces of reaction,’ ‘class struggle,’ and other such things that had been crammed into my 
mind since childhood.  By the mid-1960s, I had learned to recognize those thoughts, and 
each time they cropped up I did my best to combat them.”118 Alexeyeva’s reactions to 
westerners continued to be flavored with mistrust, as she expressed in reaction to her first 
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encounters with the foreign news correspondents covering the Sinyavskii and Daniel 
trial: 
After all the spectators had entered the courthouse, the reporters edged towards 
us.  It was an awkward overture made by one pack to another, with a third 
watching.  When I sensed a reporter or an operative near me, I quieted down and 
turned away.  I didn’t want to be overheard, and I didn’t want to be quoted in a 
Western newspaper.  […]  I remember thinking: We are here because our friends 
are on trial.  It’s our problem; it’s our grief.  For reporters, this is just a political 
thriller.  I don’t want my life to be the subject of someone’s curiosity. 
Besides expressing much discomfort and distance with regard to the foreign press, 
Alexeyeva also indicated some attraction and curiosity with regard to these foreigners, 
writing, “After getting the cold shoulder, the journalists walked away, but I continued to 
glance at them with distrust and curiosity.  Shivering, red nosed, and wearing silly, warm-
weather shoes, they huddled together exchanging quips I couldn’t understand.”119  This 
initial distance was eventually bridged, as the dissidents gave into their curiosity and met
with the journalists, in some cases forging life long bonds and friendships, with 
Alexeyeva eventually inviting these reporters over to a pel’meni shop for some food.120
Western journalists were similarly anxious to meet the Russians, as they were 
often friendlier than the bureaucratic or cultural figures they dealt with on a normal basis.  
It was very difficult therefore for reporters to learn much about Russia and the Russians 
from Smith’s “official Russians,” so when journalists finally had the opportunity, they 
jumped on to the chance to speak with the dissidents, and the other Russians.  As Peter 
Osnos exclaimed, “now at last there were people who would talk, who would invite the 
outsiders to share unforgettable evenings around crowded tables, sharing information and 
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insights into life in the USSR.”121  These unforgettable evenings around crowded tables 
allowed many journalists to build not just professional relationships with the dissidents, 
but strong personal bonds as well, ones that often extended to their friends and their
families.  Alexeyeva, who was initially suspicious of the foreigners eventually changed 
her opinion and indicated in an interview with Walker, that “I simply came to my own 
conclusion that Americans help, and not only journalists, but diplomats, lawyers, tourists.  
Americans expressed greater interest in us and sympathy than the other Europeans.”122
This relationship between American journalists and dissidents came to serve the 
needs of both groups, resulting in an explosion of press coverage on all issues related to 
Soviet dissidents between the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s.  Historian Edward 
Bailey Hodgman noted that with regard to The New York Times, stories concerning 
Soviet human rights activists increased five-fold between 1968 and 1971.123  Peter Osnos 
alleged that this explosion of press coverage could be attributed to the fact that for a
reporter, the story of a human rights activist pitted against the Soviet state sold more 
papers than dry foreign-policy analysis or stories on subjects like health, housing, or 
agricultural policy.124  This was especially true since the journalist, according to Walker, 
often identified politically with the dissidents since they both advocated the need for 
openness and free speech.125  Similarly the dissidents realized they needed the foreign 
press.  Soviet scientist, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, and later outspoken 
proponent of peaceful coexistence and human rights in the Soviet Union, Andrei 
Sakharov, stated of the necessity of the outside world:  
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We could not know whether there is some kind of cooperation between our 
country and the outside world.  If no signals about our unhappy situation are sent 
out, then there cannot be . . . then even the possibility, which might exist, could 
not be utilized, because we wouldn’t know what it was that needed to be changed 
or how to change it.126
The West became essential for the dissident movement, and as it evolved the movement 
became more sophisticated in making their information available to the Western press.  
As soon as they began to organize, first into aid organizations for their imprisoned 
friends but later into genuine underground networks of activists, the dissidents began to 
produce statements tailor made for the foreign press publication.  In the months 
immediately after the Sinyavskii and Daniel Trial, and their sentencing to a Soviet labor 
camp, their friends remained organized and developed ways through which they could 
support the families of those imprisoned through an informal “Red Cross” for Soviet 
political prisoners.  This organization offered the families of political prisoners, food, 
clothing, and information concerning other such prisoners.127  This organization of the 
human rights movement began in Moscow, coming from the remnants of the kompanii, 
which was greatly damaged after the trial of Sinyavskii and Daniel.  It included many 
dynamic and diverse personalities, all with their own agendas, but united in their 
disappointment in the system.  By April 1968, following the prominent trial of four 
human rights activists for distributing transcripts of the Daniel and Sinyavskii Trial along 
with other subversive literature, Natasha Gorbanevskaya, a poet and professional editor, 
along with a small group of activists began publishing Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy, or 
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the Chronicle of Current Events.128  Khronika served as the human rights movement’s 
principle news source, recording all kinds of arrests and cases where individual’s human 
rights were violated.  Its editors typed multiple copies, and passed them around between 
networks of related dissidents.  According to Hodgman, Khonika served as a “reflection 
of the varied activities of dissidents all over the Soviet Union, and unified the expressions 
of underground opinion.”129  It was a form of samizdat where all dissident movements 
found a space to discuss their grievances.  Anything from the grievances of intellectuals 
being locked up, to those of the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Jews, and Russian 
Orthodox followers found their own place in the pages of Khonika.  According to 
Alexeyeva, the success of those movements striving for national and religious rights 
became increasingly tied to the success of the human rights movement, where 
intellectuals gathered together and printed in Khonika the samizdat of each of these 
groups.  Alexeyeva concluded that, “in such a heterogeneous society as the USSR, […]
only the human rights movement can play a linking role for all other movements.”130  
This was since the human rights movement was the concerted effort of a select group of 
Soviet intellectuals to bring together the various strains of dissent, uniting them under the 
universal values of human rights.
Another reason for the importance of the Khronika was that it was viewed by 
dissidents as a means of appealing to the West, as evidenced by the many open letters 
published to “people of conscience” or “the world community.”  Therefore many issues 
of Khonika were taken to the West in the hand luggage of travelers, journalists and 
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diplomats.  In particular London School of Economics political science Professor Peter 
Reddaway, brought back with him issues of Khonika and published them in his 1972
book Uncensored Russia, which was one of the first works to discuss the dissident 
movement in great detail.131  The dissidents quickly learned that they could use their 
foreign press contacts to express their views to the outside world, reaching a large 
sympathetic and powerful audience.  Whitman Bassow explained, “The AP and UPI, The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the networks began to 
receive the Chronicle [of Current Events].  Phones almost never stopped ringing as 
mysterious and often unknown voices would ask for an immediate meeting to pass on 
‘important information.’”132  The dissidents also began offering news conferences to 
announce important information, inviting the foreign press to attend, and often traveling 
long distances to meet with reporters on crowded street corners.133  This was especially 
the case in 1968, after the much publicized trial of dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg, in 
which his wife, Ludmilla, asked Western journalists to appear at her apartment to attend a 
late night news conference.134  Therefore, this relationship between the Western news 
correspondents and the dissidents was a symbiotic one, with both groups benefiting from 
each other’s contact.  The correspondent wanted to know Russians and get a good news 
story, and the dissident wanted to tell the world what he thought and make his name 
known internationally so that the authorities would be kept in check.135  
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The coziness of this relationship did however generate some criticism.  In 
particular Peter Osnos became critical of the rapport between the dissidents and the 
foreign press.  Osnos alleged that the coziness of this relationship conflated the 
importance of the dissidents, and was an instance where journalists began making the 
news instead of reporting it.  Osnos wrote, “Westerners find it difficult to be completely 
objective or critical about dissidents because we are instinctively sympathetic to their 
views, even when we don’t fully understand them.  Since the Soviet Union is considered 
our country’s most formidable adversary, opposition expressed to its negative features 
finds ready approval here.”136  Therefore, for Osnos, the Moscow correspondents were
overplaying their hand, focusing too much on the dissident movement and blowing it out 
of proportion.
This focus on the dissident movement within the Western press had its affects 
back home, with the American public and the American policy makers who were reading 
and watching these news stories with intense interest.  These stories about the dissidents 
played well in America, and they fulfilled the desire of many Americans to read about the 
out manned and out gunned freedom fighters going up against America’s prime adversary 
in the Cold War.  Figures like Andrei Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Boris 
Pasternak, Roy and Zhores Medvedev all becoming household names.  The fight for 
national rights also played well in America.  This can easily be said of ethnic Lithuanian 
and Latvian nationals in America, who increasingly learned of and sympathized with the 
situation faced by their ethnic brethren abroad.  Most prominently though, the Soviet 
Jews found allies in the United States, looking for ways to allow them the right to
emigrate, with stories on the so-called refusniks, or Jews denied exit visas, being 
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prominently played in the American press.  It is therefore no surprise that shortly
thereafter, Congress and American policy makers began to take notice of the dissident 
movement.  This was particularly after the publication of the transcripts of the Sinyavskii 
and Daniel Trial in the West, with Congress launching its own inquiry into the Soviet 
treatment of the dissident movement.137  The justification for such a venture was given by 
Senator Thomas J. Dodd, who argued the existence of a link between international 
security and the Soviet Union’s treatment of its own citizens.  Senator Dodd stated: 
In this [intellectual dissent] lies the best hope for the peaceful evolution of the 
totalitarian Communist society into a more open society which will, by this very 
token, be more responsive to popular needs and the popular will, less 
conspiratorial and less prone to engage in subversion and aggression abroad.  
With such a society the free world would have no difficulty in achieving that 
degree of basic understanding essential for peaceful coexistence.138
Therefore as early as the mid-1960s, just as Western journalists and the dissident 
movement began their own rapprochement in Moscow, Congress began advocating on 
the behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union, and the dissidents began to benefit from 
their new and powerful ally.
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THE RISE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONNECTION:
DISSIDENTS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE AMERICAN CONGRESS
“The key to the rescue of our people lies now in the hands of the 
United States of America.”139
From the relationship between Western journalists and the Soviet dissidents 
themselves, this chapter turns to the relationship of the American people and American 
policy makers to the dissident movement.  For the vast majority of Americans and 
American policy makers, their knowledge of issues concerning the Soviet Union came
from their reading American newspapers and watching and listening to broadcast news.  
Therefore the sympathetic relationship between American foreign news journalists and 
Soviet dissidents received ample press coverage.  Stories of oppression experienced by 
Soviet intellectuals, religious groups, and ethnic minorities had the direct result of 
prompting the interest of many in the United States, particularly anyone who felt they had
ethnic kin in the Soviet Union, most notably Jews, but also Latvians, Lithuanians, 
Estonians, and others.  The plight of the Soviet Jews seemed to have gained the most 
interest due to the powerful and vocal Jewish minority in the United States and their 
consternation at the refusal of the Soviet government to allow the Jews the right to leave
the Soviet Union, and immigrate to Israel or the United States.  It was this issue that came 
to define American’s perception of the dissident movement most strongly.  Concern over 
the fate of the Soviet Jews was so acute during the late 1960s and early 1970s that a 
historian of the dissident movement has concluded that for the US the issue of human 
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rights in the Soviet Union was synonymous with the Jewish issue.140  By the early 1970s, 
advertisements, editorial letters and news pieces on Jewish emigration regularly appeared 
in The New York Times, and in 1971 developments regarding the Jewish issue constituted 
close to 80 percent of news stories on dissidents.141
Jewish activists in the United States followed the situation in the Soviet Union 
carefully through their close reading of the samizdat publications of Soviet Jewish 
dissidents and trips made there themselves.  There were several different American-
Jewish organizations that actively demanded the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate freely, 
differing in their approaches but quite influential in their effort to lobby Congress and the 
American public to take action.  The National Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry
(NJCSJ) lobbied members of Congress and the Soviet leadership, waging public 
education campaigns in the American press and organizing vigils at the Soviet embassies 
and consulates.142  This contrasted with the approach of the Student Struggle for Soviet 
Jewry (SSSJ) and the Jewish Defense League (JDL), whose methods were more 
confrontational.  The most radical members of these groups even threatened Soviet 
diplomats in 1970 and 1971 in order to draw attention to the issue.143
The widespread publication of news stories concerning Soviet Jews, combined 
with the intense concern of interest groups working on behalf of them, compelled 
Congress to find someway to act on the issue of Soviet Jews.  The activism of this
movement in America influenced many members of Congress, out of either their own 
concern for the plight of Soviet Jews, their concern for supporting issues important to 
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their base constituencies, or their own political self-promotion.  Some members of 
Congress used the issue of Jewish emigration as a means of criticizing the policy of 
détente, promoted by President Richard Nixon, and his National Security Advisor (later 
Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger, which favored quiet diplomacy and the trade carrot
in order to encourage the gradual liberalization of the Soviet Union as opposed to direct 
confrontation on these issues.
The issue of human rights in the Soviet Union was raised during an era of 
Congressional assertiveness at the expense of a Presidency troubled by the Watergate 
scandal, and was therefore very much tied to American domestic politics.  Many in 
Congress touted the human rights issue to play toward their constituents and rebuke the 
Nixon administration for its perceived cold heartedness and apathy toward the issue of 
human rights in the Soviet Union as a result of détente.  This “dissident-card” afforded 
Congress the opportunity to assert itself against the Nixon administration, to take a moral 
stand, to satisfy their constituents, and to make clear Congress’s anti-Communist 
credentials.144  Hearings on the Jewish issue began as early as 1971, and soon thereafter 
talk of actual legislative action followed.  The issue of Jewish emigration evolved to 
encompass support for all forms of dissidents and dissenters in the Soviet Union, and 
culminated in a general assault on détente headlined by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to 
the 1974 Trade Act, which barred the Soviet Union and any other non-market economy
from receiving Most-Favored Nation (MFN) trade status if its human rights record was 
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found lacking.145  This legislation contradicted the Nixon administration’s emphasis on 
quiet diplomacy and détente with regard to the Soviet Union, and it pitted different 
factions of American policy makers against one another.  The faction most opposed to 
détente, and the Senator most well known for his fight on behalf of the Soviet Jews was 
the influential Washington State Democratic Senator, Henry “Scoop” Jackson, who along 
with his backers in Congress, pursued policies that forced the Soviet regime to relent on 
Jewish emigration.  On the other side were Nixon and Kissinger, who argued that quiet 
diplomacy was the most effective means of resolving the Jewish issue, as the open 
confrontation preferred by Jackson would only force the Soviets to retreat on the issue.  
As argued by historian Paula Stern, the raucous debate between Kissinger and Senator 
Jackson and his colleagues demonstrated the complete failure of the notion of the 
“water’s edge,” where debates on foreign policy were supposed to remain at home in 
order to present an united front to America’s adversaries abroad.  Therefore the debate 
over the human rights movement and America’s involvement in Jewish emigration was 
subjugated to divisions within America’s own domestic politics, affecting the dissident 
movements in the Soviet Union.
The Rapprochement of the American and Soviet Jewish Movements
The United States there has long had a history of activism and interest by an 
ethnic group in their own ethnic kin abroad since the United States is a nation made up of 
immigrants.  Therefore American Jewish interest in the plight of the Soviet Jews was no 
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exception.  During the heyday of emigration from Eastern Europe to the United States, 
between 1875 and 1914, 2.4 million Jews came to America, of whom 1.5 million 
emigrated from Tsarist Russia.146  For many activists in the American movement to aid 
Soviet Jews, these immigrants were their ancestors, giving some what they felt was a 
personal connection to events going on in the Soviet Union.  An activist and later 
historian of the movement, Stuart Altshuler, recalled how he felt this personal connection 
from remembering his grandmother’s stories of life growing up in a Ukrainian shtetl and 
his great-grandparents’ deaths early in the twentieth century during the pogroms.147  This 
personal connection, in conjunction with what has been described as a guilt complex 
among American Jews for not helping during the Holocaust, inspired many American 
Jews to action upon learning about the modern tragedy faced by Soviet Jews.148
This American-Jewish movement emerged during an era where all over the 
Western world, one’s attachment to ethnic identity was on the rise.  This included
movements among the Basques in France and Spain, as well as the Irish Catholics in 
Northern Ireland.  According the William Orbach, American and Soviet Jews were not 
left out of this “ethnic wave,” with many Jews boldly demonstrating their interest and 
concern for their history, culture, and their brethren abroad.149  For Jews in the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the single most important event in awakening Jewish 
identity and pride was Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six Days War, which propped-up 
Jewish confidence all over the world, and inspired Jews to take up an interest in their own
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culture, history, and identity.  In the Soviet Union these feelings resulted in the 
movement for Jewish emigration to Israel, while in America, this sense of pride acted 
with the social forces propelling the Civil Rights movement and attention to social justice 
and human rights to compel American Jewish groups to take up the cause of Jewish 
emigration.
The Soviet Jewish movement for emigration
The Soviet Union has had a history of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic policies.  
The Jews were viewed by Stalin as having too many connections abroad to be trusted, an 
attitude which grew during the post-war years.150  The Soviet government reacted to 
Israel’s 1967 victory in the Six Days War by stepping up its campaign against Soviet 
Jews.  This meant suppressing Jewish identity while severing diplomatic relations with 
Israel, resulting in a complete halt to the slow flow of Jewish emigration.  In the words of
political scientist Peter Reddaway, this escalation of Soviet anti-Semitism in the wake of 
the Six Days War, “tipped the balance,” meaning that many Soviet Jews, sensing that 
their situation could hardly get any worse, moved towards activism and became involved 
in the dissident movement.151  Between 1967 and 1968, there was an evolution in the 
democratic dissident movement in the Soviet Union, in which between sixty and seventy 
percent were Jews themselves, or married to Jews.152  Many Soviet Jews found their 
sense of Jewish identity awakened by Israel’s victory in the Six Days War and by the 
increased repression they experienced at the hands of the Soviets based on their Jewish 
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identity.  Similarly, some of these Jewish dissidents took to heart the failure of Alexander 
Dubček’s experiment with “socialism with a human face” in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 
shifted to a Zionist approach.  They reasoned that there was no way to change Soviet 
culture and Socialism.  These Jews recognized that their future no longer belonged in the 
Soviet Union, and therefore sought to leave.  For some this reawakening had been indeed 
inspired by a religious reawakening, but as Ludmilla Alexeyeva argued, the roots of the 
Jewish movement for emigration laid less in Jewish nationalism than it did in 
socioeconomics.  For those Jews who faced official discrimination in the Soviet Union 
and the inability to express themselves freely, emigration meant the ability to further 
oneself economically, and the opportunity to pursue the scientific, artistic, and 
professional passions they were denied in the Soviet Union.153  Therefore most Soviet 
Jews concluded that the best means for them to achieve the future they desired for 
themselves and their children laid abroad, and not in the Soviet Union.
Prior to 1967, there were very few instances where Soviet Jews had won the right 
to emigrate.  For instance, Stalin had allowed some Jews to ability to leave in order to be 
reunited with their families, but these were generally older people.  In total, between 
1960 and 1970 it is estimated that about 4,000 Soviet Jews had been given permission to 
emigrate, and after the Six Days War there was little or no emigration at all.  Any Jew 
who sought to leave 1967 was refused an exit visa, and became known as a refusnik, 
since they were refused a visa and were forced to remain in the Soviet Union often at a 
reduced social status, as engineers became repairmen or researchers guards.154  
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The Soviet government’s rigidity on the issue of Jewish emigration had less to do 
with anti-Semitism than it did with the perceived ideological and geopolitical problems 
free emigration posed for the Soviet government.  It was believed by many Soviet 
officials that permitting free emigration would lead to a degree of social liberalization 
that could prove destabilizing to the Soviet government.  This position was related best 
by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin who wrote in his 
memoirs that, “In the closed society of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin was afraid of 
emigration in general (irrespective of nationality or religion) lest an escape hatch from 
the happy land of socialism seem to offer a degree of liberalization that might destabilize 
the domestic situation.”155  Therefore, the Soviet government was much less concerned 
about ethnic issues when it came to Jewish emigration than they were about the political 
signal it would have demonstrated to other disaffected groups. Another reason the 
Soviets offered to prohibit free emigration came from ideology.  The Soviets had 
reasoned that they had created a “utopia,” and in turn anyone who wished to leave their 
“utopia” would naturally be viewed as a traitor.156  This was especially the case with 
regard to the Jews, as many had already been considered disloyal given their perceived 
cosmopolitanism and connections with outsiders.  Similarly, Jewish emigration was a 
threat to the Soviets because their desire to leave signaled that there was ethnic 
discrimination, a phenomenon the state did not want to acknowledge, since 
discrimination was supposed to have been absent from the Soviet Union.157  There was 
also the concern posed by the idea of a “brain drain” and leaking of military and state 
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secrets through the emigration of the Soviet Jews, as many Jews had been prominent 
academics, researchers, and scientists, many of which were in contact with sensitive 
information or equipment.158  Another major factor preventing the Soviets from allowing 
the Jews to emigrate was the tenuous relationship between the Arab states and the Soviet 
Union.  The Soviets needed their Arab allies as a counterweight to America’s interests in 
the Middle East, particularly with regard to Israel and to energy.  Therefore, the Soviets 
under no circumstances wanted to offend their Arab allies by contributing to the growth 
of Israel’s population and to its military.  The free emigration of Jews had to be opposed 
by the Soviet government, because the price of allowing it proved to be too much.
The act of becoming a refusnik made life much worse for many Soviet Jews, 
having to work menial jobs and live off of reduced wages, while losing their apartments 
and facing discrimination by the authorities.  The next question many refusniks faced was 
whether to go public with their emigration problems by placing their names on the 
petitions and lists passed along to foreign diplomats, or to sign a collective letter, or even 
to participate in public demonstration.159  The earliest refusnik activists expressed their 
dissatisfaction through the use of letters, and petitions much in the same manner other 
disaffected groups, such as the Crimean Tatars, and the human rights activists, expressed 
their frustration with the system before them (see Chapter 1).  Like these other groups, 
the refusniks reached out to the human rights activists involved in writing and publishing 
Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy, or the Chronicle of Current Events.  At first though many 
refusniks attempted to keep their distance from the human rights activists, fearing that if 
they participated their prospects for being issued an exit visa would decrease.  As 




Alexeyeva pointed out, this opinion changed once Yulius Telesin, a vocal human rights 
activist, applied for emigration and was issued a visa in quick order to the astonishment 
of the refusniks.160  Jewish activists learned from Telesin that their best bet at leaving 
came from making noise and becoming vocal about their discontent to the point that the 
Soviets would deport them.  Many refusniks also ended up coming to this conclusion
having recognized that their future in the Soviet Union looked grim.  Many had already 
lost their jobs and their homes, and so reckoned they had nothing else left to lose in going 
public in their discontent with the regime, and reach out to the West for help.161
The American Movement to aid Soviet Jews
Israel’s victory in the Six Days War proved to be just as much a seminal event for 
American Jews as it was for Soviet Jews.  The wave of American Jewish activism that 
followed the war was not instantaneous, but rather the result of an evolutionary process
that had its roots in the Civil Rights movement of which many young Jews were 
participants.  The movement to aid Soviet Jews emerged just as the Civil Rights 
movement began to recede and the era of non-violent student activism was drawing to a 
close.162  Many activist-minded Jews took up the issue of the Soviet Jews as they became 
disenchanted with the growth of black militancy in the Civil Rights movement.163  The 
decade of Civil Rights marches and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations also echoed a rise
in moral consciousness in the United States, a phenomenon that spurred many American
Jews to view the events in the Soviet Union through a moral lens.  For instance as Orbach 
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observed, about half the members of the youthful and anti-establishment Student Struggle 
for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) were also participants in the anti-war movement, bringing their 
activist tactics and sense of moral consciousness with them between both movements.164  
In particular the young and outspoken founder of the SSSJ, Jacob Birnbaum, lent his 
experience in the Civil Rights movement to his activism on behalf of the Soviet Jewish 
issue.  Birnbaum argued in one of his earliest pamphlets that, “Many young Jews forget 
that if injustice cannot be condoned in Selma, USA, neither must it be overlooked in 
Kiev, USSR.  Though there are no gas chambers in the Soviet Union, our people there—
the surviving remnants of Hitler’s massacres—are being destroyed in their innermost 
humanity.”165  Birnbaum in this passage connected the activism of the Civil Rights 
movement, the plight of Soviet Jews, and American Jewish guilt over the Holocaust.
Ties between the movement to liberate Soviet Jews and the Civil Rights 
movement ran both ways, with prominent Civil Rights and related non-Jewish figures, 
expressing their concern for the Soviet Jews.  For instance, participating in the first ever 
Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews held on October 21, 1963 was Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr., who personally expressed concern for the treatment of Jews in the Soviet 
Union.166  In a similar vein, Civil Rights activist Bayard Rustin argued that the 
discrimination faced by Soviet Jews was analogous to the experience of African 
Americans in the United States, and therefore African American Civil Rights activists 
should lend their support to the Soviet Jews, as it would give the Civil Rights movement 
an air of universality in its struggle for social justice.  Rustin stated, “Just as the white 
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abolitionists fought for the liberation of black slaves before the Civil War, people in the 
United States, Jewish and non-Jewish, white and black, should fight for the liberation of 
Jews in the Soviet Union.”  Rustin continued to argue that given the history of racial 
discrimination in America, African Americans “have gained a certain moral authority 
which can be effectively used to assist other oppressed groups in their own struggle for 
liberation.”167  Rustin’s statements, as well as the activism of many young people spoke 
to the rise of social consciousness in America, a sentiment which fueled the moral 
outrage and the desire to come to the aid of the Soviet Jews.
Another factor that led to Jewish-American concern over the situation faced by 
the Soviet Jews was the changing meaning of the Holocaust with regard to American-
Jewish identity in the 1960s.168  Jacob Birnbaum alluded to American Jewish guilt over 
inaction during the Holocaust in one of the organization’s earliest handbooks. “Most of 
us are too young to bear any responsibility for the dearth of protest during the Nazi era.  
But our time has its own mighty challenge and it is up to us to make a full response.”169  
In spite of Birnbaum’s depiction of the situation faced by many Soviet Jews, the reality 
was far from that of the Holocaust and any comparison between the two would be 
incorrect.  Birnbaum’s invocation of the Holocaust was important because his rhetoric
roused many American Jews to action, since many believed that their support for the 
Soviet Jews would assuage any guilt they may have felt over the Holocaust.  Birnbaum, 
along with other Jews from Columbia University, held the first rally on behalf of Soviet 
Jews at the Soviet Union’s United Nations Mission on May 1, 1964.  One thousand 
protesters showed up to the demonstration, many bearing placards reading, “Let Them 
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Live or Leave.”170  This first show of activism on behalf of the Soviet Jews in the United 
States predated the Six Days War and the more radical imposition of restrictions on 
Jewish emigration that followed.  
Prior to Birnbaum’s efforts, the issue of the treatment of Soviet Jews had already 
started to get the attention of America’s policy makers.  As early as the mid 1950s, 
President Eisenhower had raised the issue with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev during 
a meeting at Camp David.  President Kennedy was also well aware of the Jewish problem 
in the Soviet Union, having been briefed on it by prominent Jewish politicians such as 
Senators Jacob Javits of New York and Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, as well as 
Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg.  The State Department believed that the US
Government could do little in reaction to the persecution Jews faced in the Soviet Union.  
In fact, officials within the State Department believed that intervention on behalf of the 
Soviet Jews would make matters worse for them, by further alienating them from Soviet 
society.  The Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Frederick G. 
Dutton, articulated this view in a 1962 reply to a letter of inquiry by Senator Kenneth B. 
Keating of Massachusetts.  Dutton wrote: 
It is very difficult for our Government to contribute to the direct solution of the 
problems of minorities in a territory where a foreign sovereign government 
exercises full control.  Further, and more importantly, it is doubtful if further 
protestations would be helpful to the Jews in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet 
government has accused Soviet Jews of being under the influence of foreign 
governments, including the United States.  Further intervention concerning the 
problems of the Jewish minority in the USS.R. might well redound to the 
disadvantage of Soviet Jewry.
                                                
170 Altshuler, 27.
74
Dutton further argued that it was best for private individuals and organizations to call
attention to the Jewish issue in the Soviet Union, not the US Government, believing that 
world public opinion would be the best deterrent to future abuse.  Dutton added:
The force of world opinion has become an important factor to discourage certain 
governments from pursuing policies which result in the persecution of their own 
nationals on religious and other grounds.  The United States naturally looks with 
favor on activities by organizations and private individuals which effectively 
bring such persecution to the notice of world opinion.171
The State Department remained consistent in this view throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
with diplomat Walter J. Stoessel iterating in a 1967 letter to Ambassador Malcolm Toon:
We believe that the activities of private organizations and individuals are the best 
means for keeping world public attention focused on this [Jewish] problem, 
thereby persuading the Soviets that it is in their interests to relax their restrictive 
policies.  The most effective way that Americans can make their feelings on this 
subject known to the Soviet authorities is to raise their voice individually and in 
groups against Soviet religious and racial discrimination.172
Stoessel’s position, like that of Dutton, set the tone for official US Government policy 
with regard to the Soviet government’s human rights conduct well into the 1970s. The 
State Department’s wariness of government to government dialog on the issue, as well as 
support of non-governmental organizations in raising the issue, provided the framework 
for the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente which emphasized similar policies.  President 
Richard Nixon’s most trusted foreign policy confidant, Henry Kissinger, like Dutton and 
Stoessel before him, believed that direct interference in the sovereign affairs of the Soviet 
Union would only make the situation worse for the Soviet Union’s Jews.  
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The quiet diplomacy advocated for by the State Department left the door open for 
the advocacy efforts by the American movement to aid Soviet Jews. This movement was 
far from cohesive, and was in fact quite diverse, as it reflected the fractured nature of 
America’s Jewish population during the 1960s and 1970s.  Many historians of the 
movement have divided the different advocacy groups between so-called “establishment” 
and “non-establishment” or “grassroots” organizations.173  Historian William Orbach 
goes further, by dividing these organizations into four main groups: Zionist, defense, 
religious, and coordinating.174  In general the establishment groups represented the 
interests of older entrenched Jewish activists and groups, and were adherents of quiet 
diplomacy, fearing that activism would result in negative repercussions for the Soviet 
Jews.175  The establishment position grew out of the October 12, 1963 Conference on the 
Status of Soviet Jewry, and led to the formation of the American Jewish Conference on 
Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ).176  The American Jewish establishment generally remained on the 
sidelines of the movement to aid Soviet Jewry, as it maintained its support for quiet 
diplomacy until the early 1970s, when the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) 
was persuaded to support the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.177
In contrast to the establishment groups, which were generally older and favored
quiet diplomacy, the non-establishment groups were younger and activist.  Their 
membership consisted primarily of university students, many of whom were veterans of 
or inspired by the activities of the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements.  Jacob 
Birnbaum’s SSSJ was the most active organization of these organizations.  Birnbaum 
                                                






generally believed in the legitimacy of quiet diplomacy but thought it was essential for
public demonstrations to take place, arguing that doing so would “increase our efforts to 
mobilize a tidal wave of public opinion” and show the US Government “that we really do 
care deeply for our cause.”178  The activist work of the SSSJ was considered relatively 
moderate in comparison to the radical actions undertaken by Rabbi Meir David Kahane’s 
Jewish Defense League (JDL), which split from the SSSJ in 1967.179  The JDL was 
responsible for carrying out violent demonstrations, among the most well-known
included an assault on Aeroflot’s New York office and an attack on the Soviet Union’s 
mission to the United Nations.  Its radical activities were designed to persuade the public 
to take action on behalf of Soviet Jews.  In an inflammatory March 26, 1970 
advertisement taken out by the JDL in The New York Times, the group accused the 
American Jewish establishment of complicity during the Holocaust for its silence, and 
indicated to the world that it would stop at nothing to make known its message.  The 
advertisement read in part, “We, by our silence, doom the Soviet Jew.  We, by our 
apathy, shed this blood.  We reject respectability.  We will do what must be done.  We 
wish to shake the world and spotlight the Jewish problem so that the United States 
government will be forced to demand justice for people if the Soviets want Western 
friendship.”180  The JDL espoused confrontation and was not afraid to commit violence in 
the name of saving the Soviet Jews, believing in the dire need to draw attention to the 
issue.  Unlike the establishment NCSJ, the SSSJ and JDL made it their mission to sway 
public world public opinion to take action to save the Soviet Union’s Jews.  The older 
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establishment groups were clearly influenced and believed in the restraint preached by 
the State Department and later the Nixon administration.  The youthful SSSJ and JDL 
embodied the anti-establishment mood and radical striving for social justice that 
characterized the generation of young people coming of age in the 1960s and 1970s.  
These young people were also afraid of repeating the mistakes of their parent’s 
generation, who in their view through apathy, allowed the Holocaust to take place.  
Participation in the movement to liberate the Soviet Jews thus satisfied the desire of the 
generation coming of age to atone for inactivity during the Holocaust, while channeling 
the mood of their generation to a new cause of social justice.
In part the participation of interest groups in the movement to aid the Soviet Jews 
was made possible by the explosion of information channels between the Soviet Union 
and the United States through the 1960s.  Initially, due to the censorship practiced on 
foreign journalists by Glavlit (see Chapter 1), these information channels were quite 
limited, as Dutch diplomat, and later historian, Petrus Buwalda observed in writing that, 
“In the beginning there was a lack of knowledge in the West about Soviet Jews and a lack 
of contact with them.  No one knew how many wanted to emigrate.”181  The growth in 
the relationship between foreign news correspondents in the Soviet Union and dissidents 
also helped fuel the activist sentiment of the American Jews by publicizing their stories.  
These stories had the positive affect of deterring abuses taken on Jews by the Soviet 
government, as was indicated by news correspondent Robert Kaiser.  Therefore it became 
helpful for Soviet Jews to have as many Western contacts as possible and to be known in 
the West.182  Kaiser wrote, “In Moscow the Jewish activists have extensive contact with 




western correspondents, who report official actions against Jews, a factor which has 
obviously deterred the KGB in many instances.”183  It also seemed that major newspapers 
such as The New York Times consciously chose to run more stories related to dissident 
activities in the Soviet Union, given the growth in the number of news pieces on the 
issue.  According to historian Edward Bailey Hodgman, between 1968 and 1971 the 
annual number of news stories, editorials, and advertisements concerning Soviet 
dissidents published by The New York Times increased from 84 in 1968 to 430 in 1971.  
Similarly in 1972 there were 359 such articles, leading Hodgman to conclude that for the 
years 1971 and 1972 there was on average an item published about every day, with 
multiple items often appearing in the same issue of the paper.184  In part this increased 
interest in dissident issues may be attributed to the fact that beginning in 1964 Harrison 
Salisbury, a former longtime correspondent in Moscow and Russia enthusiast, became
the managing editor of The New York Times.  So not only were those interested in 
dissident issues writing more stories, but newspaper editors were consciously publishing
them in greater numbers, resulting in the plight of Soviet Jews and dissidents in general, 
becoming well-known and followed in the West.
One of the main sources of information on dissident issues for the press was 
Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy, which Western journalists often consulted and published 
anecdotes from back home.185  Many of Khonika’s articles described the pervasive anti-
Semitism faced by Soviet Jews when dealing with the Soviet authorities.  In particular, 
the influential story of Boris Kochubievsky, one of the first refusniks subjected to blatant 
Soviet anti-Semitism, was published in The New York Times by journalist Henry Kamm, 
                                                




and was taken directly from Khronika.  The publication of Kochubievsky’s story in the 
West placed a human face on the anti-Semitism faced by Soviet Jews, subsequently 
spurring many American Jews to action.186  Kochubievsky was an unlikely candidate to 
become an activist and one of the first refusniks.  Despite his Jewish heritage, and his 
father’s murder at Babi Yar during the Holocaust, Kochubievsky had been a loyal Soviet 
citizen, even marrying a Ukrainian KGB agent.  He came to prominence when he refused 
to go along with a declaration at the factory he worked in condemning Israel for its 1967 
victory in the Six Days War, since he recognized the declaration’s anti-Semitic 
undertones.  This action earned Kochubievsky the distrust of his fellow workers, who
pressured him to resign from his job.  Thereafter Kochubievsky became a critic of Soviet 
anti-Semitism, and became famous for going to Babi Yar in February 1968 to insist that 
the Soviet authorities recognize the uniquely Jewish character of the tragedy that 
occurred there during the Second World War.187  Kochubievsky had become so 
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Soviet Union that he and his wife applied for 
permission to emigrate.  The Soviets initially denied their application, but later that year 
the authorities changed their mind and decided to issue the Kochubievskys exit visas.  On 
the day the Kochubievskys were supposed to leave, their apartment was searched and 
their exit visas were revoked, and Kochubievsky was arrested for “anti-Soviet slander.”  
Kochubievsky was then sentenced to three years forced labor in May 1968, shortly after 
his story first appeared in The New York Times.188  Upon receiving word on 
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Kochubievsky in the West, those involved in the movement to aid the Soviet Jews held
vigils in his support across the country with the backing of Amnesty International.
Popular support for the movement only grew by the press’s interest in these cases 
of anti-Semitism, as was again the case after the publication of a letter written by twenty-
six Lithuanian Jews complaining about conditions in the Soviet Union.189  This letter was 
originally written in February 1968, but was published both by The New York Times and 
The Washington Post eight months later.  The letter discussed the rising tide of anti-
Semitism in the Soviet Union, as expressed particularly in the Soviet press following 
Israel’s victory in the Six Days War.  The document also outlined the discrimination Jews 
faced in higher education and in obtaining professional jobs, as well as the destruction of 
Jewish cemeteries outside Vilnius and elsewhere.190  This letter was initially smuggled 
out of the Soviet Union and later translated and made public by Professor Nathan Glazer 
of the University of California and Chairman of the Academic Committee on Soviet 
Jewry.  The publication of such information, which came directly from Soviet Jews, 
inspired the Jewish community in the United States to action by painting a picture of 
desperation faced by Soviet Jews.
Ultimately the bleakness of the situation became fully apparent in 1970 with the 
arrest of the Leningrad hijackers.  Vladimir Bukovsky, a non-Jewish dissident, along with 
Edward Kuznetsov and about a dozen other mostly Jewish plotters from Leningrad and 
Riga, planned to hijack an Aeroflot plane enroot to Priozersk from Leningrad, and reroute 
it to Finland.  Most of the conspirators were Jews who had been refused exit visas, and 
they saw the radical move as their best hope of leaving the Soviet Union and drawing 
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international attention to the issue.  Their plot was however poorly prepared, with only 
one conspirator, Mark Dymshits, actually having experience as a pilot.191  Just before 
their plans came to completion, the KGB arrested the plotters, and close to 200 other 
Jews who supposedly had some kind of connection with the plot, accusing them as
terrorists.192  The Soviet authorities likely had known about the conspiracy for a long 
time, but waited until the moment was right to proceed with the arrests.193  The Soviet 
government intended to use the attempted hijacking as a means of highlighting the 
antisocial aspects of the dissident and Jewish movements, and use the trial against the 
plotters as a means of publicly discrediting them.  The Soviets held a series of show trials 
for the plotters behind closed doors, drawing death sentences for Kuznetsov and 
Dymshits, and hefty prison terms for the others.  
The severity of the sentences in the case of the Leningrad hijackers shocked the 
world and resulted in a public relations disaster for the Soviet Union, as its tactics were 
universally condemned in the West.  In the West, the act of hijacking itself was not 
condoned, but in this case, the hijackers were portrayed by the American press as
freedom fighters seeking to escape totalitarianism.  The press played up the fact that 
many of these hijackers were Jews denied exit visas, seeking to escape the Soviet Union 
for political purposes.194  Therefore when the Soviet Union leveled death sentences 
against two of the hijackers, and other harsh sentences against the rest, the Western world 
appealed to the Soviet government for clemency.  These requests for clemency included a 
Congressional Resolution along with official diplomatic statements from 24 separate 
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governments and many non-governmental organizations.195  Congressional Resolution 
No. 501: Concerning the Continued Injustices Suffered by Jewish Citizens of the Soviet 
Union highlighted the concern the American Congress had taken over the anti-Semitism 
faced by Soviet Jews, calling on the Soviet government to commute the death sentences 
and extend equitable justice toward its Jewish citizens.196  For some in Congress, the 
harsh sentences of the hijackers ushered in memories of the Holocaust, with Senator 
Robert Dole of Kansas stating when offering the resolution: 
The world once sat by and ignored a national policy of intimidation and 
harassment and murder, eventually genocide, for political convenience.  And it 
soon learned that the bell that tolled for every 6 million European Jews tolled for 
every man.  The lesson came high, and it brought unmistakably to the attention of 
all humanity a moral obligation as old as time—that we are, for better or for 
worse, our brother’s keeper.197
Like Senator Dole, Senator Jacob Javitts of New York added that the strength of Western 
public opinion may influence the Soviet Union, writing, “I think that the Soviet Union 
and its people should be informed how millions of Americans react to this kind of 
situation.”198  The debate over the resolution indicated that American politicians were 
becoming receptive to Jewish concerns within the Soviet Union out of their own sense of 
moral duty, as well as in some cases out of political expediency.  While Congress passed 
the resolution, the State Department remained silent, sticking with the notion that 
American government interference may in fact hurt the defendants.  Despite the State 
Department’s silence, the Soviet regime caved in to the pressures it faced from the 
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American Congress and other influential Westerners. It granted clemency to the 
hijackers scarcely two weeks after it had handed down its original draconian sentences.199
The case of the attempted Leningrad hijacking did the most to focus Western 
attention onto issues affecting Soviet Jews.  Many activists and policy makers in the West 
took note of the success outside pressure had in convincing the Soviet Union to 
ultimately grant clemency.  Similarly the Soviet Jewish movement was emboldened by 
the events surrounding the Leningrad hijacking, recognizing the success Western 
pressure had in convincing the Soviets to change their tactics.200  By the early 1970s the 
Soviet Jewish movement for emigration was the loudest and most successful protest 
movement in the Soviet Union.  To a large extent this was made possible by the support
for the movement in the West and its publicity in the American press.  Therefore the 
issue of Jewish emigration and the treatment of Soviet Jews became a game of public 
relations between the Soviets and the West, a game the Soviets consistently misplayed.  
The Soviets retreated in the face of Western public opinion because they needed the 
support of the West.  Economic stagnation began to register in the Soviet Union by the 
late-1960s and early 1970s, and both the Soviets and the Nixon administration sought 
rapprochement through trade, with the Soviets seeking to export more to the United 
States, obtain Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status, and qualify for export loans from the 
Export-Import Bank.  The Soviet government recognized in the case of the Leningrad 
hijackers that their strict control over their citizens could only go so far until it 
jeopardized relations with the West and the economic carrot offered by détente.  Not only 
did the Soviet government recognize this so-called “linkage” between foreign trade and 
                                                
199 Feingold, 82.
200 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 183.
84
public opinion on human rights, but some American policy makers took note as well.  
They crafted policy that linked human rights and Jewish emigration to trade, notably 
through the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill.
Détente and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment: Congress vs. the White House
Despite the popularity of the movement to aid Soviet Jews, and its constant
presence in the press, the White House and many in the Nixon administration preferred 
not to alter their policy of détente in order to come to their rescue. Instead the 
administration opted to maintain official silence on the issue and deal with it through 
quiet diplomacy.  For the Nixon administration the policy of détente called for an easing 
of Cold War tensions in part by promoting trade and promising credit guarantees with the 
Soviet Union, most notably through the 1972 Trade Agreement.  This emphasis on trade 
and easing Cold War tensions meant that divisive issues such as human rights and the 
free emigration of the Soviet Jews were ignored.  It was not that the Nixon administration 
did not care about the plight of the Soviet Jews.  But they believed public discussion of 
the issue would sour the already tenuous relationship between the two superpowers and 
potentially make the Soviet Union even more dangerous for its Jewish population.  
Nixon’s foreign policy priorities consisted of winding down the war in Vietnam and 
stabilizing the political situation in the Middle East, two areas the administration needed 
Soviet cooperation on.  The Nixon administration full heartedly believed in continuing 
State Department policies which emphasized that support for Soviet Jews lay outside the 
purview of the American government, but in private organizations, or as the Deputy 
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Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Davies suggested, perhaps the United 
Nations.201
For the White House, the experiences of the Jews and other dissidents in the 
Soviet Union were reprehensible, but for President Nixon and his National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger, it was not in the interests of the American government to
overreact with regard to issues such as human rights.  President Nixon famously 
commented that, “great nations consult their interests, not their emotions,” a principle to 
which Kissinger agreed.202  Kissinger, who was famous for his reliance on realpolitik, 
made his view of the irrelevance of the Jewish issue with regard to détente abundantly 
clear, going as far as to comment to the President that “the emigration of Jews from the 
Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy… and if they put Jews into 
gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian 
concern.”203  Despite these controversial remarks, Kissinger, a German Jew himself, 
admitted he was sympathetic to the plight of the Soviet Jews, but reasoned that in foreign 
policy “moral issues become transmuted into operational ones” and overt methods with 
regard to the Jewish question proved to be counterproductive when compared to quiet 
diplomacy.204  Both Nixon and Kissinger feared that emphasis on human rights would 
sour relations between the United States and Soviet Union, making the world all the more 
dangerous.  President Nixon responded to Kissinger’s quip about the Soviets throwing 
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the Jews into the gas chambers by responding that, “We can’t blow up the world because 
of it.”205  
Nixon himself has been alleged to harbor anti-Semitic feelings, and it is possible
that this may have colored his attitude with regard to the Jewish issue in the Soviet 
Union.  But as scholar Paula Stern has suggested, President Nixon was in fact 
sympathetic to the experience of the Soviet Jews, and sought to help them, as long as 
doing so did not fundamentally damage détente.  As Stern pointed out, Vice-President 
Nixon in 1959 was the first American official to begin the practice of presenting the 
Soviet leadership lists of Soviet citizens whose status concerned the American 
Government.  Similarly, candidate Nixon in September 1968 addressed the American 
Conference on Soviet Jewry (ACSJ), stating that he deplored the discriminatory measures 
imposed on Soviet Jews, and that he would “hope and trust that humanitarians throughout 
the world will continue vigorously to protest these restrictions and deprivations of human 
rights.”206  Moreover, as Ambassador Dobrynin suggested, Nixon was opportunistic, and 
he often resorted to unfair demagoguery and political games to advance his own political 
ambitions over those of his rivals, a strategy the President played with regard to the 
Soviet Jewish issue.207
Humanitarian issues were therefore of secondary importance to the White House, 
with the administration concerned that emphasis on such issues would hinder what little
goodwill existed between the Americans and the Soviets, and would hamper Soviet 
cooperation on more important issues, such as Vietnam, Berlin, or nuclear deterrence.  
                                                





Nixon and Kissinger, as the architects of détente, viewed a slow and gradual change in 
the internal politics of the Soviet Union as preferable to aggression and a renewed arms 
race, with President Nixon stating that: 
It would be easy for me to say we’ll have nothing to do with them [the Soviets] 
until they change their internal system. But then we would have a massive arms 
race. Even that would be okay if it would work—but it won't. If a change comes 
it will come gradually—it may take a century. They at least let Solzhenitsyn and 
his family out—earlier the punishment was liquidation.208
Nixon’s policy of détente reaffirmed preexisting State Department policies that
deemphasized overt government to government communications regarding human rights
concerns and the Jewish issue, and instead favored quiet diplomacy.  Much as before, the 
Nixon administration felt it was in the best national interest to refrain from direct 
confrontation on the issue, preferring to talk privately with the Soviets on human rights
concerns, through back-door or quiet diplomacy. This was especially since the President 
opined that public discussion would force the Soviets not to back down on the issue, as 
he indicated in a closed-door meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. “My view 
is we accomplish more—our conversations with the Russians are tough, frankly; that is 
why we get along—by doing it privately.  Publicly they will slam the door.”209 Quiet 
diplomacy meant keeping communications concerning human rights and the Jewish 
question through a secure and confidential Presidential Channel that existed between 
Nixon and Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin and Moscow.  The key to quiet 
diplomacy was keeping it concealed, believing, as Kissinger stated that “[we] calculated 
that the Soviets could alter practices within their domestic jurisdiction more easily if they 
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were not overtly challenged.”210  Kissinger emphasized that quiet diplomacy had been 
working in this regard, guaranteeing a hundred-fold increase in Jewish emigration 
between 1968 and 1973 (roughly Nixon’s first term in office), as well as securing the 
protection of prominent dissidents, such as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn.211  
The hallmark of détente and the Nixon administration’s Soviet policy was the 
1972 Moscow Summit and subsequent Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union, which 
guaranteed MFN trade status, along with trade credits, and promises of increased trade 
relations between the two superpowers.  It was thought by the Nixon administration that 
such an agreement would serve as the cornerstone of Nixon’s détente policy by 
moderating hostilities between the two superpowers and proving to deter the threat of 
nuclear war.  It was also thought by Kissinger that such a trade carrot would entice 
further Soviet cooperation. “We believed, however, that Soviet restraint would be more 
solidly based if reinforced by positive inducements, including East-West trade.”  
Kissinger went on to explain that in reality MFN was a misnomer, since the deal would 
have treated the Soviets on an equal basis with over a hundred other nations covered by 
similar agreements, and that this guaranteed “status of equality, rather than economic 
boon,” which was the principal reason the Soviets were interested in it.212
The good will between East and West generated by the 1972 Moscow Summit
was short-lived, since the issue of Jewish emigration soon took center stage. Within a 
few months of the summit, Soviet officials promulgated the so-called education or 
diploma tax to be levied on Jews seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union.  The 
purpose of this tax was ostensibly to reimburse the Soviet government the value of an
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emigrant’s state paid-for education, which amounted to a large sum few could afford.  In 
effect this policy put a total halt to the flow of Jewish emigration.  As Ambassador 
Dobrynin later revealed, the idea of the education tax did not come from Brezhnev, or the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko.  Instead it originated from the Soviet 
Ministry of Education and was the idea of the Kremlin’s chief ideologist and a fierce 
opponent of Jewish emigration, Mikhail Suslov, who conveniently was left in Moscow
while Brezhnev and Gromyko were on vacation that summer.213  The promulgation of the 
diploma tax dumfounded the Nixon administration as well as some of those in the Soviet 
government. It allowed for détente’s critics to argue that the administration’s Soviet 
policy was not working and that it instead enabled the Soviet Union to continue abusing 
the rights of its citizens. In Kissinger’s words, the education tax had let “the genie out of 
the bottle.”214  The announcement of the diploma tax could not have come at a more 
awkward time, making news just as Congress was reviewing the 1972 Trade Reform Bill
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), both of which originated from the 
Moscow Summit.  The diploma tax drove Nixon’s critics to act, and in the words of the 
Dobrynin, it “only helped to stir up the debate in the United States” for the proposition of 
linking the emigration of Soviet Jews directly to trade privileges, as it was assumed by 
many Americans that the Soviets wished to stall Jewish emigration altogether, and 
therefore it was necessary to take action.215  
The diploma tax proved to be a winning issue for the policy makers most critical 
of détente.  Criticism of the White House’s approach on the Jewish issue and human 
rights stemmed mostly from criticism of Nixon’s détente policy, which was challenged 
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by both Republicans and Democrats.  Scholars have noted that those opposed to détente 
consisted of three main groups: defense focused anti-Soviet and anti-Communist right-
wingers, liberal anti-Communists who were mostly concerned with human rights, and 
Jewish groups.216  Nixon’s most vocal and opportunistic critic was Senator Henry
“Scoop” Jackson, a Democrat from Washington State, who used the issue of the tax as a 
means of lambasting détente and rallying his Jewish supporters.  Jackson, much like 
others in Congress, stuck with the issue of Jewish emigration in part because he 
recognized its potential in unifying the opposition to détente by bringing together its 
opponents on both the political Right and Left.  Jackson himself was just as opportunistic 
as President Nixon.  This was particularly after Jackson’s unsuccessful 1972 bid for the 
Democratic Presidential nomination, where he realized the importance of the Jewish vote 
if he were to run in 1976. Opposition to détente and support for the Soviet Jews therefore 
became a vital part of Senator Jackson’s 1976 Presidential ambitions, as Kissinger 
criticized Jackson by writing that “Sometimes it was hard to avoid the impression the
[Jackson] was as interested in the symbolism of confrontation as in the result.”217
The idea of linking the emigration of Soviet Jews to the flow of trade originated
from Senator Jackson’s aid Richard Pearle, and before him the idea had circulated among 
some Jewish academics.218  The proposal was to make trade credits and MFN trade status
contingent on free emigration.  The amendment to the 1972 Trade Bill was authored in 
broad language aimed at any non-market (Communist) economy that wished to stymie 
emigration, but its target was specifically the Soviet Union.  Jackson by the end of 
September 1972 offered his proposed amendment to Congress, where it received broad
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support from others opposed to détente.219  Not only did Jackson’s amendment receive 
the support of many in Congress, but it convinced the skeptical Jewish establishment, one 
that had seen some success in quiet diplomacy, to get behind Jackson’s plan.  Jackson
announced his proposed amendment at an emergency gathering of the National 
Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) that was called in order to deal with the crisis 
stemming from the education tax.  Jackson convinced the skeptical audience that hanging 
signs in front of synagogues reading “Free Soviet Jewry,” and holding candlelight vigils 
would no longer be enough, telling the gathering that, “The time has come to place our 
highest human values ahead of the trade dollar by firm and immediate action that the 
Russians can understand. You want to know what you can do?  I’ll give you some 
marching orders.  Get behind my amendment.  And let’s stand firm.”220  Jackson’s 
marching orders convinced the Jewish establishment to get behind his bill, and become 
supporters of the amendment and legislative action on the issue.
The Nixon administration was adamantly opposed to Jackson’s amendment, 
recognizing it as a restriction on the President’s executive authority and an assault on his
détente policy.    Kissinger admitted that he originally saw some merit to the idea, as it 
forced the Soviets to back down on the education tax, but as Jackson continued to press it 
after its initial success, Kissinger opposed it.221  Kissinger also questioned Jackson’s 
tactics, viewing his amendment as detrimental to the reliability of the United States as a 
negotiating partner, since the amendment’s conditions were never discussed, nor part of 
the domestic political discourse, during the negotiations over the 1972 Trade Agreement
                                                
219 Stern, 35-36; Buwalda, 95-96.
220 Joseph Albright, “The Pact of Two Henrys,” The New York Times Magazine (5 January 1975) : 
16-34, 20; quoted in Stern, 32.
221 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 986.
92
with the Soviet Union.  To this affect Kissinger stated in a 1973 speech address on the 
issue, “The demand that Moscow modify its domestic policy as a precondition for MFN 
or détente was never made while we were negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides 
have carefully shaped an overall mosaic.  Thus it raises questions about our entire 
bilateral relationship.”222  Others in the administration openly argued that the Jackson 
amendment posed a great danger to Soviet Jews.  This included Deputy Secretary of State 
Kenneth Rush, who stated that Jackson’s amendment could “bring about anti-Semitism in 
Russia and cut down on emigration” since the Jews were already targeted for having too 
many foreign connections and were seen as an insidious and untrustworthy presence in 
Soviet society.223
Shortly after the amendment was reintroduced to Congress following the recess
for the 1972 election, Nixon dispatched the Secretary of the Treasury, George Shultz, to 
Moscow to discuss the amendment’s implications with Brezhnev.  Schultz indicated to 
the Soviet leader that under Jackson’s proposed legislation trade and credit guarantees 
would become dependent on liberalized emigration policies.224  Within a week Brezhnev 
contacted Ambassador Dobrynin and instructed him to pass onto President Nixon a
confidential note that the Soviets would no longer levy the education tax.  Brezhnev also 
provided Dobrynin with statistics the Ambassador could give to the President indicating
that emigration had increased between 1971 and 1973.225  The Soviets changed their 
policies because they were interested in trade with the United States, and they recognized
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the danger posed to détente by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  Brezhnev did so through 
the confidential Presidential channel between him and Dobrynin, and Dobrynin and the 
President, to keep the issue as quiet as possible, since the Soviets did not want to look as 
if they were caving into Western pressure when they quietly informed the President that 
the diploma tax would fade away.226
News of the Soviets’ change of heart on the diploma tax made itself quickly 
known and despite Soviet reassurances that they would allow for greater Jewish 
emigration, these promises were insufficient in convincing Senator Jackson and his allies
to let up on the amendment.  In fact, despite the law no longer being enforced, it 
remained on the books and emigration remained difficult for Soviet Jews.  The Soviets 
also added to the problem through a series of public relations blunders that played into 
Jackson’s hands.  These included the arbitrary arrest and harassment of several prominent 
dissidents such as Andrei Amalrik, Andrei Sakharov, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.227  
American Jewish organizations along with other human rights related groups insisted that 
the Jackson amendment was necessary to guard against a future Soviet backslide.228  
Similarly the Action Committee of Newcomers from the Soviet Union, an organization 
which consisted of recent Jewish emigrants to Israel, argued in a letter written to 
President Nixon that the suspension of the education tax left Soviet Jews in a “more 
critical position” than they were in before, and that further action, such as that called for 
by the Jackson amendment, was necessary to guard against future Soviet abuses.229  
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The Soviet government’s concession on the education tax emboldened Senator 
Jackson. He reasoned that the pressure generated by his amendment had had a positive 
effect, and that the Soviets’ supposed moderation on the emigration issue was “a fraud.”  
Jackson therefore argued that he needed to reintroduce the amendment in the next 
congressional session, and attach it to the President’s Trade Reform Act, with Jackson 
declaring, “I say that we are going to put the Jackson amendment on the statue books but 
in the hope that it won’t apply to the Soviet Union because they will be in compliance 
with the free emigration provision.”230  In spite of the administration’s opposition, 
Jackson obtained seventy-six Senate co-sponsors for his amendment as soon as he 
reintroduced it.231  This so-called human rights card played by Jackson easily gained him 
support.  It appealed to American politicians because it was much easier for the public to 
digest debates on human rights related issues compared to those on trade or disarmament, 
finding support from across the American political spectrum.  Also it was politically
dangerous not to be supportive of the rights of Jews to leave the Soviet Union.  Therefore 
Jackson had a winning issue that acquired the support of many in Congress despite the 
President’s opposition.  This initiative came from a Congress seeking to assert itself in 
foreign policy matters after the Vietnam War.  Then the Watergate scandal broke in 1973 
and severely hampered the administration’s effectiveness in combating the amendment 
thereafter.232
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As the debate over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment raged in Washington, those in 
America with close ties to the dissident movement, as well the dissidents themselves, 
came out in support of the legislation since they were generally not satisfied with the 
Nixon administration’s tepid response on the Jewish issue, which they blamed on détente
and the President’s over reliance on quiet diplomacy.  In a letter to President Nixon, the 
Israel-based Action Committee of Newcomers from the Soviet Union went so far as to 
exclaim that “the key to the rescue of our people lies now in the hands of the United 
States of America.”233  The Action Committee for Newcomers believed that the Nixon 
administration had taken the wrong approach by trying to broker trade relations with the 
Soviets without their first making vital human rights concessions.  In their view, the 
Soviets were becoming dependent on Western economic aid through trade, and the 
United States should take advantage of the situation and demand humanitarian 
concessions in return for such aid.  The Action Committee of Newcomers wrote 
approvingly of the confrontational approach adopted by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
in their memorandum to the President, writing:
It is quite clear that the USSR will relent only under extraordinary pressure and 
only if she is convinced that this is the lesser evil, or that she has no alternative.  
Today, the USA has all the possibilities of exerting such pressure.  The help of the 
West, and mainly the US is, today, a matter of life and the continued existence of 
the Soviet regime.  The Soviet leadership that brought the national economy to the 
brink of catastrophy [sic.] know this and will be ready to grant concessions if they 
know that the demand for such concessions is a firm and unavoidable condition 
for the receipt of aid.  Senator Jackson’s amendment to the Trade Bill is an 
effective instrument to this end.234
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Much like the approach advocated by the Action Committee for Newcomers, Dr. Lev 
Dobriansky, head of the Captive Nations Network Incorporated, argued before the Senate 
Committee on Finance, that the US should use its economic strength to extract 
concessions from the Soviet Union through a “poltrade policy,” similar to that of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Without such an approach Dobriansky argued that granting 
MFN and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union would be appeasement, and such détente 
would “not contribute to the interest of world peace,” as World War II demonstrated. 235
Chairman Stanley Lowell, and Executive Director Jerry Goodman, of the NCSJ 
were also critics of the administration’s reliance on quiet diplomacy and their view that 
passage of the Jackson amendment would make the situation worse for Soviet Jews.  The 
leaders of the NCSJ argued that such assertions by the administration, and in particular 
by Dr. Kissinger, “could prove to be a self-fulfilling prophesy” and “an open invitation to 
make his [Secretary Kissinger’s] prediction a reality,” endangering the welfare of the 
Soviet Jews.236  Lowell and Goodman continued to critique quiet diplomacy by stating 
that, “If quiet diplomacy is to be the answer, we are left in a position whereby we are 
completely dependent upon the Soviet Union and its own subjective method or response 
to determine how it will expand or contract the numbers of individuals allowed to leave 
the Soviet Union.”237  Therefore, for the NCSJ the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was 
necessary because it opened up the issue of Jewish emigration to discussion by Congress, 
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something that would not have occurred otherwise.  The leaders of the NCSJ believed 
this debate over the Jackson amendment before Congress placed the Soviets in check,
because it forced the administration to pursue a human rights agenda in its Soviet policy 
that it otherwise would not have.  Lowell and Goodman testified that without the 
amendment, the issue of Jewish emigration “would not be on the agenda for discussion 
by the Secretary of State, and it is only because there is such an amendment pending in 
the Congress of the United States that the Secretary of State has the ability to even 
discuss this issue with the Soviets.”238
Just as activists in the United States who had ties with dissident groups in the 
Soviet Union were making their case in favor of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, activists 
in the Soviet Union were coming up with similar arguments in support of the amendment.  
They were actively reaching out to the US Congress for their support.  In particular,
refusniks David Azbel, Vitaly Rubin, and Vladimir Galatsky, issued their own direct plea
to the American Senate while on hunger strike in Moscow, writing:
In our view, those who, in the name of the global and til now vague goals, are 
prepared to absolve the Soviet government and consider that human rights 
regarding emigration are being fulfilled, are committing a tragic mistake.  The 
battle is only beginning and its first results can only encourage, but not set one at 
rest.  That is why we are turning to you at a time when we are staging a hunger 
strike as an extreme way of making the Soviet government respect our human and 
civil rights.239
For the refusniks, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was important because it offered the 
opportunity for the Jewish issue to be brought to the attention of the American Congress 
and American policy makers so that it could no longer be ignored.  Soviet nuclear 
physicist turned dissident Andrei Sakharov similarly weighed into the controversy
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surrounding the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, offering his own endorsement of the 
legislation.  As for the administration’s commitment to human rights Sakharov famously 
asserted international security could only be achieved through an open and democratic 
society. “A country that does not respect the rights of its own people will not respect the 
rights of its neighbors.”240  Sakharov was an outspoken supporter of the legislation, 
making public his support for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in an open letter to the US
Congress dated September 14, 1973. Sakharov took aim at those most critical of the 
Jackson amendment, especially those who critics of the amendment who believed that the 
legislation would result in outbursts of Soviet anti-Semitism.
Here you have total confusion, either deliberate or based on ignorance, about the 
USSR. It is as if the emigration issue affected only Jews.  As if the situation of 
those Jews who have vainly sought to emigrate to Israel were not already tragic 
enough and would become more hopeless if it were to depend on the democratic 
attitudes and on the humanity of the OVIR.  As if the techniques of “quiet 
diplomacy” could help anyone, beyond a few individuals in Moscow and some 
other cities.241
Sakharov continued to warn of mass reprisals against the Soviet Jews if the world were to 
cast a blind eye on their plight.  Unlike before, where discussion concerning human rights 
had remained shuttered behind closed doors, diplomacy was now taking place on the 
public stage, through open letters to Congress, Congressional hearings, opinion pieces in 
public newspapers, and demonstrations.  This public dialogue in the view of the Soviet 
dissidents and their American supporters forced the Soviet government to take actions 
benefiting the Jews.
Despite widespread support for the Jackson amendment by the Soviet dissidents, 
Secretary of State Kissinger believed that the dissidents were an unreliable source for 
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information.  He argued that the fact that the dissidents had been the ones suffering and 
were naturally the most resentful of the White House’s slow but steady progress on 
human rights issues.
What they [the dissidents] sought, with extraordinary courage and fortitude, was 
to change the political and moral character of the Soviet system.  The rigorous 
standards that had impelled them to court suffering and harassment made them 
resentful of the gradualism inherent in diplomatic methods.  And this is why the 
“men on the firing line” were not the best witnesses to design American 
strategy.242  
There were others in the Soviet Union who agreed with Kissinger’s impression that the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment was bad for the Soviet Jews and dissidents. The most notable 
critic was Roy Medvedev, who much like the Nixon administration, believed that the 
American Government’s emphasis on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would push the 
Soviets into a corner resulting in more violence and discrimination against the Soviet 
Jews.  Roy Medvedev wrote in reaction to Sakharov’s letter supporting the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, that “Outside pressure can play a negative as well as a positive role: 
it can deter our organs of power from certain actions in some cases, and in other cases, on 
the contrary, it can provoke those or other undesirable actions and in that way only 
impede the process of democratization of Soviet society.”  Medvedev continued to argue 
that the Soviet government was in the process of drafting a new constitution and that it 
was his hope that the Soviet government would liberalize its emigration approach on its 
own without outside intervention.243
Despite the White House’s forceful arguments against the amendment, the House 
of Representative passed the first version of the legislation in December 1973, with a 
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vote of 319 to 80.244  The amendment was then attached to the final 1974 Trade Act 
which cleared the Senate unanimously, with an 88 to 0 vote a year later. The omnibus 
1974 Trade Act, with the Jackson amendment attached was reluctantly signed by 
President Gerald Ford into law on January 3, 1975.  Dissidents in the Soviet Union and 
their allies in America hailed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as a step toward the right 
direction, with Andrei Sakharov calling the amendment a “principled and deeply 
humane” action.245  Ohio Congressman and House co-sponsor of the amendment, Charles 
Vanik, asserted on the House floor that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would go down in 
American history as the first piece of legislation requiring humanitarian considerations 
while seeking to achieve goals of economic exchange.246  
The Nixon and later Ford administrations continued to struggle against the 
Jackson Amendment.  President Nixon’s position in negotiating with Congress 
deteriorated as soon as the Watergate scandal broke.  After Nixon resigned on August 8, 
1974, President Gerald Ford picked up right where the former President had left off, 
assuring Brezhnev that he would pursue the same foreign policy agenda Nixon had.247  
The Ford administration attempted to negotiate between Senator Jackson and the Soviets, 
seeking to find a compromise all sides could agree on so as to keep the original 1972
trade agreement on the table.  According to the administration, Jackson kept ratcheting up 
his conditions in negotiating the terms of the amendment.  One particularly difficult issue 
involved quotas on the annual number of Jewish emigrants, with Jackson initially 
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pushing for at least 100,000 emigrants per annum, a number the Soviets could not agree 
to, and one Kissinger agreed was unrealistic.  There was indeed evidence less Jews were 
seeking to emigrate given conflict in the Middle East.  Dobrynin later informed Kissinger 
that the Soviets would not object to allowing 50,000 Jewish emigrants per year, but 
would not sign anything official as not to show publicly they were conceding to 
American pressure on an issue that affected their own sovereignty.  In response to the 
deal, Jackson initially pushed for a quota of 75,000, but eventually conceded to 60,000, a 
figure the Soviets still found troublesome.248  The administration resisted an outright 
quota and wished instead to guarantee MFN if the Soviet met three conditions: no limit to 
applications, no refusals except for security reasons, and there would be no prosecution 
of applicants.249  Jackson rejected these conditions, arguing that the Soviets were 
untrustworthy and there were in excess of 130,000 Jews seeking to emigrate.  In order to 
push the idea of a quota forward, Senator Jackson released during a press conference
confidential letters he exchanged with the administration which contained details of the 
negotiations and references to a quota of 60,000 Jews per annum.250  Jackson stated:
We have agreed with President Ford that a minimum standard of initial 
compliance will be the issuance of 60,000 visas per annum. I wish to emphasize 
that this figure is not a quota. It is my judgment that, if the agreement is 
implemented in good faith, the actual number will exceed 60,000 per annum since 
there is abundant evidence of a current backlog in excess of 130,000, and the 
agreement calls for the number to rise to correspond to the number of 
applicants.251
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Jackson’s move incensed both the administration and the Soviets.  The administration 
was upset because the Senator had compromised the fragile negotiation process they had 
with the Soviet leadership.  The Soviets were similarly angry because they did not want 
to be portrayed as willing to give up their sovereignty and concede on the issue.  
Scarcely a week after Senator Jackson’s leak, Brezhnev made his frustration over 
the revelation of the idea of an emigration quota known to Kissinger in Moscow:
You know that the Soviet Union has not given an obligation in terms of numbers. 
We have said we would not erect barriers; we are not. […] I have official proof 
on this from our Minister of Internal Affairs. This is as of this October. Even if I 
were to allow all who want to leave, I see that only 14,000 want to go. This 
document also says that there are 1,815 applications pending. Even if I add those 
figures, I still get 15,000 whereas Jackson cites 60,000. Where am I to get those 
applicants?252
Brezhnev proceeded to express his dissatisfaction with the inability of President Ford to 
put his house in order and reprimanded Kissinger for allowing Jackson’s behavior.  In 
response to Brezhnev’s criticism, Kissinger explained that he agreed with the General
Secretary’s analysis of the emigration situation, and then proceeded to explain that the 
Jackson issue was a byproduct of the American political process, and that he himself felt 
just as offended by Senator Jackson’s actions as the General Secretary.  Kissinger then 
informed Brezhnev that, “almost anything Senator Jackson does to the Soviet Union he 
has done to me.  He doesn’t only claim he has defeated the Soviet Union; he claims he 
has defeated me.”253
In spite of Jackson’s actions and the intricate workings of the American political 
process Brezhnev made it clear that he was disappointed with the inability of the
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Americans to live up to their part of the original 1972 agreement.  Brezhnev informed
Kissinger that from the Soviet perspective it was unfair for the Soviet Union to be 
granted MFN with special conditions attached, while China and several other countries 
received MFN unconditionally.  Brezhnev stated to Kissinger that such treatment was 
insulting and that if the Soviets were offered MFN with the Jackson amendment attached, 
then there would be no agreement at all.  Brezhnev further stated, “Let me say frankly 
that we cannot accept that “gift.”  We see it as a discriminatory practice that we cannot 
agree to. I wish to emphasize that!”254  To add muscle to Brezhnev’s threat was the fact 
that the economic situation for the Soviet Union had changed by the mid-1970s.  During 
the First Moscow Summit in 1972, the Soviets were in a period of economic stagnation, 
but by 1974 the energy crisis, which began a year earlier with the Arab Oil Embargo, had
forced oil prices to jump 300 percent.  Rising Soviet income from oil exports made MFN 
status with the United States less of an economic priority.255  Therefore rising oil prices 
on top of an American Congress consumed with attaching a human rights package to the
original 1972 agreement, gave the Soviets ample reason to back away from the deal if
Congress passed the Trade Reform Act with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment attached.  
News that the Trade Reform Act with the amendment attached had cleared the Senate in 
December 1974 nonetheless came as “an unpleasant surprise for the leaders of the Soviet 
Union.”  The Soviet leaders had thought it unimaginable that public opinion could affect 
American policy in such a way, incorrectly believing that the American President acted 
as a “supreme ruler.”256  Brezhnev quickly wrote to President Ford on Christmas Day 
                                                





1974, expressing his disappointment with the direction the debate had taken in the 
American Congress.  Brezhnev wrote to Ford that it was unacceptable for the Americans 
to add terms onto an agreement after it had been negotiated and agreed to by both sides.  
This was especially true with regard to terms which interfered with the sovereignty of the 
Soviet Union; an issue which Brezhnev wrote was “of no concern either for American 
legislators or anyone else.”  Brezhnev added that he could just have easily put in place 
restrictions which would block Soviet trade with America until racial discrimination was 
eliminated there, or until the millions of unemployed Americans were employed.  
Brezhnev finished by indicating that the trade legislation accepted by the US Congress 
was highly objectionable, and that the 1972 trade deal would no longer be on the table,
and the Soviets Government would be relieved of its obligations if the Trade Reform Act 
were to become law.  Brezhnev further warned that this conclusion would bring severe 
harm to trade and economic relations between the two superpowers.257  Despite 
Brezhnev’s warning, President Ford reluctantly signed the omnibus 1974 Trade Act, with 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment attached, into law on January 3, 1975.  The Soviets
quickly responded by suspending Lend-Lease payments and dropping their end of the
1972 trade agreement.
Despite the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and its perceived success
in making human rights the center of American policy with regard to the Soviet Union, 
the number of Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union had dropped from 35,000 in 1973 
to 13,000 in 1975, much as Dr. Kissinger had forewarned.258  Kissinger even remarked 
that prior to Senator Jackson’s efforts at promoting Jewish emigration, quiet 
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conversations in 1971 and 1972 between the administration and the Soviet government
resulted in a dramatic increase in the rate of emigration from 400 to 35,000.  After
Jackson went public and brought the debate out into the open, the rate of emigration 
slowed.259  The Jackson-Vanik Amendment had pushed the Soviets into a corner.  It was
perceived as an offense to Soviet sovereignty, since the amendment sought to legislate on 
events occurring within the Soviet Union.  The ultimate response of the Soviets was to 
repudiate the 1972 trade agreement, damaging the Nixon and Ford administration’s 
policy of détente.  
After the affair over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, some Soviet dissidents 
openly questioned whether American legislators had overreached in passing the 
legislation.260  Once talk of trade and trade credits were taken off the table, the situation 
deteriorated for Soviet Jews.  The legacy of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is debatable.  
One view holds that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, despite its noble aims, ultimately
proved to be counterproductive and had little diplomatic effectiveness.  Another view
contends that the legacy of the amendment was to bring the discussion of human rights in 
the Soviet Union front and center.  A later meeting between Ambassador Dobrynin and 
Senator Jackson suggests a further political aspect.  In his memoirs, Dobrynin records a
meeting with Jackson the summer after the amendment had passed, at which point the 
Senator had expressed his very frank and personal views on Soviet–American relations.  
During this meeting, Jackson revealed to Dobrynin the mistakes he made in negotiating 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  Dobrynin wrote that during this meeting, Senator 
Jackson had expressed that, “Leaders of Congress, including himself, had developed a 
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false impression that Moscow would eventually concede on Soviet emigration if they 
kept pressing.  Eventually, their mistake became obvious, but by then the matter had 
become so clouded by emotion that it was too late to compromise.”261  Furthermore 
Jackson told Dobrynin that his opposition to détente and intransigence regarding Soviet-
Jewish emigration was largely dictated by partisan politics.   Dobrynin was surprised by 
the Senator’s candor, and remarked in his memoirs of this meeting, that “As we parted, 
[Jackson] asked me to tell Brezhnev that he was not and never would be guided by 
hostility toward the Soviet Union.  He said he supported the improvement of Soviet-
American relations, yet as a member of the opposition, he sometimes had to criticize the 
administration as a matter of tactics rather than strategy.”262  At least by Dobrynin’s 
account, through Jackson’s own admission, the politics behind the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment were dictated by the Senator’s political agenda and hubris, and the Senator 
himself recognized that the amendment had been a ghastly over extension of power.
Despite the overall failure of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to increase
emigration from the Soviet Union, the legislation nonetheless brought the issue of human 
rights to the forefront of the American public’s perception of détente.  The amendment 
was the first instance in American history, as Congressman Vanik noted, where the 
notion of human rights dictated American policy.263 The amendment also emboldened
Congress and the human rights movement in the Soviet Union to further action, and it 
served as a precedent for Congressional involvement in human rights policy abroad.  In 
the United States, this public debate over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment combined with 
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an escalation of news coverage concerning the Soviet dissident movement, prepared the 
American public and American policy makers to become bold supporters of the Soviet 
human rights movement.  This emboldened attitude of the American Congress with 
regard to human rights was happening just as the Soviet dissidents came to the realization 
that their new friends in the American Congress allowed them to become increasingly 
assertive and confident in the way they reached out to the West and fought for their rights 
in the Soviet Union.  The level of commitment to human rights increased dramatically on 
both sides following the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and this proved to be especially the 
case after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by the Soviet Union, the first international 




THE HELSINKI PROCESS: 
THE FORMATION OF THE MOSCOW HELSINKI WATCH GROUP &
THE US HELSINKI COMMISSION
In the same year the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was debated before the US
Congress, representatives of thirty-five European and North American countries,
including the US and the USSR, were putting the final touches on a document that would 
have significant ramifications on human rights policy as well as other fields of East-West 
relations, the Helsinki Final Act. The Final Act was the concluding declaration of the 
nearly three-year long Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a 
forum where the United States, Canada, and all thirty-three European states, with the 
exception of Albania, met to discuss and debate the major issues affecting East-West 
relations.  The Conference concluded with a three-day summit in Helsinki, Finland, 
where its Final Act, a non-binding declaration of principles was affirmed.264  For this 
reason, the Conference and the Final Act have been characterized by historians as the 
“high-water mark” of détente, if not “détente’s very symbol.”265  Therefore, this third and 
final chapter will focus on the creation of the Helsinki Final Act and the role this 
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document had in inspiring human rights activists in Moscow to reach out to and be fully 
embraced by American policy makers.
The Helsinki Final Act was the result of several long years of negotiations that at 
times seemed as if they would never end, given the fact that all thirty-five participants
had an equal voice.  It was the Soviets who came up with the initial idea to hold a 
European Security Conference, ostensibly as a means superseding the NATO alliance and
obtaining Western recognition of the Soviet Union’s post-World War II borders.  The 
Western representatives initially resisted participating in the Conference, but eventually 
agreed to the idea.  They recognized the Conference as a forum in which to push for the 
normalization of relations, a quadripartite agreement on Berlin, Mutual and Balance 
Force Reductions (MBFR), and even the freer movement of peoples, information, and 
personal contacts between East and West.266  American and other Western delegates
therefore successfully used the CSCE to push their own agenda and even convinced the 
Soviet Union to acknowledge provisions on basic human rights in return for the political 
concessions on borders and sovereignty sought by the Soviets.
The Final Act itself consisted of ten articles divided into three groups, or
“baskets.”  These three “baskets” contained political, economic, and humanitarian 
objectives that reaffirmed the rights of sovereignty while encouraging the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief.267  Basket III specifically called for the fundamental understanding and 
implementation of basic human rights principles, while Baskets I and II referred to 
                                                
266 Maresca, 4.
267 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true (accessed: 8 July 
2012).
110
questions relating to security in Europe, and cooperation in the fields of economics, 
science, technology, and the environment, respectively.  These principles embodied in the 
text of the declaration, along with the Soviet Union’s acceptance, made the Helsinki Final 
Act the most authoritative statement on human rights in the Soviet Union, and a powerful 
encouragement to the Soviet dissident movement to reach out to the West.  Even Henry 
Kissinger, a critic of the inclusion of Basket III in the Final Act, later in life 
acknowledged its importance in inspiring Vaclav Havel to establish Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia, and Lech Walesa to fight for human rights in Poland, both of which 
were instrumental in bringing about the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe.268  Scholar John J. Maresca even pointed out that the most important aspect of 
the Basket III and the human rights principles found in the Final Act was that it was even 
included at all.269  The inclusion of human rights in the Helsinki Final Act was evidence 
of the rising importance of human rights in foreign policy, especially in the wake of the 
fight over Jewish emigration as was demonstrated during the debate over the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment.  Basket III also reflected a major change in America’s acceptance of 
human rights in its relationship with Moscow. A little over three years earlier Nixon’s 
1972 trip to Moscow had concluded with the Soviet-American Statement of Principles
which contained no mention of human rights.
Any reading of the text of the Helsinki Final Act plainly demonstrated that the 
Soviet Union affirmed that it would abide by the human rights principles found in the 
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which 
included the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.  Since Soviet 
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dissidents believed that their fundamental freedoms and rights were non-existent in the 
Soviet Union, the Final Act gave them documentation upon which to argue that they were 
entitled to those rights, as well as to the rule of law.  In the Soviet Union, this belief in the 
rule of law based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act was best exemplified by the 
formation of the Helsinki Watch Groups, first in Moscow, but later elsewhere in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The founders of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group
were many of the same activists who had previously written for Khronika tekushchikh 
sobytiy.  They now reached out to other like-minded dissidents and those in the West by 
publishing and distributing statements and accounts of instances where the Soviet 
government failed to live up to its human rights obligations according to the Final Act.
The formation of these Helsinki Watch Groups would not have been possible had 
there not been a powerful and receptive audience to read their documents and 
publications in the West.  Debate over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment had primed the 
Congress, journalists, and the American public to pay further attention to human rights.  
But to the dismay of activists in both the East and West, the Helsinki Accords lacked any 
kind of enforcement mechanism, since the declaration did not have the legal status of a 
treaty or an international agreement.  Therefore, just as the Helsinki Watch Groups in the 
Soviet Union took it upon themselves to monitor compliance, activist policy makers in 
the US Congress devised of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also 
known as the US Helsinki Commission, to monitor and report on compliance with regard 
to the Helsinki Final Act.  Even though the Commission was tasked with reviewing 
compliance in connection with all three Baskets of the Final Act, it concentrated on
Basket III and Eastern Europe.  The US Helsinki Commission proved to be decisive in 
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allowing the dissidents a forum in the West to be heard, since it was the Commission’s 
task to recommend policy to the rest of Congress given the reports it drafted, which were 
often based on the documents and testimony it received from the members of the 
Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.  This full exposure of the Soviet dissidents to the 
American Congress could not have been possible without the inroads that were already 
made by the American journalists who chose to cover the dissidents and make their story 
known to the American public, as well as the proponents of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, which made the American public fully aware of the issue as it became an 
ever more important facet of America’s foreign policy.  For the dissidents, the use of the 
Americans also became an essential part of their strategy for pursuing social justice and 
the rule of law in the Soviet Union.
Human Rights and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
When the idea to hold a European Security Conference was first proposed, the 
inclusion of human rights and text concerning the freer movement of peoples and ideas 
was far from the top of the agenda.  In fact the initial proposal to hold a European 
Security Conference came from Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in 1954, 
who sought to use the forum to promote Soviet interests, such as an affirmation from the 
West on the inviolability of the Soviet Union’s post-World War II borders and to drive a 
wedge between the NATO allies. In part the Soviet’s insistence on holding a conference 
was to force the Americans and other NATO powers to acknowledge the Soviet Union’s 
annexation of the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, along with other border 
changes made by Stalin following the Second World War. Despite Soviet persistence, 
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the Americans and NATO consistently rejected the idea of a European Security 
Conference throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  In 1969 the Soviets again formally
proposed a Security Conference with the West, but broadened the original scope of the 
Conference and recommended that it include a framework for future East-West economic 
and technological interchange.  The NATO powers were again skeptical of the Soviet’s 
plans.  But they decided to hold talks on organizing a conference if the Soviets would
first agree to Western concessions, such as a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and 
Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks.  President Nixon’s National Security 
Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, was skeptical of the utility of the European Security 
Conference, believing that such a meeting could turn out to be a “propaganda circus” that 
would potentially “open up differences among NATO allies.”270  Given these concerns 
over the Soviet agenda for the CSCE and the Soviet eagerness to begin the Conference, 
Kissinger reasoned that it was in America’s best interests to stall for time.  Kissinger 
indicated in his memoirs that the American strategy with concern to the CSCE “was to 
create no obstacles to progress but to do little to accelerate it either,” in the recognition 
that the longer it took for the Conference to begin, the more likely the Soviets may bend 
on issues of interest to the West.271  The passage of time served Western interests by 
draining the Conference of its original rationale of consolidating Soviet power.  Kissinger 
indicated to Nixon prior to the President’s May 1972 trip to Moscow, that when meeting 
with Brezhnev the President should insist that CSCE only deal with the principles of 
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relations among European states, including: “1) sovereign equality, political 
independence, and territorial integrity; 2) non-intervention and non-interference in 
internal affairs; and 3) the right of people in each country to shape their own destiny.”  
Kissinger also indicated that CSCE could also incorporate discussions on restraints on the 
movement of armed forces, as well as cultural, economic and technological 
cooperation.272  To the delight of the administration, the Soviets consented to such terms, 
and informal preparatory talks on the CSCE were agreed to begin in November 1972.
Original discussions on the Conference did not include any mention of human 
rights.  The closest any such discussion came to human rights concerned only an increase 
in economic and technological exchanges as well as an aspiration for “increased 
tourism.”273  The desire to add discussion on the “freer movement of peoples, ideas, and 
information” to the Conference’s agenda came from NATO and American diplomats who 
saw the tactical and propaganda advantage in pressing those issues on the Soviets.  Some 
diplomats even believed that there might be some Soviet concession on the issue if the 
West remained firm on its inclusion.  Several members of the US National Security 
Council staff even wanted to see NATO delegates urge the Warsaw Pact nations to agree 
to “end radio jamming; relax exit restrictions on their nationals; permit freer circulation 
of books, magazines, and periodicals; and allow foreign journalists normal working 
conditions.”274  The National Security Council staff did recognize the difficulty posed in 
pressing such conditions on the Soviets, even acknowledging that many in the West 
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would likely prefer to pursue “easier issues,” recognizing the diplomatic difficulty in 
pressing the Soviets on their human rights treatment, since many diplomats viewed only 
minor improvements in relations as possible.275  Nonetheless, the US State Department
began to emphasize to the Soviets that they would only move forward on the CSCE if its 
agenda included issues related to the freer movement of peoples, ideas, and information, 
so that the Conference would not degenerate into a propaganda spectacle.276
After it was announced that informal preparatory talks on the European Security
Conference would begin in November 1972, the National Security Council began 
debating which direction the Conference should take.  It was accepted that the CSCE was 
more of a symbolic occurrence than one that would result in any practical agreements, 
and that the best chance the West had in extracting concessions from the Soviets would 
be if it were to emphasize issues related to the freer movement of peoples and ideas. This 
emphasis on the idea of “freer movement” was believed by some to be the best way to 
lessen the propaganda risks of the Conference, and perhaps use it to promote Western
interests.277  Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a member of the National Security Council believed 
that the strategy of emphasizing “freer movement” could potentially result in an 
American propaganda win against the Soviets, as the Soviets would ultimately fail to live 
up to those standards.  Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger in a 1972 memorandum: 
The underlying Western philosophy which we have subscribed to and promoted is 
that “liberalization” of the Eastern bloc is the only road to the reconciliation of 
Europe and that liberalization flourishes when exposed to the nourishing influence 
of Western societies. There is something to this theory. But we are not likely to 
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trick the USSR into opening its doors to a free flow of people, in or out, or to an 
inundation of Western literature and broadcasts. […] In fact, the Western 
approach is cynical.  No one expects to achieve much, but in pursuing the issues 
the East is to be exposed as the obstacle to European “cooperation.”  In sum, this 
takes on the character of psychological warfare and the issue, therefore, is 
whether the state of East-West relations justifies such an approach.278
Sonnenfeldt was not completely cynical, and he did feel that real progress could be 
achieved with regard to human rights, adding “[W]e can achieve some very limited 
practical improvement in freer movement—which might be feasible in light of the 
loosening up in Eastern Europe—but not if our aim is polemics.”279   Sonnenfeldt 
therefore felt that the only way progress could be made was for the West to be sincere in 
its negotiations, and to pursue issues regarding freer movement with an authentic interest 
in promoting the liberalization of the Soviet block.
Informal preparatory talks for the CSCE began in Helsinki on November 22, 
1972, and it concluded with a draft document known informally as the “Blue Book,” or 
the “Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations.” The Blue Book outlined the 
practical arrangements and the agenda for the Conference and it set in place the 
Conference’s three main themes, each of which were later referred to as “baskets.”  The 
third theme proposed to cooperate in humanitarian and other fields, and authorized the 
Conference to discuss issues “conducive to creating better conditions for increased 
cultural and educational exchanges, for broader dissemination of information, for 
contacts between people, and for the solution of humanitarian problems.”280  In addition, 
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the document asserted that the Conference would address issues which would improve 
access to human contacts across borders, the freedom of information exchange, and 
international cooperation regarding culture and education.  These terms laid the 
foundation for the CSCE’s emphasis on human rights, which Secretary of State William 
Rogers acknowledged were of “paramount importance [. . .] there are few words that are 
so filled with meaning, so venerated by the people everywhere, as the words ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”281  Secretary Rogers not only embraced the provisions 
of the Blue Book which dealt with human rights, but he also warned his fellow foreign 
ministers gathered in Helsinki not to back down from the issue and to keep its premise 
intact in the final declaration that was to emerge from the Conference.  Rogers stated that, 
“Section III [Basket III] could turn out to be a sad footnote in future history books unless 
the Committee finds concrete ways to embody the concepts contained therein so that the 
everyday lives of people are favourably [sic.] affected.”282 Rogers concluded that the 
lowering of barriers to the movement of peoples and ideas in a way that encouraged
human contacts would be essential for building mutual respect and understanding 
between East and West, stressing that the goal of the CSCE should be a European 
continent where “no nation feels threatened, a continent open to the free flow of people 
and ideas, and a continent enriched rather than divided by political and cultural 
diversity.”283  
This emphasis by Secretary Rogers on human rights from early on in the CSCE 
process contrasted with the rest of the administration’s position on the issue, as noted in 
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Chapter 2.  The administration’s support for détente and quiet diplomacy had led it to 
refrain from pressuring the Soviets openly on issues related to the freer movement of 
people and human rights.  This was especially with regard to the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment and the public battle between the administration and Senator Henry Jackson
over whether to include language in the 1974 Trade Act linking Most-Favored Nation 
(MFN) trade status, trade credits, and debt guarantees for the Soviet Union to that 
nation’s treatment of its Jewish citizens.  Notably, there was also no mention of human 
rights or the freer movement of peoples in the Soviet-American Statement of Principles, 
which was the final result of the May 1972 summit between Nixon and Brezhnev in 
Moscow, worrying America’s European allies who felt perhaps that not mentioning 
“freer movement” was undercutting their bargaining position.284  The Statement of 
Principles addressed only issues of sovereignty and non-interference, assuring respect for 
each other’s governmental system.
The administration’s change of heart on human rights may have originated from 
the American failure in Vietnam and the fall of Saigon in 1975.  America’s failure in the 
Vietnam War left enduring scars on the nation’s self-confidence, and in return, according 
to John Maresca, America’s foreign policy makers sought to reaffirm its relationship with 
their allies by building upon issues of mutual interest, such as human rights.285  In any 
case, America’s NATO allies were much more vocal in their support for the inclusion of 
human rights in the CSCE, making Basket III a bigger part of the CSCE negotiations than 
Kissinger would have liked.  When Kissinger was challenged on Basket III and the 
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troubled negotiations between the East and West by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko, Kissinger responded that the Americans were trying to stay out of those issues, 
leaving it up to Gromyko to sort them out with America’s allies.  Kissinger even stated
that, “Basket III—it’s too intellectual for me.  There is a French text and there is a 
Russian text, so it’s between you and the French. […] We’re staying out of it.”286  
Kissinger was no advocate of Basket III or of the CSCE in general.  In a meeting with 
President Ford, Kissinger informed the President that the only reason language on 
“freedom of movement” and “human contacts” were included in the CSCE negotiations
was because of the insistence of the European powers and the political Left.  While 
giving a status report on the CSCE to Ford, Kissinger stated that “The big hang-up is on 
freedom of movement. It is meaningless—it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are 
going along with it.”287  In part the CSCE was able to get away with discussing human 
rights just because Kissinger had little regard for the Conference.  Believing that it would 
not amount to very much he did not find it worth his time to block its inclusion in the 
final version of the text.
The administration also was facing pressure to change its strategy with regard to
human rights because American public opinion had come out in favor of adding human 
rights to America’s foreign policy.  This was especially so in the wake of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, which prepared the American public to support the inclusion of 
human rights as part of the CSCE because the public debate had made the issue of human 
rights so well known.  The popularity of human rights with the public demonstrated to 
America’s foreign policy makers that human rights would have to be taken into account 
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in order to gain the public’s support for a foreign policy initiative.288  The administration 
was already receiving warning signs that the American public would be reluctant to 
support its foreign policy approach if it did not take human rights into account.289  In the 
eight months between President Ford’s reluctant signature of the 1974 Trade Act, which 
included the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and the President’s trip to Helsinki to sign the 
Final Act, the most important test of the President’s human rights approach was his 
refusal to meet with the exiled Soviet writer and critic of détente, Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn. 
Solzhenitsyn, who was arrested and deported from the Soviet Union in February 
1974, arrived in America a few months later and became an instant celebrity and a vocal
critic of the President’s détente policy and especially the CSCE.  Solzhenitsyn was 
outspoken in his support for open confrontation with the Soviet Union, believing that the
Soviet regime was inherently evil and that it could not be dealt with as if it were any 
other normal country.  Solzhenitsyn further viewed the White House’s détente policy as 
an example of the West’s moral weakness, claiming that détente was akin to appeasement 
and that the whole policy ran counter to the liberal and democratic spirit of America, 
believing that détente and the CSCE would go down in history as another Munich-like 
moment of appeasement.290  Solzhenitsyn stated of the CSCE in a speech given before 
the AFL-CIO Conference in Washington on June 30, 1975 that:
The European negotiators of the 35 countries for two years now have painfully 
been negotiating and their nerves were stretched to the breaking point and they 
finally gave in.  A few women from the Communist countries can now marry 
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foreigners.  And a few newspapermen are now going to be permitted to travel a 
little more than before.  They give 1/1,000th of what natural law should provide.  
Matters which people should be able to do even before such negotiations are 
undertaken.  And already there is joy.  And here in the West we hear many voices, 
saying ‘Look, they’re making concessions; it’s time to sign.’  […]  What sort of 
agreement would this be?  The proposed agreement is the funeral of Eastern 
Europe.  It means that Western Europe would finally, once and for all, sign away 
Eastern Europe, stating that it is perfectly willing to see Eastern Europe be 
crushed and overwhelmed once and for all, but please don’t bother us.291
Solzhenitsyn’s rousing speech at the AFL-CIO, with its and caustic criticism of détente 
and the CSCE, was well attended.  Sitting behind Solzhenitsyn were many powerful 
members of Congress, especially on the American political right, as well as a few 
members of the Ford administration, such as Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, all 
of who were aware that the purpose of the event was to undermine the President’s foreign 
policy.292 On July 2nd, two days after Solzhenitsyn’s speech, Republican Senators Strom 
Thurmond and Jesse Helms contacted President Ford’s counselor and requested that the 
President meet with Solzhenitsyn before the writer was scheduled to depart Washington
three days later.293  President Ford declined the Senators’ offer, citing scheduling
difficulties. In fact, the President was supposed to be in Ohio on July 3rd and July 4th was 
a holiday.  According to Henry Kissinger, President Ford sensed that the meeting was an 
attempt by the Republican Party’s right-wing to embarrass the President on his foreign 
policy since Solzhenitsyn was such a vocal critic of détente and of the CSCE.294  Despite 
appeals from the Secretary of Defense and Ford’s White House Chief of Staff, Donald 
Rumsfeld, to meet with Solzhenitsyn, the President recognized that to have met with the 
author just a few weeks prior to his trip to Helsinki to sign the Final Act would have 
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totally undercut the administration’s message and policies.  Kissinger reaffirmed this 
argument in a State Department news conference a few days after the incident, remarking
that he respected the author, but added that, “From the point of view of foreign policy the 
symbolic affect of [Solzhenitsyn meeting with senior officials] can be disadvantageous –
which has nothing to do with a respect either for the man or for his message.”295  The 
meeting would also have offended Brezhnev, with who the State Department had pleaded 
for the release of Solzhenitsyn to the West on compassionate grounds, promising not to 
exploit the author’s presence in the US.  Although Kissinger acknowledged having given
Gerald Ford a copy of Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago early in his presidency, he 
feared that relations with the Soviet Union would suffer unduly if the administration 
looked too supportive of the author.296
Many members of Congress and the press criticized the President for his actions.  
They viewed the President’s trip to Helsinki after his snub of Solzhenitsyn as evidence of 
the administration’s lack of interest in human rights.  Public opinion polls demonstrated a
drop in the President’s popularity after the President’s rebuff of Solzhenitsyn.  A Gallup 
Poll taken just before the incident showed a fifty-one percent approval rating, while a 
Harris Poll a week later reflected a ten percent drop.297  Many Americans simply did not 
know about the inclusion of human rights in the Final Act, or perceived Basket III as less 
important than the other provisions in the Final Act which ostensibly benefited the Soviet 
Union.  Therefore it is not surprising that the public’s reaction to the CSCE was 
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overwhelmingly negative.  Editorials widely condemned the Final Act and implored
President Ford not to sign it.  The Wall Street Journal even ran an editorial entitled 
“Jerry, Don’t Go,” where it made the case that the Final Act gave the Soviets too much in 
return for very little.  The article also associated the President’s failure to meet with 
Solzhenitsyn and his acquiescence to the Soviet Union in Helsinki as evidence that Ford 
had become “chief apologist” to the Soviets.298  Many in the West focused their criticism 
of the Final Act on the compromises the document made with the Soviets, specifically the 
“inviolability of borders.”  This was the case made especially by those critics with ethnic 
ties to the “captive nations.” They viewed the Final Act as a concession to the Soviets 
which implicitly ended America’s longstanding support for the Baltic nations and the 
Ukrainians. As Kissinger noted in his memoirs, every side of the political spectrum had 
their own complaints about the Final Act.  Conservatives, like Ronald Reagan and Henry 
Jackson, wanted ideological combat without compromise.  They feared that any summit 
with the Soviets would “confuse the democracies.”  Liberals argued that the Final Act
paid insufficient attention to human rights.299    
Negotiations concerning the Final Act lasted twenty-two months after beginning 
in the summer of 1973.  Initially, a final agreement seemed to have been in the works in 
May 1974, but the Watergate scandal, as well as leadership changes in Europe delayed 
the completion of the agreement for over a year.  The Soviets fought against the inclusion 
of human rights to the agenda of the CSCE throughout the negotiations, but they 
ultimately reasoned that Basket III could ultimately be watered down, if they succeeded 
in pushing through language which asserted that the principles of sovereignty and non-
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intervention in internal affairs were as valid as those points endorsing human rights.  
Therefore, for the Soviets, the language which asserted the primacy of sovereignty made 
any stipulations on human rights moot since they were unenforceable.  The Soviets also 
consistently believed that they were the ones who had won in the negotiations, since the 
West ultimately acknowledged the Soviet Union’s borders and sovereignty.  Given the 
intricacies of political infighting among the thirty-five participants, each of them
possessing an equal voice, deliberations over the exact wording of the declaration were 
painstakingly tedious.  In many cases negotiations came to a complete standstill as 
diplomats engaged in bitter debates over the exact phrasing and translation of a string of
words or expression, such as the benefit of “equal applicability” versus “equal 
validity.”300
In spite of these handicaps, the CSCE wrapped up its work in the summer of 
1975. The resulting document was not legally binding but nonetheless one that the 
Soviet Union agreed to uphold in spite of its explicit provisions on human rights.  
General Secretary Brezhnev gave his agreement to the Final Act on July 31, 1975. “We 
proceed from the assumption that all countries represented at the Conference will 
translate into life the understandings that have been reached.  As regards to the Soviet 
Union, this is exactly what it will do.”301  Meanwhile, for the West, the text of the 
Helsinki Final Act represented the linkage between human rights and international 
security.  To this effect, the Final Act stated that, “The participating States recognize the 
universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an 
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essential factor for the peace, justice and wellbeing necessary to ensure the development 
of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.”302  
President Ford acknowledged the Final Act’s attention to human rights during his speech 
in Helsinki, stating, while looking directly at Brezhnev:
To my country these [Basket III principles] are not clichés or empty phrases.  We 
take this work and these words very seriously.  We will spare no effort to ease 
tensions and to solve problems between us.  But it is important that you realize the 
deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this Conference has made 
regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, information.303
Despite Ford’s words, and the assurances Brezhnev had given that he would support the 
terms of the Final Act, the Soviet Union failed to comply.  The only means of measuring 
compliance was up to Soviet human rights activists themselves, as well as members of 
the American Congress and other policy makers who were determined not to allow the 
Helsinki Final Act’s promises on human rights “turn out to be a sad footnote in future 
history books.”304
The Helsinki Final Act and Compliance
Since the Final Act lacked any formal enforcement it was up to activists and 
policy makers to ensure that each signatory nation lived up to the pledges made in the 
declaration.  There were provisions for review meetings to be held periodically, such as 
one in Belgrade in 1977 and Madrid in November 1980, but this did not necessarily mean
that signatories of the Helsinki Final Act were held accountable if they violated the 
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agreement.  Therefore enforcement, or at least monitoring the implementation of the 
Final Act, was up to the dissidents themselves in the Soviet Union as well as activists and
the American Congress, all of whom formed institutions charged with monitoring 
compliance.  Dissidents in the Soviet Union, most notably Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Yuri 
Orlov, were among the first activists to read the text of the Helsinki Accords and believe
that it was possible to form a monitoring commission that would report on and publicize 
the Soviet government’s failure to live up to the principles of human rights it had 
affirmed in the Final Act.  At the same time the Soviet dissidents established what 
became known as the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group (MHWG), politicians in the United 
States undertook the formation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, also known as the US Helsinki Commission.  The role of the Commission was to 
research compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and make official recommendations 
based on its findings that US policy makers would take into account when crafting 
policy.  
The simultaneous creation of such parallel bodies represented the maturation of a 
dialogue on human rights between the dissidents in the Soviet Union and American 
policy makers.  Scarcely two years before Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick of New 
Jersey introduced her idea for the US Helsinki Commission; Congress was debating the
merits of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  Similar to the debate concerning the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, the US Helsinki Commission gave Soviet dissidents the opportunity 
to testify before the US Congress and make their stories known, becoming a vital tool for 
the dissidents behind the MHWG in Moscow.  To help the US Congress in their 
deliberations on human rights issues in the Soviet Union, the MHWG published a digest 
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of infractions on human rights taking place on the Soviet Union, a publication much like
Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy which came before it, and whose text often became the 
basis for the research by the US Helsinki Commission.  For the Soviet dissidents, the 
relationship between the MHWG and the US Helsinki Commission became their most 
powerful connection with the West, offering them the best chance for a genuine change 
in Soviet policy, just as the Commission viewed itself as the best means of affecting a 
change in Soviet human rights policy.
Unlike earlier treaties and international agreement, the complete text of the 
Helsinki Final Act was published in all the Soviet newspapers, an unprecedented move, 
since traditionally the text of international agreements were only distributed to specialists
and never made their way into the popular press.  The Soviet government was proud of 
the document, boasting that the Final Act was a political victory, given its language on 
the permanence of its borders and sovereignty.  But for the Soviet citizens who read the 
text of the Final Act its promises on “freer of movement,” “human rights,” and 
“fundamental freedoms” stood in complete contradiction to the reality of everyday life. 
Activist Ludmilla Alexeyeva noted that the Helsinki Final Act was full of empty 
guarantees, stating, “I had glanced over the thirty-thousand word document, found the 
section on human rights, then stopped reading.  The section contained some nice 
promises, but such promises had long ago ceased to impress me.”305  
While Alexeyeva found the Final Act as full of empty promises and ineffectual in 
the long-term struggle for human rights, her colleague and fellow dissident, Yuri Orlov,
saw the Final Act as the perfect opportunity to press the Soviet government on the 
question of human rights.  For Orlov, the Final Act was significant because it explicitly
                                                
305 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 280.
128
linked the notion of international security to human rights by making the case that the 
way a society dealt with the outside world was a reflection of the way it treated its own 
citizens.  According to this logic Orlov believed that the only way to provide 
international security in a nuclear age was to ensure that the Soviet Union recognized 
basic human rights, and this could only be accomplished through the West’s acceptance 
and support for the human rights movement there.306  Orlov therefore believed that the 
Soviet human rights movement had the opportunity to press the outside world into 
monitoring the Soviet performance on human rights because the Final Act offered human 
rights guarantees as part of a package alongside assurances on international peace and 
cooperation.307  For Orlov the West had to become an active participant in the human 
rights struggle for the sake of international security.  Convincing the West was an uphill 
battle for Orlov given the apprehensiveness Western governments had felt in becoming 
involved in the Soviet human rights movement.  Orlov expressed his frustration over the 
West’s inaction by commenting: 
I can’t understand why the Western governments don’t protest the persecution of 
human rights activists.  Can’t they understand that human rights abuses in the 
USSR present a danger to the West?  Haven’t they learned any lessons after 
making a deal with a dictator in Munich in 1939 [sic.]?  Can’t they understand 
that Soviet dissidents are their natural allies?  We have the same ideology, and it’s 
not that we have borrowed it from them; we’ve come to it on our own.308
Orlov presumed that the West knew the Soviet Union would fail to live up to their 
promised human rights standards and that the purpose of forming a Helsinki Watch 
Group would be to “change this ‘Munich’ approach of the West” that had dominated 
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détente.309  He was not alone in believing it was possible to pressure the West into taking
action against the Soviet Union on the basis of the Helsinki Accords.  Andrei Amalrik 
argued for the creation of academic “seminars” in both the East and the West that would
monitor each nation’s compliance with the Final Act.  Amalrik felt that such an 
international network would prove difficult for the KGB to breakup since it would be 
intimately tied with similar bodies in the West.310 Soviet Jewish activist Natan 
Shcharansky urged Orlov and Amalrik to proceed, “Let us appeal to the foreign public 
[…] to form committees for monitoring human rights on the basis of the Final Act. […] If 
they do that and it becomes the norm in the West, then after a while we can create the 
same sort of committee at home with less risk of persecution.”311  Under the leadership of 
Yuri Orlov, fellow dissidents Amalrik, Shcharansky, Alexeyeva, and seven other 
prominent Moscow activists came together to officially organize the MHWG.
The MHWG, which was known officially as the “Public Group to Assist the 
Implementation of the Helsinki Accord in the USSR,” presented itself as trying to help 
the Soviet Union in implementing the Final Act.  Orlov’s vision for the group was 
admittedly idealistic.  He imagined that outside nations would help play a mediating role 
between the Soviet state and people, envisioning the participation of citizens from all 
signatory countries pressuring their governments to abide by the principles expounded by 
the Final Act.312  The mission of the MHWG was to prepare reports on cases of human 
rights abuse, or any other infraction of the Helsinki Final Act, and distribute them to the
Soviet government and the governments of the thirty-four other signatories to the Final 
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Act.  As Alexeyeva put it, this documentation of Soviet violations of the Final Act 
“would use the governments of the West to force our own government into dialogue with 
us.”313  The idea behind the MHWG was not unique, since it had been tried before.  For 
instance, the MHWG included many of the very same activists who had been participants 
in the dissident movement since the 1966 trial of Andrei Sinyavskii and Yuli Daniel.  
These were also the same people who had written Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy, which 
similarly attempted to reach out to the West in order to change Soviet policy.  According 
to Alexeyeva though, the main difference between the MHWG and efforts that came 
before was the fact that the Helsinki Final Act gave the dissidents a new focus, one which 
made it possible for politicians in the West to understand what the dissidents wanted.314
According to historian Joshua Rubenstein, this new post-Helsinki focus which 
meant reaching out to the West and using the text of the Helsinki Final Act as a means of 
protesting Soviet policy, allowed for the various strains of dissent within the Soviet 
Union to come together and fight for a common cause under the universalistic emblem of
“human rights.”315  The dissident movement’s Helsinki connection pushed dissidents of 
all types, whether they were intellectuals, Jewish, Crimean Tatar, Seventh Day Adventist, 
or any others, to put forward a common political program advertised under the 
internationally palatable framework of human rights.  In an unprecedented fashion, the 
MHWG united the disparate nationalist and religious dissident voices under what 
Rubenstein termed the “common vocabulary” of human rights.316  This blanket term of 
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human rights gave the MHWG the ability to tackle a wide variety of issues that it argued
concerned human rights.  Such issues included the fate of imprisoned Crimean Tatar 
activist Mustafa Dzhemilev, the KGB’s examination of activists’ mail, the treatment of 
psychological prisoners, the persecution of Pentecostal religious groups, and Jewish 
emigration.  The ability of the MHWG to engage in a these issues was also made possible 
by the loose structure of the organization.  It accentuated the universal nature of their 
human rights agenda while making it difficult for the Soviet authorities to arrest all its
members.  The MHWG, in the words of Alexeyeva, “lacked structure,” meaning there 
was no voting, no application to join, no procedures, and no need to reach a consensus on 
every issue.317  The documents the group created also never required a consensus.
Obliging every member of the group to agree and vote on a document and its language 
would have slowed down the entire process and hampered the group’s mission of 
publishing as many documents as possible.  Therefore only those members who signed a 
particular document were responsible for its content.  Each document written by the 
MHWG was scholarly in nature and addressed a specific article in the Final Act that was 
violated.  Orlov noted that each document was “scrupulously accurate, deliberately 
academic, even pedantic in tone, and focused precisely on specific violations of the 
Helsinki Accords.”318  Such an approach did not require the group to put forth its own set 
of political beliefs, since its members argued that it merely sought to report violations of 
human rights in the Soviet Union regardless of their origins.  For example many of the 
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reports produced by the group dealt with the persecution of religious groups 
notwithstanding the fact that many of the group’s members were not religious.319
The MHWG could not be a success unless its efforts received attention from
Western policy makers.  In spite of what was perceived as an overall failing of the 
Helsinki Final Act in coaxing the Soviet Union to shift course on human rights, dissident
Andrei Amalrik argued that the one success of the Final Act in the Soviet Union was the 
formation of the MHWG, which drew the attention of the West to violations of human 
rights in the Soviet Union.  As Amalrik wrote in his assessment of the Final Act a year 
after its passage,
The successful work of this group [MHWG] and its sympathizers could gradually 
force the USSR to fulfill the obligations it undertook.  Therefore the attitudes of 
the Soviet authorities and the West to this group will be an indication of how 
seriously each takes Helsinki.  It is in the West’s own interests to help this group, 
as well as the Movement for Human Rights in the USSR in their struggle to 
democratize the Soviet system and to turn it into a more open and less aggressive 
society.320
For Amalrik and the other members of the MHWG, their success was in fact limited by
the receptiveness of the West to their struggle.  Like Orlov, Amalrik confessed his 
frustration with the West’s reluctance to take action on human rights, writing that the 
West “fusses over the USSR continually, as over a spoiled child,” adding that the West 
“is afraid to ‘offend’ Soviet leaders even slightly, saying that they will ‘become 
obstinate’, ‘become worse’, and so on.  Sometimes the West loses any kind of moral 
yardstick.”321
For the dissidents, their most loyal, if not occasionally fickle allies remained the 
Western news correspondents.  They made it possible for them to get their message out, 
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especially once the American embassy had banned its diplomatic personnel from 
maintaining personal relationships with the locals.  The MHWG aggressively encouraged 
the participation of foreign news journalists in their movement by artfully arranging the 
public release of their documents and information through staging elaborate press 
conferences with members of the Western media.  These news conferences were held as 
often as once a week and came staffed with interpreters, and plenty of onion-skin copies 
of MHWG’s documents and statements for the Western press.322  Alexeyeva concluded
that the MHWG and issues related to human rights in the USSR must have been
receiving constant coverage in the West judging from the attendance at their press 
conferences.323 Not only was the West paying attention to the issues faced by Soviet 
dissidents, but many of MHWG press conferences were broadcast back to the Soviet Bloc 
countries by Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America as a means of 
spreading the news of the group’s existence and actions.324  
Western journalists were not only professionally involved in the lives of the 
dissidents, but many were often their personal friends as well.  George Krimsky of the 
Associate Press (AP) was mentioned by Andrei Sakharov as being one of the few 
journalists with whom he had developed a personal relationship.325  Similarly many other 
journalists reported being invited to stay with Russian dissidents in their summer dachas.  
Such friendship was not uncommon between the dissidents and the American press.
They were naturally attracted to each other based on their shared desire for the freedom 
of movement and the freedom of speech.  Similarly the Western press and the Soviet 
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dissidents formed a symbiotic relationship, where foreign news correspondents sought 
out the dissident’s stories as great material to report back home, while the dissidents 
sought out the foreign press as a medium through which to send their message abroad and 
to evade arrest (see Chapter 1).  It was therefore not at all uncommon for American 
correspondents to receive threats very similar to those the dissidents did, in some cases 
being subjected to random arrest and harassment.  It was during a trip by Krimsky and his 
family to Sakharov’s dacha that the police had burst in and dragged Krimsky to the police 
station under the pretext that the AP journalist had entered a zone excluded to 
foreigners.326  Similarly, journalist Emil Sveilis, who opened the first United Press 
International bureau in Leningrad, recounted how he once left to meet a dissident friend, 
parking his Zhiguli car near two militiamen on duty at the hotel Astoria where he was to 
meet his contact.  After his meeting, Sveilis drove off in his Zhiguli, only to notice that 
the steering wheel was not turning correctly.  He pulled over to discover his front tires 
had been replaced by completely bald ones screwed on by a single bolt, meaning as soon 
has he would have turned, he would have lost his tires and likely driven into one of 
Leningrad’s canals.327  Krimsky’s and Sveilis’s stories are far from unique among foreign 
news correspondents working in Moscow who befriended the dissidents and made them a 
major subject in their news reports.  Given these close relationships, the Soviet 
authorities monitored the correspondents closely and suspected many of them of having 
ties to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  These suspicions focused particularly on
Krymski, Christopher Wren of The New York Times, and Newsweek’s Alfred Friendly.328  
Despite the allegations and the repeated threats, many Western journalists continued their 
                                                




friendship with the members of the MHWG. Many journalists had come to believe that 
they were involved in much the same fight as the dissidents and that they were 
performing a worthy cause by making the West aware of them.
Besides providing friendship and a receptive audience to the dissidents, the 
journalists also provided them with access to American politicians and policy makers. It 
was Christopher Wren who made it possible for Valentine Turchin, a member of the 
MHWG and the head of the Moscow Chapter of Amnesty International, to first meet 
Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, the Congresswoman behind the idea for the US
Helsinki Commission.329  Fenwick, a first-term Congresswoman from New Jersey, was 
the least senior participant of a nineteen member US Congressional delegation led by 
House Speaker Carl Albert that traveled to Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Soviet Union in 
August 1975, just after President Ford had signed the Helsinki Final Act. The 
Congresswoman was most interested in meeting genuine Russians, and her enthusiasm 
for doing so could hardly be contained by the more seasoned members of the delegation.  
During a reception at the American Embassy, Fenwick discussed the dissidents with 
Wren, who was friends with many of them.  Wren agreed to take the Congresswoman the 
next day to a meeting he had planned with Turchin.  In an experience Fenwick later 
remarked as being out of “a spy movie,” Wren drove the Congresswoman to Turchin’s 
modest Moscow apartment.330  Also attending this meeting between Turchin, Wren, and 
Fenwick was Yuri Orlov, who used the occasion to raise the prospect of cooperation 
between the Soviet human rights movement and US policy makers on the basis of Basket 
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III of the Helsinki Final Act.331  Orlov also presented Fenwick with a document entitled 
“An Appeal to the United States Congressmen.” It discussed the conditions experienced 
by political prisoners.  It included fifteen demands, some of which asked for the abolition
of forced labor camps, torture, and restrictions on mail.
Besides meeting with Turchin and Orlov, Fenwick also held an audience with 
many other dissidents during her short stay in the Soviet Union, many of whom traveled 
to meet with the Congresswoman at her Moscow hotel.  Fenwick explained:
We would meet them [the dissidents] at night at hotels in Moscow and Leningrad 
[…]  I would ask them, ‘How do you dare to come see us here?’ ‘Don’t you 
understand?’ they would say.  ‘That’s our only hope.  We’ve seen you.  Now the 
KGB knows you’ve seen us.’  I felt, my God, it’s like being in the Atlantic in the 
middle of a terrible storm, and seeing people go by in rafts, and we are trying to 
pick them up, but can’t.  But at least we have our searchlights on them.332
In particular Fenwick was deeply moved by the story of Lilia Roitburd, a refusnik with an 
“ashen face” and “tiny ravaged eyes.” Roitburd, between tears, confided to the 
Congresswoman about the plight of her family following her husband’s application for an 
exit visa to Israel, a story Fenwick acknowledged brought her to tears and gave her 
nightmares years later.333  Meeting with these dissidents left a lasting impression on the 
Congresswoman, who on her last day in Moscow met with Brezhnev, and asked the 
Soviet leader to look into specific cases of human rights abuse.  The Soviet leader later 
commented that Fenwick was “obsessed” about the issue.334
Shortly after returning to Washington from her trip to the Soviet Union, Fenwick 
introduced her idea of a Helsinki monitoring commission in H.R. 9466, a bill that would 
authorize the creation of the US Helsinki Commission to monitor compliance with the 
                                                
331 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 283.




Final Act.  Fenwick, like many others, was concerned that the Final Act conceded too 
much to the Soviets, and reasoned that a commission tasked with monitoring compliance 
with the Final Act could help hold the Soviet government accountable.  Fenwick 
envisioned that her Helsinki monitoring commission would consist of six members from 
the House, six from the Senate, and three members of the executive branch, one each 
from the Commerce, State, and Defense Departments.  The Commission would undertake 
the investigation of allegations of human rights abuses and publish periodic reports on 
compliance, as well as respond to Congressional requests for information.  Fenwick 
imagined that a record which documented violations of the Helsinki Final Act would be
necessary so Congress would have documentation at hand before making decisions 
concerning trade, international copyright laws, or any other similar agreements with the 
Soviet Union or any other signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.335
Fenwick’s motivation for advocating the creation of the US Helsinki Commission
stemmed from her sense of moral outrage at the treatment of the Soviet dissidents she 
encountered.  Fenwick stated of her experience in Moscow that, “I went to Russia with a 
delegation from the House of Representatives and, for me, a somewhat distant and 
theoretical exercise in international diplomacy became a dramatically present and 
personal issue.”336  Fenwick was not alone in coming to the conclusion that the United 
States could do more to safeguard and protect the dissidents.  Representative Joshua 
Eilberg of Pennsylvania, after returning from a similar trip to the Soviet Union in June 
1975, argued that the United States should come to the aid of the dissidents, dismissing 
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the Administration’s détente policy as detrimental to relations with the Soviet Union and 
the dissidents.  Eilberg stated that because of what he heard from speaking with the 
dissidents, “[I]t is my firm belief that persons who claim we are hurting the cause of the 
people who are trying to leave Russia by publicly supporting them as a group or 
individually are wrong.  Everything we do, including putting restrictions in the trade bill 
is an asset to their cause.”337  In a similar fashion to Congressman Eilberg, 
Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman of New York projected the way she believed a
changed American policy would benefit the Soviet dissidents, particularly in allowing the 
refusniks the right to emigrate.  Holtzman stated, “I am convinced […] that if there is to 
be any freedom of emigration in the Soviet Union, and if those who have sought to 
emigrate are to be protected from cruel penalties, it can only come about through United 
States pressure. […]  In fact we were told time and time by Soviet citizens that without 
continued American pressure the situation is very grim.”338  Overall this group of 
congressmen who traveled to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1975 concluded from 
their meetings with the dissidents that they most of all wanted Western attention, and not 
to be forgotten by the West.339
These trips to the Soviet Union to meet with the dissidents, much like the debate 
over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, made Congress increasingly active in matters 
relating to human rights.  For many of these politicians, the story of the dissidents was 
simple and compelling, filling the role of the noble freedom fighters going up against the 
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evil Soviet Empire.  The story of the plight of the dissidents in the Soviet Union had just 
as much appeal for America’s politicians as it did for America’s journalists.  Many 
congressmen bought into the dissident’s rhetoric and campaigned on their behalf in 
America, raising the issue especially during the 1976 election, where candidates running 
for both Congress and the Presidency criticized the incumbent Ford’s Soviet policy.  In 
particular, Democratic Presidential candidate, Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia, 
capitalized on the unpopularity of the President’s Soviet policy by going so far as to 
dispatch campaign advisor Eleanor Holmes Norton to Moscow to meet with Andrei 
Sakharov and other dissidents in order to learn their situation and demonstrate the 
Governor’s dedication to promoting a foreign policy based on human rights.340
Fenwick’s, and many others, sense of moral outrage in coming to the aid of the 
Soviet dissidents drew the ire of Secretary of State Kissinger.  He took the view that
Fenwick’s proposed commission would further damage Soviet relations based on its 
insistence on human rights.  Kissinger also believed that the US Helsinki Commission
represented an unprecedented intrusion of Congress into the executive branch’s 
autonomy over foreign affairs. As a result of Kissinger’s position, many in the State 
Department refused to participate in Fenwick’s Commission, lobbying Congress not to 
pass the legislation.341  Despite Kissinger’s criticism, President Ford was receptive to the 
idea of the US Helsinki Commission, conceding years later in an interview with
Fenwick’s biographer, Amy Schapiro, that the idea had some merit.  Ford told Schapiro, 
“Having signed the accord I felt it was absolutely essential to proceed with the review 
process.  If we were going to implement the Helsinki Accords we were going to have to 
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monitor it.”342  President Ford therefore quietly, and with a small audience in attendance, 
signed the bill authorizing the creation of the Commission on June 3, 1976.  Ford’s quiet 
approval of the legislation was done so as not to draw attention to the fact that the 
administration had consistently opposed the Commission.343  Without coincidence,
Congress passed the legislation authorizing the creation of the US Helsinki Commission 
the same day in May 1976 Fenwick informed her colleagues in the House that the 
MHWG had been formed to carry out the function of reporting violations of the Helsinki 
Final Act.
The human rights movement in the Soviet Union hailed the achievement of 
Congresswoman Fenwick in establishing the US Helsinki Commission.  The founding of 
the Commission came as a pleasant surprise to Yuri Orlov, who saw it as an incredible 
coincidence that an American Congresswoman he had met the previous summer had 
formed a monitoring commission with similar aims as Orlov’s MHWG.344  In September 
1976, Orlov wrote a letter to Fenwick, informing the Congresswoman that the MHWG
would send their findings and reports directly to her commission for review.345  Despite 
the hard work of the US Helsinki Commission, Alexeyeva conceded that it would 
ultimately be futile in forcing the Soviet Union into real change. “Save for a novel 
commission started by an eccentric congresswoman, the West seemed unlikely to respond 
to the pleas of the Helsinki group.”346  When Alexeyeva was forced into exile in the 
United States in 1977, she could not help but comment how ignorant people in 
Washington were of the dissident movement.  “The words ‘dissident’ and ‘refusnik’ were 
                                                
342 President Gerald Ford, 30 August 2001, quoted in Schapiro, 175.
343 Schapiro, 175.
344 Goldberg, The Final Act, 63.
              345 Goldberg, The Final Act, 63-64.
346 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 284.
141
being used interchangeably, and some otherwise knowledgeable people naturally 
assumed that most dissidents were Jewish and that the human rights movement was an 
offshoot of the Jewish movement.”347  Despite the greatest of intentions in founding the 
US Helsinki Commission, many American policy makers still lacked an adequate 
understanding of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union.
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CONCLUSION & EPILOGUE
By the late 1970s the Soviet human rights movement seemed to have become 
very much dependent on its relationship with the United States, as actions taken in 
America were often reflected one way or another on the dissident movement.348  The US
Helsinki Commission laid the groundwork for further American involvement and interest 
in the dissident movement that nonetheless proved to be ineffective.  This was especially 
the case after the election of Jimmy Carter as President in November 1976, who ran 
against the Nixon/Ford-Kissinger policy of détente by championing human rights as the 
most essential component of America’s new foreign policy.  Carter’s support for human 
rights was made clear in his January 20, 1977 inaugural address by stating: 
Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. 
Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share 
with us an abiding respect for individual human rights. We do not seek to 
intimidate, but it is clear that a world which others can dominate with impunity 
would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people.349
Despite Carter’s commitment to human rights, his rhetoric was bound by the tough reality
on the ground, and his administration proved unable to intervene on behalf of the 
dissident movement when it needed direct American assistance.  
Initially many of the dissidents welcomed Carter’s challenge to détente.  
Alexeyeva discussed how this change in American policy towards a human rights focus 
was first made possible by the passage of Fenwick’s Helsinki monitoring Commission
and then cemented by Carter’s election, writing that with the election of a new American 
President, “Our most optimistic projections now seemed within reach: it appeared likely 
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that the new US foreign policy would include insistence that the Soviets live up to the 
promises made in Helsinki.  The alliance of Western politicians and Soviet dissidents was 
starting to emerge.”350  But 1977 proved to be a challenging year for the dissident 
movement, despite the new American President.  In early January, the KGB raided the 
apartments of several of the MHWG’s members, including Orlov’s.  A few days later on 
January 8, 1977, a bomb exploded in the Moscow Metro, killing several people, an act of 
terrorism the Soviet government blamed on the dissident movement.351  Given the
harrowing situation faced by the Soviet dissidents at the beginning of 1977, Andrei 
Sakharov composed a letter to President Carter, appealing for his help and urging the 
President to be steadfast in his resolve to support human rights in the Soviet Union.  The 
President responded to Sakhov two weeks later, thanking him for his letter and reiterating 
the commitment to human rights he had made during his inaugural address.  Sakharov 
was impressed with the new President’s dedication to human rights and his strong sense 
of morality, commenting that it was “striking” that “the head of a great power had 
announced an unambiguous commitment to the international defense of human rights.”352
But Sakharov further believed that the President’s inconsistent policies proved fatal for
the Soviet dissidents.  In particular, Sakharov criticized the President’s slow response to 
crises, and lack of following through with regard to human rights cases.  Sakharov argued 
that this inconsistency allowed Soviet leaders to believe that Carter was “manageable,”
permitting the Soviets to take advantage of any opportunity to arrest and repress the
dissidents.353
                                                
350 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 288-289.
351 Sakharov, Memoirs, 462-463.
352 Sakharov, Memoirs, 464-465.
353 Sakharov, Memoirs, 464-465, 470.
144
In spite of America’s commitment towards human rights in the Soviet Union, 
through President Carter and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and US Helsinki 
Commission that preceded his election, the dissident movement was thoroughly crushed 
by the early 1980s.  Orlov, followed by all the other members of the Moscow Helsinki 
Watch Group were arrested one after the other.  In fact a letter Orlov received from 
Congressman Dante Fascel, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations as 
well as the US Helsinki Commission, was cited as evidence that the human rights 
movement was taking its marching orders from the American Government, with the 
Soviets alleging a conspiracy involving the MHWG and the US Helsinki Commission.354  
Many of the dissidents, such as Orlov, Alexeyeva, and Sakharov, ended up abroad with 
their citizenship taken away.  In October 1977 a new Constitution came into effect in the 
Soviet Union, which contained numerous references to the very democratic rights the 
dissidents were striving for such as the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly among 
other democratic rights.355  Much like Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act, the democratic 
provisions of the 1977 Constitution were treated insincerly by the Soviet government.  
The delineation of these democratic rights nevertheless gave the Soviet dissidents more 
confidence to challenge the Soviet government to live up to the rule of its own law.    
In several respects, this dialogue on human rights may not have been much of a 
dialogue at all since American politicians could not in reality help the dissidents despite
their best of intentions.  The drive of American policy makers to come to the help of the 
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Soviet dissidents really was motivated both by idealism and the political opportunism that 
supporting human rights represented.  This was particularly appealing in the American 
domestic political environment that followed the raucous nature of the 1960s and 1970s, 
which included the Civil Rights and Anti-War Movements, the Vietnam War, and the 
Watergate scandal. In this environment the noble support for human rights in the Soviet 
Union made sense.  In addition some elected officials used the dissident issue for the 
purpose of advancing their own political agenda by challenging détente.
Given the polemical temptations posed by the issue of human rights for American 
foreign policy, it seemed that this dialogue forged between the Moscow dissident 
movement and American politicians proved damaging to the dissidents.  This was 
especially true since the Soviet government was able to capitalize on the increasing 
closeness between the movement and the West to push forward with the mass arrest and 
exile of the Soviet human rights leaders.  Despite these arrests, the human rights rhetoric 
used by both the West and the dissidents did succeed in accomplishing the limited short-
term objectives of both groups.  American policy makers succeeded in being reelected or 
in satisfying their moral sense in helping the Soviet dissidents, while forcing the Soviets 
to accede to some minor concessions.  Similarly, the Soviet human rights activists 
became international celebrities, with a captive audience in the West.  The Soviet human 
rights movement also succeeded in consolidating several different strains of dissent under 
the umbrella of human rights, creating a new political network where none existed
before.  This alignment with the West also allowed for the temporary protection of some 
Soviet dissidents from KGB arrest and seizure, but it did not save the movement, since 
the American government was in fact powerless to force regime change in the Soviet 
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Union, or to prevent the Soviet government from crushing the movement, when it was 
challenged during Carter’s Presidency.
The dialogue on human rights launched by American news journalists in Moscow 
conflated a rather small group of dissident into something much larger, ultimately 
resulting in the destruction of the Soviet human rights movement.  This process began 
with the American journalists in the late 1960s, for whom the dissident movement 
satisfied their and the broader American public’s desire to find a moral cause to fight for 
during the Cold War.  Washington Post correspondent Peter Osnos summed up this 
perspective best in writing that the “[d]issidents in the Soviet Union say what most 
Americans want – and expect – to hear about the evils of communism.  Excessive 
dependence on them, however, creates a picture of that complex country as 
oversimplified in a way as Soviet reports about the United States being a land of a little 
more than poverty, violence, corruption, and racism.”356 This close relationship between 
the Western journalists and the Soviet dissidents was also cited by the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) as 
justification for arresting the dissidents in January 1977: 
According to our data, accredited Moscow correspondents from the United States, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, England, France and Italy are persistently 
encouraging the leaders of the anti-Soviet movement to use such methods as 
“addresses” to the governments of various countries, containing vile slander of 
Soviet life, “press conferences,” and open protests against the projects of the 
Soviet Union in their anti-Soviet activities.357
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The dissident movement truly was then, as Andrei Sakharov wrote, “a moral and not a 
pragmatic undertaking,” that for many American policy makers satisfied their need for a 
more moral and just foreign policy that was lacking in détente.358
In spite of all these arrests in the late 1970s, the Soviet human rights movement 
laid the groundwork for reforms which would take hold a decade later.  After the
unsuccessful and short reigns of Brezhnev’s successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin 
Chernenko, the Soviet leadership chose the much younger Mikhail Gorbachev to lead the 
nation.  Gorbachev, and others who came to power in the late 1980s, hailed from the 
Alexeyeva’s “thaw generation,” much like many of the dissidents.  These leaders were 
touched by the same events which defined the lives of the dissidents, such as the 
beginning and end of the Second World War, the death of Stalin, and Khrushchev’s 
Secret Speech.359  Alexeyeva optimistically opined in 1987 while working for Radio 
Liberty that, “Gorbachev defines ‘perestroika’ as the ‘acceleration of socio-economic 
development.’  Not only this general formula, but the specific measures in the socio-
economic sphere are measures taken from the arsenal of liberals and social-
democrats.”360  Gorbachev’s program of perestroika therefore encompassed some of the 
very rights the human rights movement had been fighting for, though only a decade later.
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